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SUMTER COUNTY, ALABAMA AND THE ORIGINS
OF THE VOTING RIGHTS ACT

Brian K. Landsberg*

I been in de war so long, I ain't got tired yit,
I been in de war so long, I ain't got tired yit,
Well, my head been wet wid de midnight dew,
The 'fo' -day star was a witness, too,
I been in de war so long en I ain't got tired yit. 1
-African-American of Sumter County
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The Voting Rights Act of 19652 employs a wide menu of innovative
techniques to secure the right to vote free from racial discrimination. The
"'
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I.
" HONEY IN THE ROCK;" THE RUBY PICKENS TARTT COLLECftON OF RELIGIOUS FOLK SONGS
FROM SUMTER COUNTY, ALABAMA 47 (Olivia & Jack Solomon eds., 1991) [hereinafter HONEY IN THE
ROCK].
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Act radically changed the enforcement of the Fifteenth Amendment/ by
relying less on the local federal courts and more on the Department of Justice, shifting the burden of justification away from those representing blacks
and onto voting officials, and making extensive use of a test that looked to
the effects of official action rather than requiring proof of discriminatory
purpose.4 These techniques were rooted in the litigation of the preceding
seven years. That litigation flowed from an unusual tacit partnership--black
citizens attempted to register to vote and the United States Department of
Justice brought suits when local registrars discriminatorily denied them the
vote.
Sumter County, Alabama exemplifies this process. To paraphrase the
song of a black Sumter Countian,5 local blacks had long been in a peaceful
struggle for the vote, with a small vanguard repeatedly applying to register.
Along with the '"fo' -day star," registration records bore mute witness to the
systematic discrimination they encountered. Within a few years of the passage of the first modern civil rights act in 1957,6 a newly reinvigorated Department of Justice exposed the practices that had denied many the right to
vote. The Department developed innovative legal theories, methods of
proof, and remedies in this and other similar cases. These would, in tum,
supply the tools for structuring a truly effective voting rights law.
The story of Sumter County reveals particular types of civil disobedience. Martin Luther King, Jr.'s Letter from the Birmingham Jail speaks of
7
just and unjust laws and justifies disobedience to the latter. The blacks who
sought to register to vote in Sumter County were in essence challenging the
unjust law regime of white supremacy. Their means were not marches or
sit-ins, but a much milder form of disobedience. By seeking to register to
vote in significant numbers, the blacks of Sumter County disobeyed the
customs, but not the laws, of Alabama. The real civil disobedience came
from the state and local officials, who systematically violated the Fifteenth
Amendment and sought to perpetuate the unjust and unlawful racial caste
system. Official disobedience took two forms: "massive resistance in the
sense of outright defiance of federal authority" and, more pervasively,
"open failure to comply with unquestioned standards of federal law until
forced to do so.''8 The response to all this, the Voting Rights Act, demon-

2.
Pub. L. No. 89-110, 79 Stat. 437 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 1971, 1973 to 1973bb-l
(1994)).
3.
U.S. CONST. amend. XV.
Voting Rights Act of 1965 § 2, 42 U.S.C. § 1973 (1994).
4.
HONEY IN THE ROCK, supra note I, at 47.
5.
6.
Civil Rights Act of 1957, Pub. L. No. 85-315, 71 Stat. 634 (codified as amended in scattered
sections of 28 and 42 U.S.C.).
7.
Martin Luther IGng, Jr., Letter from the Birmingham Jail (Apr. 16, 1963), available at
http://www.nobelprizes.com/nobel/peace/MLK-jail.html.
BURKE MARSHALL, fEDERALISM AND CIVIL RIGHTS 7 (1964). Marshall notes: "There is no
8.
parallel to be found in law enforcement." /d. He adds, "The crisis is more deplorable, of course, because
it is not private persons ... who are failing to comply with laws, but the states themselves, and the instrumentalities of state law." /d. at 8.
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strates the law generating power of disobedience. Lawyers played important
roles in all this. The black applicants for registration did not have their own
lawyers; indeed, the few Alabama lawyers willing to challenge the system
of white supremacy had their hands full. The passage of the 1957 Civil
Rights Act introduced a new set of lawyers into the picture, the Civil Rights
Division of the U.S. Department of Justice.9 Their presence emboldened
blacks to assert their right to vote. On the other side, the actions of Alabama
Attorney General Gallion and Sumter County Probate Judge Dearman, described below, are examples of lawyers using illegitimate tools to support
the illegal conduct of the local registrars.
Sumter County's story significantly supplements the two stories of the
origins of the Voting Rights Act that are more familiar to us. Most prominent in public consciousness is the March 1965 civil disobedience exercised
by civil rights marchers at the Edmund Pettus Bridge in Selma, Alabama,
and the brutal response by Alabama state troopers, Dallas County deputy
sheriffs, and their ~osse. 10 That assault, heavily covered by mass media,
shocked the nation. 1 The march successfully resumed after a federal court,
in light of the vast deprivations of black voting rights, upheld the right of
the marchers to walk along the highway from Selma to the state capitol. 12
President Johnson quickly mobilized his legislative team, beginning with a
ringing speech equating Selma with Lexington, Concord, and Appomattox-turning points in "man's unending search for freedom." 13 Congress
enacted the Voting Rights Act in record time. President Johnson stressed
that "[t]he real hero of this struggle is the American Negro." 14 So it seems
plausible that the brave civil disobedience of leaders like John Lewis and
Albert Turner 15 and of ordinary black citizens of Dallas County and its environs, coupled with the naked abuse of power by the state and local law enforcement officials, were the main sources of the Voting Rights Act.

Civil Rights Act of 1957 § II I.
For discussion and photographs of these events see The Library of Congress, American Memory
Section. Today in History: March 7, at http://www.memory. loc.gov/ammem/today/mar07.html (last
visited March 3, 2003).
II.
See id.; see also Roy Reed. Alabama Police Use Gas and Clubs to Rout Negroes, N.Y. TIMES,
Mar. 8, 1965, at I, 20.
12.
The court held that lhe enonnity of the deprivation outweighed the expense and inconvenience
that the march would cause. Williams v. Wallace, 240 F. Supp. 100, 106.()7 (M.D. Ala. 1965).
13.
Lyndon B. Johnson, Special Message to the Congress: The American Promise (March 15,
1965), in I PuB. PAPERS281 ( 1966).
/d. at 285.
14.
15.
John Lewis, an Alabama native, was the chairman of the Student Nonviolent Coordinating
Committee from 1963- 1966 and suffered severe head injuries when he helped lead the march over the
Edmund Pettus Bridge. He had previously participated in lunch counter sit-ins and in the Freedom Rides.
He has been a member of Congress from Georgia since 1986. See generally JOHN LEWIS & MICHAEL
D'ORSO, WALKING WITH THE W IND: A MEMOIR OF THE MOVEMENT ( 1998). Albert Turner was a leade1
in a Perry Counry, Alabama, civil rights organizalion and was affiliated wilh the Soulhem Christian
Leadership Conference. He was anolher leader of the Selma-Monlgomery march. See Tom Gordon,
Turner Recalled as ··one of Giams" of Civil Rights Era, BIRMINGHAM NEWS, Apr. 15, 2000, al lA;
Tina Kelley, Albert Turner is Dead at64; Strove for Civil Rights in South, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 15, 2000, al
A27.
9.

I 0.
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The Supreme Court version expands the creation story, focu sing on the
longer history of discrimination. In upholding the constitutionality of this
extraordinary law, the Court emphasized the history of denials of voting
rights "through unremitting and ingenious defiance of the Constitution," and
the civil disobedience of state officials. 16 The Court described the failure of
prior civil rights laws, which imposed lesser measures, to remedy the constitutional violations. 17 That history, detailed in the record before Congress,
exposed the flaws of case-by-case litigation of voting rights before hostile
Southern federal courts. 18 Ninety-five years had elapsed since the Fifteenth
Amendment forbade racial discrimination in voting 19 and Congress enacted
legislation to secure the right to vote free from race discrimination?0 Numerous Supreme Court decisions had elaborated on Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendment rights to vote, free from sophisticated methods of discrimination?' And eight years earlier, Congress had attempted to strengthen
enforcement by granting the Department of Justice authority to seek injunctive relief against racial discrimination in voting practices.22 Yet discrimination persisted. Broadly speaking, these are the reasons the Court upheld the
Voting Rights Act, and this history is often cited as justifying the Act. 23
The case of Sumter County, Alabama, supports the Supreme Court's
story, as do numerous other voting rights cases from the early 1960s. It is
instructive to examine that case in detail, to humanize the very general story
told by the Supreme Court. Close examination of this case-from investigation, to filing of suit, to trial, to decision, to aftermath-moves the story
from the general to the specific?4 However, the case provides illumination
in another way. It not only helps explain why the Voting Rights Act was
enacted, but also helps us understand the content of the Act. The remarkable
provisions of this law did not spring full-grown from the Johnson administration or Congress, but were based in large part on lessons learned in the
government's litigation of cases such as Sumter County's. Black civil disobedience of the customs of Sumter County was focused on voting rights,
so the lessons learned were focused there, as well.

16.
South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301,309 (1966).
17.
Katzenbach, 383 U.S. at 309-15; see also Lyndon B. Johnson, Remarks in the Capitol Rotunda
at the Signing of the Voting Rights Act (Aug. 6, 1965), 2 PUB. PAPERS 840,841 (1966) (''There were
those who said smaller and more gradual measures should be tried. But they had been tried. For years
and years they had been tried, and tried, and tried, and they had failed, and failed, and failed. And the
time for failure is gone.").
18.
Katzenbach, 383 U.S. at 308-15.
19.
U.S. CONST. amend. XV, §I.
20.
The Enforcement Act of 1870, ch. 114, 16 Stat. 140 (1870).
21.
See Katzenbach, 383 U.S. at 3 11 -12 (citing ten such Supreme Court decisions).
Civil Rights Act of 1957 § 13l(c), 42 U.S.C. § 197l(c) (1994).
22.
23.
Katzenbach , 383 U.S. at 337.
See, e.g., Alfred L. Brophy, The Tulsa Race Riot of 1921 in the Oklahoma Supreme Court, 54
24.
OKLA. L. REV. 67, 69 n. IO (2001) ("The trial is a particularly good vehicle for crystallizing the issues,
which can sometimes tell a great deal about the ideology surrounding the trial, in addition to the factual
questions in front of the court. ").
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Passage of the Voting Rights Act concluded a process that had begun
with the first modern civil rights act, the Civil Rights Act of 195725-a
move from an intent test to an effects test to determine whether a practice
was discriminatory, as well as a move from litigative to administrative
remedies. The 1957 Act contained no new substantive standards, but created
the Civil Rights Division of the U.S. Department of Justice and authorized it
to bring civil suits to remedy racial discrimination abridging the right to
vote. 26 To prevail in such a suit the government would have to prove that
state or local officials treated black applicants for registration or voting less
favorably than whites, or that the state law or practice was adopted with the
intent of discriminating against blacks. 27 The 1957 Act also created the Civil
Rights Commission, which was to become an important voice for further
change. 28 The 1957 Act triggered an initially gradual, but later quickening,
process of litigative action and congressional reaction.
Initial efforts to enforce the 1957 Act revealed the depth of Southern official resistance to black voting rights and the need for stronger measures. 29
Congress therefore enacted the 1960 Act, which, while hardly a radical
measure, provided additional enforcement tools, including voting referees
appointed by federal courts 30-the precursor to the administratively appointed federal voting examiners of the Voting Rights Act. 31 The Department of Justice filed an increasing number of cases, attempting, with variable success, to use those new tools.32 Yet Southern voting officials, though
sworn to uphold the Constitution and laws of the United States, continued to
resist. 33 Moreover, many Southern federal courts took refuge in the lack of
specificity in the 1957 and 1960 Acts, and refused to grant effective relief. 34
This led in turn to the voting rights provisions of the 1964 Act.35 While that
Act primarily addressed segregation and discrimination in employment and
federally assisted programs, it also adopted substantive standards that would
enable the Department of Justice to prevail in voting rights litigation with25.
Pub. L. No. 85-315. 71 Stat. 634 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 28 and 42 U.S.C.)
26.
/ d.
27.
/d.§ 131.
28.
/ d.§ 101.
29.
See S. REP. NO. 86- 1205, at 1926 ( 1960) ("Congress, when it passed the voting provisions of the
Civil Rights Act of 1957, believed they would be effective tools in fulfilling the federal government 's
responsibilities under the 14th and 15th amendments to the Constitution.... To date, this assumption
with respect to the 1957 Act has proved wrong.").
30.
Civil Rights Act of 1960, Pub. L. No. 86-449, 74 Stat. 86 (codified as amended in scattered
sections of 18 and 42 U.S.C.).
3 1.
Voting Rights Act of 1965 § 6, 42 U.S.C. § 1973d ( 1994).
32.
See, e.g., United States v. Mayton. 335 F.2d 153. 164 (5th Cir. 1964) (remanding case and
suggesting that district judge uti lize services of voting referee); United States v. Parker, 236 F. Supp.
5 11 ,5 18 (M.D. Ala. 1964) (denying motion to appoint federal voting referees).
See United States v. Mississippi, 339 F.2d 678, 682 (5th Cir. 1964) (discussing barriers to black
33.
voters added in 1960 and 1962).
34.
See, e.g., United States v. Mi ssissippi, 229 F. S upp. 925 (S.D. Miss. 1964). rev'd, 380 U.S. 128
(1965).
35.
Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 241 (codified as amended in scattered
sections of 42 U.S.C.).
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out explicitly proving race discrimination.36 Before the effectiveness of the
1964 Act could be tested, however, the combination of the Mississippi
summer of 1964 and the attack at the bridge in Selma led to the 1965 Act.
This radical legislation imposed very strict administrative remedies on the
covered jurisdictions and contained the first explicit use of an effects test for
racial discrimination.37
The choice of Sumter County may appear somewhat arbitrary. It was
not a focal point of congressional attention and spawned no groundbreaking
appeJ!ate decision . The case I want to discuss is a federal district court case,
never reviewed on appeal. It cannot even be found in the Federal Supplement. Sumter County was far from Alabama 's worst violator of black voting rights. Unlike in, for example, Lowndes and Wilcox Counties, at least
some blacks in Sumter County were registered to vote. 38 Sumter lacks the
notoriety of Dallas County, where the 1965 incident at the Edmund Pettus
Bridge took place and where Registrar Victor Atkins, Sheriff Jim Clark, and
other public officials engaged in a determined, len&thy, and sometimes violent, campaign against black voter registration. 3 Sumter was a remote
county that did not attract attention from civil rights activists. And Alabama
was no worse a violator of black voting rights than Mississippi and Louisiana.40 The Sumter case saw less federal court delay, and the federal judge in
the case granted some relief.
I chose Sumter County for three reasons. First, I worked on the case as a
fledgling lawyer. This means I bring firsthand knowledge to bear,41 though
personal involvement may skew judgment. Second, it is precisely Sumter's
ordinariness that makes it an appropriate case to study. Heroes such as
Robert Moses, John Lewis, and Albert Turner could not be everywhere and
the blacks of Sumter County, as in many places, operated without their aid.
Similarly, if one points to judges like the oft-reversed Daniel Thomas of
Alabama or the racist Harold Cox of Mississippi, or to overtly segregation36.
See infra notes 480-86 and accompanying texl.
37.
An excellent early comme ntary that recognizes the link between the government litigation and
some provisions of the Voting Rights Act is Barry E. Hawk & John J. Kirby, Jr., Note, Federal Protection of Negro Voting Rights, 5 1 VA. L. REV. 1051 (1965).
38.
DAN T. CARTER, THE POLITICS OF RAGE 247 (1995).
39.
See id. at 248-50 (discussing the "clash between state and local police and civil rights marchers
on the Peuus Bridge").
Mississippi was the location of considerable efforts by civil rights organizations to register
40.
blacks to vote, especially in the famous ''Mississippi Summer" of 1964. These events, and the discriminatory and often violent reactions of white officials and others are well summarized in FRANK PARKER,
BLACK VOTES COUNT: POLITICAL EMPOWERMENT IN MISSISSIPPI AFTER 1965, at 1-33 (1990). For a
summary of voting discrimination in Louisiana, see United States v. Louisiana, 225 F. Supp. 353, 37080 ( 1963), afj'd, 380 U.S. 145 (1965).
41.
Some would go so far as to say "Who we are mailers as much as what we are and what we
think." Jerome McCristal C ulp, Jr., Autobiography and Legal Scholarship and Teaching: Finding the Me
ill the Legal Academy, 77 VA. L. REV. 539, 543 (1991). I'm not so sure. My book, ENFORCING C IVIL
RIGHTS: RACE DISCRIMINATION AND THE DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE ( 1997), drew on both personal
experience and Department of Justice files. To several reviewers, my personal knowledge enhanced the
book; indeed, o ne wanted more personal fee ling. Tinsley E. Yarbrough, Book Review, GA. Htsr. Q.,
1998, at 230. On the other hand, one objected that it was laced with my own bureaucratic policy bias.
Michael D. Cary. Book Review, Htsr: REV. OF NEW BOOKS, Winter 1998, at 61.
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ist registrars like Theron Lynd of Hattiesburg or Victor Atkins of Selma,42
the rejoinder may be that they are aberrations, because most judges and registrars simply tried to do their job as best they could. No such claim is available regarding Sumter County, an arguably ordinary place in the state that
prompted this trenchant remark from an Alabama newspaper: "Mark it well:
Alabama passed this law [the Voting Rights Act].'.43 The law is more easily
adapted to deal with clear-cut villainy than with the non-malicious misdeeds
of ordinary people, but only by addressing the ordinary can we eliminate
discrimination. Finally, despite the ordinariness of the case, the complex
relationships of Sumter blacks and a remarkable white woman, Ruby Pickens Tartt-folklorist and voter registrar- add a layer of richness to the
story.
It is important to tell this story for several reasons. First, we are in the
midst of a struggle for control of memory. If David Irving can deny the
Holocaust,44 so will some future historians deny or try to explain away the
United States' record of racial discrimination. Indeed, the early twentieth
century school of American history did precisely that, aided by such popular
culture creations as Birth of a Nation 45 and Gone with the Wind. 46 Second,
the justification for the prophylactic rules of the Voting Rights Act rests on
somewhat impersonal accretions of evidence. Most writing about the Voting
Rights Act focuses on its post-1965 history and amendments and provides
47
only passing reference to the pre-1965 litigation. Full understanding of
what happened in Alabama in the 1960s will provide a better base for
evaluating the continuing need for these rules. Third, Sumter County serves
as a laboratory for more general lessons about judicial and governmental
behavior. Finally, the case recalls a day when all three branches of government were, in varying degrees, united in seeking enforcement of a right
conferred by the Constitution.
The late Robert Cover wrote, "No set of legal institutions or prescriptions exists apart from the narratives that locate it and give it meaning.'.48 I
want to explore whether we can learn more about a case by going beyond
the court's opinion and examining the case's context, the judge, the parties,
the testimony, and the contentions of the lawyers. In particular, can we learn
42.
FRANK SIKORA, THE JUDGE: THE LIFE AND OPINIONS OF ALABAMA'S FRANK M. JOHNSON, JR.
278-79 (1992); TAYLOR BRANCH, PARTING THE WATERS: AMERICA IN THE KING YEARS, 1963-65, at 52
(1998).
The Wallace-Lingo Act, ALA. J., Aug. 9, 1965.
43.
See generally DEBORAH LIPSTADT, DENYING THE HOLOCAUST: THE GROWING ASSAULT ON
44.
TRUTH AND MEMORY (1993) (describing the growth of Holocaust denial by persons such as Irving).
THE BIRTH OF A NATION (D.W. Griffith 19 15).
45.
46.
MARGARET MITCHELL, GONE WITH THE WIND ( 1936).
See, e.g., Thalia L. Downing Carroll, Casenote, One Step Forward or Two Steps Back? Abrams
47.
v. Johnson and the Voting Rights Act of 1965, 3 1 CREIGHTON L. REV. 917 (1998); Tyler J. Krandel,
Note, The '"Safe" Danger: Remedies Under the Amended Voting Rights Act of 1965, 12 N.Y.L. ScH. J.
HUM. RTS. 163 (1994).
TliOMAS ROSS, JUST STORIES: How THE LAW EMBODIES RACISM AND BIAS 10 n.l 2 (1996)
48.
(quoting Robert M. Cover, The Supreme Coun, 1982 Term: Foreword: Nomos & Narrarive, 91 HARv.
L. REV. 4 ( 1983)).
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by directing "greater attention to the concrete experiences of the disadvantaged and forgotten"? 49 In every case the lawyers shape their presentations
to tell a story. The opinion in every case tells a story. However, the rules of
evidence, the limited goals of the law, the agendas of those associated with
the case, and the limitations of human nature may lead the players to distort
the story or omit essential elements of it.50 The role of the Department of
Justice here adds a layer of complexity, for the Department represents the
United States, not the black citizens whose right to vote is at stake. The case
becomes a struggle between national power and a white minority local government seeking to perpetuate its power over the black majority. Representing the United States are lawyers who exert their skill and idealism within
the context of a political bureaucracy. 51 Presiding over the struggle is a
white judge, with a white court staff, inevitably influenced by the dominant
white culture. 52 Moreover, the events recounted at trial have a beginning
and end that differ from the story's beginning and end. 53 This is a case study
of how trials shape narratives and how those narratives, once filtered
through the prism of law, shape later responses.
I.

SUMTER COUNTY

When I started work with the Civil Rights Division in 1964, I had little
understanding of litigation or of racial discrimination. I had taken law
school courses in trial advocacy and constitutional law. Still, my understanding was rudimentary, at best. I had never visited the Deep South. My
boss, Dave Norman, sent me to Alabama to work under the tutelage of an
experienced lawyer, Carl Gabel. My feet first touched Alabama soil in
January 1964 when Southern Airways deposited me in Tuscaloosa, where
Carl picked me up, and where we checked into a motel, part of a wellknown national chain. That evening the black bellhop confided to us that the
front desk was listening in on our conversations. The next day we drove off
49.
Rachel F. Moran, Race, Representation. and Remembering, 49 UCLA L. REV. 1513, 1514
(2002).
See, e.g., Thomas Ross, The Richmond Narratives, 68 TEX. L. REV. 381, 405 (1989) (arguing
50.
that judges who disfavor affirmative action employ abstraction in their opinions, while those who favor
it name names and talk of persons and places).
Cf PETER IRONS, THE NEW DEAL LAWYERS, at xii (1982) (noting the skill, idealism, and worth
51.
of the work of governments lawyers, but also the inherent limitations stemming from bureaucratic rigidity and episodic political repression).
See VICfOR NAVASKY, KENNEDY JUSTICE 243 (1971) ("As a study of the Southern Regional
52.
Council concluded, ·A Negro involved in a federal court action in the South could go from the beginning
of the case to the end without seeing any black faces unless they were in the court audience, or he happens to notice the man sweeping the floor."') ; Ross, supra note 48, at II , 14-15; Charles R. Lawrence,
The /d, The Ego, and Equal Protection: Reckoning with Unconscious Racism, 39 STAN. L. REV. 3 17,
322-23 ( 1987).
53.
In addition to the published sources cited, I have drawn heavily on original Department of
Justice records contained in OJ File 166-1-17, now found at the National Archives, College Park, Maryland, in Box 5, NN3-060-99-008. Early documents bear the file number 72-1-17, but appear in the above
file. I also inspected the federal court file at the National Archives, East Point, Georgia, in Box 217,
80018. Finally, I have a personal file.
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into some of the heavily black areas of Alabama and interviewed black contacts. This was before the days of direct dial phone calls, and we learned
that the phone operator in one county was the sheriff's wife, and that she,
too, listened in on our phone calls. It was clear that we federal attorneys had
no cover of anonymity. Soon I was on my own in Sumter County, interviewing potential witnesses from Buck's Chapel to Kinterbish and from
Black's Bluff to Emelle and Geiger, getting stuck in the slick red clay mud,
tearing my suits on barbed wire, and learning the strange local dialect.
Let me place the lawsuit in perspective. Sumter County is a rural county
that has always been sparsely populated, sitting in the middle of the socalled "Black Belt" of the Deep South, on the Mississippi border. In 1960
its voting age population consisted of only 3061 whites and 6814 blacks. 54
Even today, the population density of this 905 square mile county is just
16.4 people per square mile.55 Only two towns have more than 500 people;
the county seat, Livingston, is home to 3297 people, and York's population
is 2854. 56 Until 1863, when President Lincoln issued the Emancipation
Proclamation, both state and federal law treated almost all members of the
black majority in Sumter County as slaves. "Most whites in Sumter County
considered slavery an ordinance of God which had been revealed in the
scriptures. Blacks were inferior to whites . .. ."57 The Thirteenth, Fourteenth, and Fifteenth Amendments were enacted to protect the rights of the
newly freed slaves. And, for a short period of time, blacks were allowed to
vote. White candidates for office actively campaigned for black support.58
A classic tour of Alabama folklore describes the myth of Reconstruction59 in Sumter County:
Sumter had been having a hard time before Steve [Renfroe]
came. The Republicans and the niggers had been raising hell. Black
congressmen were sitting in the state house at Montgomery. Carpetbaggers were sitting in judgment at the Livingston courthouse.
The Ku Klux had tried to help matters but only made them worse,
for after they had ridden a few times a detail of Yankee soldiers had

54.
United States v. Hines, 9 Race Rei. L. Rep. 1332, 1333 (N.D. Ala. 1964).
55.
U.S. Census Bureau, State and County Quick Facts, ar http://quickfacts.census.gov/qfd/
states/Ol/0 1119.html (last modifi ed Sept. 24, 2002).
56.
/d.
57.
Louis Roycraft Smith, Jr., History of Sumter County, Alabama, through 1886, at 106 ( 1988)
(unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, The University of Alabama) (on file with The University of Alabama
Library).
58.
/d. at 187.
59.
Southern literature repeatedly invokes Southern myths and legends. See, e.g., W.J. CASH, THE
MIND OF THESOUTH (Doubleday Anchor 1956) (1 941) (describing the legend of an idy llic era in the Old
South (the pre -Civil War South), with antebellum life playing heaven to Reconstruction life's supposed
hell. The myth of Reconstruction held that the South had been ruined and despoiled b y carpetbaggers,
scalawags, and ignorant, corrupt blacks.); see also RALPH McGILL, THE SOUTH AND THE SOUTHERNER
(1 %3).
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been sent to Livingston- to prevent further "outrages." Then things
began to happen. 60
What "things began to happen"? The whites of Alabama, through the use of
terror, trickery, and the legal system, succeeded in disenfranchising their
black fellow citizens by the early twentieth century.61 Sumter County was
known as a particularly tough place:
An agent of the Justice Department assigned to anarchic Alabama during Reconstruction sent back word that "he had rather be
in the heart of Comanche country than in Sumter County without
soldiers." Klansmen in "bloody Sumter," reputedly led by notorious
former Sheriff Stephen S. Renfroe, conducted a sustained reign of
terror, whipping blacks in daylight and murdering, along with several blacks, a white lawyer from New York who had been politically active among black voters. 62
In 1870, a black legislator from Sumter County was murdered as part of a

wave of violence against blacks63 and, in 1874, a black Sumter County Republican leader was assassinated, along with a carpetbagger, "and others
saw white mobs destroy their homes and crops."64
Despite the violence, by 1900 there were over 78,000 registered black
voters in the fourteen Black Belt counties of Alabama.65 Disfranchisement
carne through the legal system: after adoption of the 1901 Alabama Constitution, there were only 1081.66 As the noted political scientist V.O. Key
60.
CARL CARMER, STARS FELL ON ALABAMA 126 (1934). Ruby Pickens Tartt, the registrar who
would play such an important role in the 1950s and 1960s, is credited in an author's note as having made
his Black Belt excursions in the 1930s possible. /d. at xii.
61 .
Ex-slave Henry Garry gave this colorful description to W.F. Jordan of the Federal Writers
Project of the Works Progress Administration:
Git rid of the carpetbaggers? Oh, yes, sir, they vote 'em out. ... The ' publicans done
paid all the niggers' poll tax and give 'em a receipt so they could vote same as the whites.
They made up to ' lect the officers at the courthouse all niggers and then send other ones to
Montgomery to make the laws. Same day the election come off there was a circus in
Livingston, and the Democrats 'suaded the boss man of the circus to let all Sumter County
niggers in the show by showing their poll-tax receipts. Yes, sir, when the show was over, the
' lection was over too, and nobody was ' lected 'cepting white Democrats.
Course that made Sumter County a mighty unhealthy place for carpetbaggers and uppity niggers.
LAY MY BURDEN DoWN: A FOLK HISTORY OF S LAVERY263 (B.A. Botkin ed., 1945).
62.
VIRGINIA VANDER VEER HAMILTON, ALABAMA: A BICENTENNIAL HISTORY 84 (1977) (citing
Roy G ranade, Violence: An /nstrumem of Policy in Reconstruction Alabama, 86 ALA. HIST. Q. 18 1, 199
(197 1)); see also BORN IN SLAVERY: SLAVE NARRATIVES FROM THE FEDERAL WRITERS' PROJECT,
1936- 1938, at 29 (1941) (containing Tartt interv iew of Oliver Bell on June 17, 1937, describing incidents with Renfroe and the Klan).
63.
ERIC FONER, R ECONSTRUCTION: AMERICA'S UNFINISHED REVOLUTION, 1863- 1877, at 426
( 1988).
64.
!d. at 552.
65.
NEAL R. PIERCE, THE D EEP SOUTH STATES OF AMERICA 246 (1974).
66.
/d . The 1901 constitution was designed to disenfranchise blacks. Over eighty-eight percent of
the voters in heavily black counties were counted as in favor of ratification of the 190 I constitution,
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observed in 1949, the problem of governance in the Black Belt was seen as
"one of the control by a small, white minority of a huge, retarded, colored
population." 67 Although Sumter County's voting age population was seventy-six percent black in 1930 and sixty-nine percent black in 1960, ninetyfive percent of the persons registered during that time period were white.68
The government of Sumter County was a white oligarchy, with white officials wielding largely unchecked power over the black citizens. Ku Klux
Klan violence continued to play an important role in Sumter County in the
1930s and '40s. 69 Vestiges of slavery remained in remote comers of the
county, such as a plantation near the unincorporated town of Boyd, on the
Mississippi border, where the violent death of an unwilling black "employee" resulted, not in a state court homicide prosecution, but in a peonage
conviction in federal court in 1954.70 An outside observer might well sympathize with the moralizing of Addie, the black maid in Lillian Hellman's
melodrama, The Little Foxes: "Yeah, they got mighty well off cheating niggers. Well, there are people who eat the earth and eat all the people on it
like in the Bible with the locusts. Then there are people who stand around
and watch them eat it." 71
Some blacks, despite the barriers placed in their way, bravely tried to
register to vote. Registration, a simple procedure in most states, had been
transformed by racial politics into a difficult challenge for black applicants.
Those blacks who did manage to register would vote in the Democratic
primary in this one-party state, using ballots containing the symbol of the
"Alabama Democratic Party," not a donkey, but a rooster and the slogan
"white supremacy."

while less than half lhe voters in the othe r coumies voted to ratify. J. MORGAN KOUSSER, THE SHAPING
OF SOUTHERN POLITICS: SUFFRAGE R ESTRICTION AND THE ESTABLISHMENT OF THE 0NE-P ARTY SOUTH,
1880-1 9 10, a t 166-67 ( 1974); see also Sym posium, Celebrating the Centennial of the Alabama Constiltltion: An Impetus for Reflection, 53 ALA. L REV. I (2001).
67.
V.O. KEY, SOUTHERN POLITICS 5 ( 1949).
68.
Brief in Support of Plaintiffs' Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Decree at 10, United
States v. Hines, 9 Race Rei. L Rep. 1332 (N.D. Ala. 1964) (No. 63-609) [hereinafter U.S. Brief].
69.
See generally G LEN FELDMAN, POLITICS, SOCIETY, AND THE KLAN IN ALABAMA, 1915- 1949
(1999). Feldman re lates several incidents of Klan violence in Sumter County in the ' 30s and '40s. For
example, "A S umter County mob did lynch a black man on Independence Day [1931? 1, .. . precipitating
a race riot in which three m ore blacks and two whites died." /d. at 2 13. In 1935, during a Share Croppers
Union cam paign, "Whites also riddled a car with bullets as it carried northern organizers across Sumter
County's Gorgas bridge near Livingston." /d. at 267. In 1948 "Sheeted raiders also broke a Massachusetts student's windshield in Sumter County because it had a Henry Wallace bumper sticker on it." /d. at
298. Feldman also mentions the Klan 's women 's auxiliary in York [the second largest town in Sumter
County] in the 1920s. /d. at 23.
70.
See discussion of the Dial case, infra notes 275-78 and accompanying text.
7 1.
LILLIAN HELLMAN, The Lilfle Foxes, in SIX PLAYS 205 ( 1979).
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COUNTY

Official Absentee Ballot
PRIMARY ELECTION

MAY 1, 1962
DEMOCAA.TIC PARTY
INSTRUCTIONS: Te~ vote for ony condidote make
a cr05s (X) in the squgr~ In the appropriate column,
according to vour <:hoice.

V.O. Key compared the Black Belt with the Dutch and British colonies,
present-day Indonesia and India: "[A]s in the case of the colonials, that
white minority can maintain its position only with the support, and by the
tolerance, of those outside-in the home country or in the rest of the United
States."72 Two governing interrelated myths served as support for the white
minority to submerge the African-Americans' rights: the belief in the tragedy of Reconstruction, as retold in countless histories of the South, and the
belief in the incompetence of most African-Americans. Both myths appear
in a 1946 newspaper advertisement that the Sumter County Democratic
Executive Committee placed in the Birmingham News in support of a ballot
measure designed to impede black voter registration. 73 The ad bore the
headline: "Save Alabama from Negro Rule and Domination," and argued:

72.
KEY, supra note 67, at 5. The position they were maintaining was "an economic and social
system based on subordinate, black labor." /d. at 9.

73.

Sumter County Democratic Executive Corum., Save Alabamaji'om Negro Rule and Domination,
Oct. 30, 1946, at9 (political advertisement).

BIRMINGHAM NEWS,
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During the tragic era of the Reconstruction, many Alabama counties, in the hands of carpetbaggers and scalawags, backed by Federal bayonets, were represented by negroes in our State Legislature.
These ignorant negroes and their associates ruined the State financially by issuing bonds at high rate of interest, on which we
have already paid out over $60,000,000 in interest, and still owe a
large part of the principal which is in non-callable bonds. Their
crimes against the intelligent white people smell to High Heaven
even to this day. A more glaring example of the folly and seriousness of placing the franchise AGAIN in the hands of thousands of
ignorant people could not be named.
The Boswell Amendment . . . will correct this defect in our
State Constitution and will in no way affect present voters. Vote
74
"YES," and save our State from negro rule and domination.
Sumter County had a mixed record when it came to black voter registration. Unlike some counties, it allowed and even encouraged a few blacks to
register. The voting rolls listed 3238 white (more than 100% of the white
voting age population) and 315 black registered voters (or 4.6% of the black
voting age population).75 The first three blacks known to have registered in
the 1900s did so in 1933.76 The next one did not register until after World
War II, in 1947, with twenty-three more in the next six years.77 Then, in
January of 1954, Alabama repealed the cumulative aspect of its poll tax, and
a large number of both black and white citizens registered in the early
months of 1954.78 However, in May of 1954 the Supreme Court decided
Brown v. Board of Education79 and black registration came to a virtual
standstill until 1962, when thirty-nine blacks registered. After Brown, the
board of registrars rejected 47% of the black applicants and 1.7% of the
whites. 80 The district court concluded that these statistics "created a presumption that Negro citizens have been deprived, and are being deprived, of
the right to register to vote because of race or color."81
These are not the only statistics suggesting blacks were discriminated
against based on the color of their skin. In 1960, the average Sumter County
black had about five years of education, whereas the average white had approximately 11.5 years of schooling. 82 The few years of education blacks
did receive took place in racially segregated schools, even ten years after
74.
/d. The Boswell Amendment did pass, but a federal court held it unconstitutional. Davis v.
Schnell, 8 1 F. Supp. 872 (S.D. Ala. 1949) (three-judge district court panel), ajf d, 336 U.S. 933 ( 1949).
75.
United States v. Hines, 9 Race Rei. L. Rep. 1332, 1333 (N.D. Ala. 1964).
76.
U.S. Brief, supra note 68, at II.
77.
/d.
78.
Transcript at 587, United States v. Hines, 9 Race Rei. L. Rep. 1332 (N.D. Ala. 1964) (No. 63609) (on file with author) (testimony of Judge W.E. Deannan).
79.
347 U.S. 483 (1954).
80.
Hines, 9 Race Rei. L. Rep. at 1333-34.
/d. at 1335.
81.
82.
U.S. Brief, supra note 68, at 84.
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racial segregation in public education had been declared unconstitutional,
where teachers were paid less to teach and the student-to-teacher ratios were
considerably higher. 83 While $2.63 was spent on capital improvements for
every white student, only $0.41 was spent for every black student. 84 Sumter
County schools spent over twenty-eight dollars to transport every white
student, while spending only $7.54 to transport each black student. 85 For
every black student, the county spent $129 on teachers; nearly 150% of that
was spent on teachers for every white student. 86
The disparity between opportunities for blacks and whites did not end
when they left the academic setting. Though the percentage of unemployed
blacks and whites was almost equal in 1960, the median income was significantly lower in black families.87 In 1959, forty-nine percent of black
families in Sumter reported an income under $ 1000 as compared to only
nine percent of white families .88 While .08% of white families made over
$10,000, the ~ercentage of blacks making more than $10,000 was forty
times smaller. 9 Only thirty-two percent of black families in Sumter were
homeowners while over ninety-two percent of whites owned their own
home. 90 Disparities in wages and job opportunities became more dramatic in
the following decades, with black unemployment growing to almost sixteen
percent in 1980.91
Despite the history of slavery, the violence, and the rigged economic
system, not all was bleak for Sumter County blacks. A vibrant black culture
developed, including a rich trove of folk tales and music. The songs are
preserved in the John Lomax collection, Deep River of Song: Alabama, recorded in 1937-1940.92 The liner notes observe: " It is a testament to the
creativity and resilience of these African Americans that singing constituted
such an affinnative part of their life experiences even under the most appalling socio-economic and political circumstances."93 Folklorist Alan Lomax
referred to the singers whom his father recorded as "the black geniuses who
have made life in this country so much more livable and more beautiful by
83.
/d.
84 .
/d.
85.
Voting Rights: Hearings on S. 1564, Before the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 89th Cong.
1169 ( 1965) [hereinafter Senate Hearings].
86 .
/d.
87.
U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, B UREAU OF THE CENSUS, 1 C ENSUS OF POPULATION: 1960, pt. 2, at
2-224, 2-229 ( 1960). T his di screpancy grew over the next twenty years such that the 1980 Census reported the median black family earning only $8095 w hile the m edian family earned $20,436. U .S. D EP' T
OF COMMERCE, B UREAU OF THE CENSUS, 1 CENSUS OF POPULATION: 1980, pt. 2 ( 1980).
U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, B UREAU OF THE CENSUS, 1 CENSUS OF POPULATION: 1960, pt. 2, at
88.
2-224, 2-229 ( 1960).
89.
/d.
90.
U.S. D EP'T OF COMMERCE, BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, 1 CENSUS OF H OUSING, pl. 2, at 2-69, 285, 2-97 (1960).
U.S. D EP'T OF COMMERCE, B UREAU OF THE CENSUS, I CENSUS OF POPULATION: 1980 , pt. 2
9 1.
( 1980).
92.
VARIOUS ARTISTS, DEEP RIVER OF SONG: A L ABAMA (Rounder Records 200 I).
93.
Jerri lyn M cGregory, Alabama Bound, on DEEP RJVER OF SONG: ALABAMA (Rounder Record s
200 1) (contained in liner notes).
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their wit and by their music."94 While most blacks were dirt poor, some
owned their own homes and land. A few , such as undertaker James Weatherly-who had informed the U.S. Attorney of the peonage-related killing of
Herbert (Monk) Thompson by members of the Dial famil/5-and contractor L.L. Delaine, were not economically dependent on the white minority. 96
Others, such as public school teachers and the Negro county agent97 Henry
J. Spears, earned a middle class living, but were dependent on the good will
of the white-run Board of Education or Agricultural Service.98 While for a
period in the 1950s there seems to have been a countywide black organization, James Weatherly told us that it had been disbanded because of "a few
'Judases' among [the] Negro community who kept on informing the white
leaders of their actions."99 National civil rights organizations mainly ignored
Sumter County. The black community was widely dispersed, and civic life
was organized around local churches.
II. VOTER REGISTRATION IN ALABAMA

Voter registration has always been a state, not a federal function. As an
Alabama federal three-judge district court noted, "The States, not the Federal Government, prescribe the qualifications for the exercise of the franchise, and Federal Courts are not interested in these qualifications unless
they contravene the Fifteenth Amendment or other provisions of the United
States Constitution." 100 So qualifications and procedures for registering to
vote varied from state to state. Universal suffrage was not yet firmly established. Twenty-one states still maintained literacy or character requirements
of some sort, some states required payment of a poll tax as a prerequisite to
101
voting, and the age of eligibility to vote was fixed at twenty-one.
I registered to vote in California as soon as I turned twenty-one, then the
minimum age for voters. As I recall, I had been in a post office, seen a registration form, written in my name, birth date, and address, signed it and
94.
/d. (citing Lomax to Jonathan Lindsey, quoted in VIRGINIA POUNDS BROWN & LAURELLA
OWENS, TOTING THE LEAD Row: RUBY PICKENS TARTI. ALABAMA FOLKLORIST ( 1981)).
95.
See discussion of Dial case infra notes 275-78 and accompanying text.
96.
Memorandum from Edward H. O'Connell to file (Nov. 19, 1964) (on fil e with author).
97.
County Agents worked for the Agricultural Extension Service, which was funded by the federal
government to provide information and assistance to farmers. In Alabama, the service was strictly segregated. Interview with H.J. Spears by R.J. Groh and Gerald Stem, in Livingston, Nabama (Aug. 22,
1961) (on file with author).
98.
For example, Spears "indicated that most of his work on voter registration must be sub-rosa due
to his fear that he will lose his job." Memorandum from Edward H. O'Connell, Attorney, to Trial File,
Sumter County (Nov. 19, 1964) (on file with author).
99.
/d.
100.
Davis v. Schnell, 81 F. Supp. 872,876 (S.D. Na. 1949), affd, 336 U.S. 933 ( 1949). Indeed, one
judge of the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit argued: "The reach of the Fifteenth
Amendment was never meant to apply to registration, but was only to protect against denials, not distinctions, because of race or color, to vote." United States v. Alabama, 304 F.2d 583, 604-05 (5th Cir. 1962)
(Cameron, J., dissenting).
See Voting Rights: Hearings on H.R . 6400 Before Subcomm. No.5 of the House Comm. on the
101.
Judiciary, 89th Cong. 30 (1965) [hereinafter House Hearings].
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mailed it in. 102 Registration in most states was relatively simple, conducted
by a civil service clerk. 103 Not so in some of the states of the Deep South. In
Alabama, registration was conducted by a board of registrars, three local
citizens-generally retired men and widows-appointed by the governor,
the auditor, and the commissioner of agriculture and industries. 104 In essence, during the administration of Governor George Wallace, the appointers were all under the influence of the governor, who had won office on a
platform of "Segregation today, segregation tomorrow, segregation forever."105 Why a board instead of a clerk? A student of voting in Alabama
speculates: " [A] board may be more useful for purposes of discrimination
and as an instrument to deter Negro voting by those who wish to do so." 106
Registrars, invariably white, were paid ten dollars for each day they
worked- a modest but not insubstantial sum in 1964 (ten days at a nice
motel in Montgomery cost me $70.80 in 1964, according to my diary). 107
The Board in a county the size of Sumter met twice a month, with extra
days in July, in January of even-numbered years, and the fall of oddnumbered years. 108 The 1901 Alabama Constitution had been designed to
facilitate disenfranchisement of black voters and to minimize future black
registration. 109 In addition to the usual age, competency, and residency requirements, it required that applicants be of good character and understand
the duties and obligations of citizenship, and it conditioned the right to vote
on payment of a poll tax. 110
For decades, the white primary system shielded Alabama from black
voters. Because election in the Democratic primary was in those days tantamount to election, exclusion of blacks from the primaries meant that even
if they could register, blacks could not influence the outcome of elections. 111
However, after the National Association for the Advancement of Colored
People (NAACP) successfully convinced the Supreme Court in 1944 to
112
outlaw the white primary system, the Alabama Democratic Party became
concerned that black voters would begin to have a voice in Alabama poli102.
However, California's constitution did require that registrants be able to read the constitution in
the English language. See id. at 3 1 n.7 (citing CAL. CONST. art. IT, § 1).
103.
Thirty-one states had no literacy tests in 1960; for examples of registration in many such states,
see REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON REGISTRATION AND VOTING PARTICLPATION, 31-34
( 1963).
DONALDS. STRONG, REGISTRATION OF VOTERS IN ALABAMA I (1956).
104.
105.
Governor George C. Wallace, Inaugural Address (Jan. 14, 1963}, available at
http://www.arc hives.state.al.us/govs_lisl/inauguralspeech.html (last updated Apr. 12, 2002).
STRONG, supra note 104, at 11 5- 16.
106.
/d. at 17.
107.
108.
/d. at 15- 16.
109.
MALCOLM COOK MCMILLAN, CONSTITUTIONAL DEVELOPMENT IN ALABAMA, 1798-1901: A
STUDY IN POLITICS, THE NEGRO, AND SECTIONALISM 263-309 ( 1955); see also Wayne Aynt, Alabama's
Shame: The Historical Origins of the 1901 Constitution, 53 ALA. L. REV. 67 (200 I).
110.
Like most states, Alabama also disqualified persons convicted of serious crimes. The list of
crimes was designed to stress those crimes that were thought to be "black" crimes. That aspect of the
Alabama requirements was held unconstitutional in Hullter v. Underwood, 471 U.S. 222,232-33 (1985).
Ill.
STRONG, supra note I04, at 2 1-22.
112.
Smith v. Allwright, 32 1 U.S. 649 (1944).
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tics. So it sponsored the so-called "Boswell Amendment" to the Alabama
Constitution, which the voters adopted in 1946. 113 The Boswell Amendment
required that an applicant be able to "understand and explain any article of
the Constitution of the United States." 114
Black applicants who were refused registration successfully challenged
the Boswell Amendment in federal court in 1949. 115 The court quoted a
prominent backer of the Amendment, who had proclaimed: "I earnestly
favor a law that will make it impossible for a Negro to qualify, if that is
possible. If it is impossible, then I favor a law, more especially a constitutional provision, that will come as near as possible, making possible, the
impossible." 11 6 Not only was the Boswell Amendment intended to exclude
blacks, it was administered to do so: "[T]he ambiguous standard prescribed
has, in fact, been arbitrarily used for the purpose of excluding Negro applicants for the franchise, while white applicants with comparable qualifications were being accepted. " 117
Within two years of the decision invalidating the Boswell Amendment,
Alabama amended its constitution again, this time adopting the requirement
that the applicant be able to read and write any article of the United States
Constitution selected by the registrars. 118 The Board was to determine qualifications by furnishing the applicants with an application form, whose content was determined by the Supreme Court of Alabama. The board was to
require applicants to fill out the forms with no assistance. 119 The applicant
was to sign the form and an oath of allegiance before a registrar. 120
The application forms had evolved from a simple one-page form in use
in 1902, which caJied for little more than the applicant's signature, affirming his qualifications. 12 1 In 1922, after women were allowed to vote, the
form was expanded; while only one page long, the applicant had to fill in
blanks reflecting name, occupation, marital status, sex, race, residence, and
length of residence. 122 By 1952, the form had become four pages long, 123
with the addition of more questions, a separate oath (so that the applicant
would have to sign two places on the form), and an "examination of supporting witness." 124 The supporting witness had to be a registered voter and

113.
STRONG, supra note 104, at 22.
114.
/d.
11 5.
Davis v. Schnell, 8 1 F. Supp. 872 (S.D. Ala. 1949), aff d, 336 U.S. 933 (1949).
11 6.
Davis, 8 1 F. Supp. at 880.
117.
/d.
118.
ALA. CONST. art. 8, § 18 1 (amended 1951 ).
119.
A study of voter registration in Alabama concluded that "the task of filling it out is so difficult
that the majority of the counties studied ignore" the ban on assistance. STRONG, supra note 104, at 36.
for example, "in five north Alabama counties a registrar reads the questions aloud, the applicant gives
an oral reply, and the registrar writes in the answers." /d. These counties had a small black population.
/d. at 36-37.
120.
/d.at 2 1,3 1.
121.
Application for Registration, 1902- 192 1 (on file with author).
122.
Oath of Applicant for Registration, 1922 (on file with author).
STRONG, supra note 104, at 30.
123.
/d. at 30-47.
124.
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had to certify to the length of the applicant's residence 125 and that "I know
of no reason why he is disqualified from registering." 126 Later the form was
revised to delete the reference to race.
The new form, with twenty-one questions, plus sub-questions, required
the applicant to disclose facts that went beyond the qualifications for registration. 127 For example, to the question about whether the applicant had ever
been convicted of a felony or crime of moral turpitude the Alabama Supreme Court added the question whether the applicant had ever been
charged with such a crime. 128 There were now six questions and one subquestion relating to loyalty. The applicant was required not only to affirm
that he or she would support and defend the Constitution, but also to list the
duties and obligations of citizenship and to say whether he or she regards
"those duties and obligations as having priority over the duties and obligations you owe to any other secular organization when they are in conflict." 129 In 1954, the NAACP identified nine techniques being used to deny
Alabama blacks registration; many of those techniques continued in use
until adoption of the Voting Rights Act. 130
In 1960, after black organizations had begun educating blacks how to
fill out the form, the order in which the questions appeared was arranged in
twenty different sequences. 131In 1964, as civil rights activity intensified, the
Alabama Supreme Court adopted a new five-page form, which included this
question: "Have you ever seen a copy of this registration apglication form
before receiving this copy today? If so, when and where?" ' 2 It was perfectly lawful to see a copy of the registration form, which, after all, the law
prescribed in order to determine qualifications, rather than as some sort of
test. This question did not, however, bear at all on voter qualifications, but
could intimidate or entrap applicants. Perhaps even more important was the
addition of Part III of the form, composed of civics questions (e.g., "Name
the lieutenant governor of Alabama?"), excerpts from the Constitution
which the applicant was required to read aloud, and a space for the applicant
to write words dictated by the registrar. 133 A different Part III was to be used

125.
!d. at 45-46.
Oath of Applicant for Registralion, 1952 al4 (on file wilh author).
126.
127.
STRONG, supra nole I04, al 3 1-33.
128.
!d. at 32.
!d. at 33.
129.
130.
The techniques were !he requirement of a white characler witness, property qualifications, stricl
enforcement of literacy tests, use of unreasonable queslions about the Constitution, rejection for technical mistakes in filling oul fonns, delay in serving applicants, helping whites but not blacks fill out their
forms, evasion, and deliberale threats by official hangers-on. Herbert Hill, Southem Negroes at the
Ballot Box, THE CRISIS, May 1954, at 26 1, 265-66.
U.S. Brief. supra note 68, at 6 n.3.
13 1.
132.
The court stated that it did so because "the Legislature of Alabama has enacted Act No. 92,
approved July 26, 1961. Acts of Alabama, 1961, Vol. l, page 107; which provides for the filing of twelve
sets of questions so that a different q uestionnaire may be used each month." U.S. Brief, supra note 68, at
Table E (quoting Supp. Order of the Sup. Ct. of Ala., In reApplication for Registration Questionnaire
and Oath (Jan. 14, 1964) (on file with author)).
133.
See Application of Richard Wilson, Jr. , inji'a al Appendix B.
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each month. 134 The new form also eliminated the requirement that the supporting witness certify that he or she knew of no disqualifying circumstance; the witness only had to certify to the applicant's residence. 135
The Alabama system of registration was suspect, to say the least. It resembled in many ways the system adopted by the Boswell Amendment and
thrown out by the federal court as racially discriminatory. It was the descendant of the 1901 constitution, which had as its "purpose ... to disfranchise every Negro in the state and not a single white man." 136 It left each
county board of registrars great latitude in deciding whom to register and
whom to reject. Moreover, its lack of transparency facilitated registrar discrimination based on race, and it was administered by untrained officials
who owed their position to a segregationist governor. However, the system's adoption had not been marked by the same overt expressions of intent
to exclude blacks from the vote, and the system was not phrased in the same
standardless words as the Boswell Amendment. Arguably, a frontal attack
on the system would be more difficult to sustain. That frontal attack would
not be mounted until January 1965, when the United States filed United
States v. Baggett, 137 seeking to enjoin the state and every board of registrars
from using the literacy comprehension test embodied in the application
form. 138 In the interim, how would racial discrimination in voter registration
in Sumter County be addressed, if at all?

Ill. THE CIVIL RIGHTS DIVISION
Into this picture entered the Civil Rights Division of the U.S. Department of Justice. Congress created the Division in 1957, 139 in a bipartisan
vote (minus the so-called "Dixiecrats"-Southern Democrats) primarily to
enforce the Fifteenth Amendment right not to be denied the vote on account
134.
U.S. Brief, supra note 68, at Table E (quoting Supp. Order of the Alabama Supreme Court, in re
Application for Registration Questionnaire and Oath (Jan. 14, 1968) (on file with author)).
/d.
135.
136.
United States v. Alabama, 252 F. Supp. 95, 98 (M.D. Ala. 1966) (quoting Delegate Henin at the
1901 Alabama Constitutional Convention).
Memorandum from Frank M. Dunbaugh to Brian K. Landsberg (Mar. 22, 1966) (on file with
137.
author) (explaining that United States v. Baggett, a case in the Middle District of Alabama, "attacked the
literacy tests then in use in Alabama," but after the passage of the Voting Rights Act the tests were no
longer used, so voluntary dismissal was recommended).
138.
See 1965 ATI'Y GEN. ANN. REP. 171. The case relied on the disparate education theory and on
the freezing principle, charging that because blacks had received an inferior education, the new application test adopted in 1964 "freezes the existing racial imbalance of the voting structure in Alabama."
Arthur Osgoode, U.S. Would Nullify State Voter Tests, MONTGOMERY ADVERTISER, Jan. 16, 1965, at I.
In a last ditch repetition of earlier tactics, probate judges in six counties (Dallas, Perry, Hale, Wilcox,
Lowndes, and Marengo) were enjoined from allowing illiterate registrants to vote; a three-judge federal
district court dec lared those injunctions null and void. Reynolds v. Katzenbach, 248 F. Supp. 593, 594
(S.D. Ala. 1965). By March of 1966 the need for litigation on literacy tests in Alabama had disappeared,
since the tests were no longer in use. They were abandoned when the constitutionality of the Voting
Rights Act was upheld. Memorandum from Brian K. Landsberg to Frank M. Dunbaugh (Mar. 22, 1966)
(on file with author).
See Civil Rights Act of 1957 § II I, Pub. L. No. 85-315, 71 Stat. 634 (paving the way for the
139.
creation of the Civil Rights Division).
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of race. 140 The characteristics of the Division and its lawyers helped shape
the ultimate content of the Voting Rights Act. 141 That Act marks the culmination of Congress's quest to ensure nondiscrimination in voting. Not only
did state and local officials resist racial neutrality, but also many federal
district court judges were at best reluctant, and at worst antagonistic, to the
enforcement of the Fifteenth Amendment. 142 The one seemingly reliable
neutral party, willing and able to attack racial discrimination in voting practices, was the Civil Rights Division of the Department of Justice.
Creation of a special division for civil rights enforcement deviated from
the enforcement structure during Reconstruction. Then, the department had
relied on the local United States Attorneys to enforce the civil rights laws. 143
However, the United States Attorneys were political appointees chosen
from the local party faithful. Thus, the replacement of United States Attorneys "by men who were, in Wade Hampton's phrase, 'always conservative,
staunch & true, "' 144 hastened the end of Reconstruction. By contrast, after
1957 enforcement was centralized in Washington, D .C. headquarters, in the
Civil Rights Division. 145
The Division's function was law enforcement, not voter registration or
civil rights activism. 146 The Division leadership tried hard, and with general
success, to promote a culture of fair treatment of local officials who were
the potential defendants. 147 The lawyers were vigorous, pragmatic idealists,
trained to tum square comers. 148 They were not desk lawyers, but spent
much of their time in the field, interviewing prospective witnesses and gaining firsthand understanding of the facts on the ground. They developed an
eye for spotting discrimination and they carefully selected strong cases.
Some Division lawyers might be prone to see discrimination under every
tree, but the Division 's structure and procedures required a strong showing
before suit could be filed. The philosophy was to present such a strong case
that if the trial court ruled adversely, the government could convince the
court of appeals that the lower court's fact findings were clearly erroneous.
The government lawyers, though talented, did not all come from "the best
and the brightest" of the Ivy League, but included people from small towns,

140.
/d.§ 131 (codifiedasamendedat42U.S.C.§ 1971 (1994)).
141 .
On the role of the Justice Depanment, see Hawk & Kirby, supra note 37, at 1060-61 (explaining
that the different philosophies attributed to different attorneys general impacted the amount of litigation
brought and the amount of active investigation undenaken in areas of known discrimination).
142.
See, e.g., United States v. Mississippi, 229 F. Supp. 925 (S.D. Miss. 1964), rev'd, 380 U.S. 128
(1965).
143.
ROBERT M. GOLDMAN, A FREE 8AUOT ANDA FAIR COUNT, THE DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE AND
TliE ENFORCEMENT OF VOTING RIGHTS IN THE SOUTH, 1877-1893, at 35-40 (2001).
144.
/d. atl89.
145.
See LUTHER A. HUSTON, n1E DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE 69-86 (1967).
146.
/d. at69-70.
147.
See BURKE MARSHALL, FEDERALISM AND CIVILRIGHTS 23-25 (1964).
148.
Justice Holmes had said "Men must tum square comers when they deal with the Government."
Rock Island, Ark. & La. R.R. v. United States, 254 U.S. 141 , 143 (1920). John Doar, who led the litigation activities of the Division under Burke Marshall , turned the phrase around and required that government attorneys, too, always tum square comers.
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from the Midwest, West, and South, as well as Northeasterners. This proved
invaluable to understanding the workings of rural boards of registrars. The
Department lawyers developed innovative theories of liability and relief,
and they carefully based their relief requests on the facts in the record. The
record they compiled not only showed discrimination, but a cumulative disregard of clear legal mandates by both voting officials and some federal
judges throughout much of the Deep South. 149 So it was no accident that the
Department of Justice played a major role in drafting the proposed legislation and that when Congress began considering the content of the Voting
Rights Act, it could call on an impressive factual record and well-developed
legal theories.
With the arrival of the Justice Department attorneys, Sumter County officials whose discrimination had gone on unchallenged were faced with
what they probably viewed as a flood of federal interlopers. In retrospect,
the suit may seem incredibly easy for the government to win, because the
evidence of racial discrimination was overwhelming. Yet, in 1964, some
courts were still ruling against the government in similar cases, either on the
merits or in fashioning relief. 150 The underlying legal issue of equal voting
rights for whites and blacks hardly seemed contestable, for the Fifteenth
Amendment explicitly forbade abridging the right to vote because of race. 151
Yet the doctrine of white supremacy was so ingrained in the political process that Southern government officials viewed nondiscrimination in voting
as a radical idea and Southern federal judges were, of course, political appointees who could normally be expected to echo the prevailing community
sentiment.
A presidential appointee, confirmed by the Senate, headed the Divi152
sion. The Division did little in 1958 and 1959, its first two years, 153 but in
1960, President Eisenhower placed New Yorker Harold Tyler in the position, and Tyler hired John Doar, a Wisconsin Republican, as his top assistant. Suddenly the Division became quite active, including its initial attempted foray into Sumter County. President Kennedy's inauguration in
January 1961 brought new top leadership to the Department, including Attorney General Robert F. Kennedy and Assistant Attorney General for Civil
Rights, Burke Marshall. But bipartisanship survived and John Doar was
retained, becoming "the imperturbable Gary Cooper of the Kennedy civil
154
rights team." As Democrats, the president and attorney general had close
149.
Voting Rights Legislation: Joim Statement on S. 1564, Before the Senate Commil/ee on the
Judiciary, 891h Cong. 6-9 (1965).
See CIVIL RIGHTS DIV., DEP'T OF JUSTICE, STATUS REPORT 1964, at 41,77 (Dec. 31, 1964),
150.
reprinted in Senate Hearings, supra note 85, at 1219, 1251 (citing Judge Cox's remedy of complete reregistralion and Judge Dawkins's refusal to grant freezing relief) [hereinafter STATUS REPORT].
151.
U.S. CONST. amend. XV, § 1.
152.
Civi l Rights Act of 1957 § Ill, Pub. L. No. 85-315, 71 Stat. 634.
U.S. COMM'N ON CIVIL RIGHTS, REPORT OF THE U.S. COMMISSION ON CIVIL RIGHTS 1959, at
153.
131 ("Nearly two years after the passage of the Act, the Department of Justice had broughl only three
actions under its new powers to seek preventive civil relief.").
DIANE MCWHORTER, CARRY ME HOME 240 (2001). Peter Irons noted that "each of the New
154.
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relationships with many politicians from what was still a one-party Deep
South. However, most attorneys in the Division were merit, rather than political, hires. Indeed, the first merit hire under the Kennedy administration
was Arvid (Bud) Sather, a Republican. Many newly hired attorneys came
straight from law school, under the Attorney General's Honors Program,
which Attorney General Brownell instituted in 1954, to end "cronyism, favoritism and graft" in hiring. 155 According to Burke Marshall, he was looking for "young lawyers that would travel and work very hard, and we were
pretty successful in doing that." 156 The Division was a small law office. In
1963, it had twenty-one lawyers assigned to forty-five voting rights cases
plus fifty-six ongoing investigations. 157 This made it, however, the largest
civil rights law office in the country, far outstripping the NAACP Legal
Defense Fund. 158
The Division viewed the effort to make the right to vote a reality for
black citizens as "simply a matter of law enforcement." 159 As Assistant Attorney General Burke Marshall explained, "It turns on the impact of the
federal system on law enforcement action directed against state officials-a
question of the ability of the federal courts to control state officials in the
conduct of state business." 160 Marshall did not claim that securing the right
to vote would bring about an end to other forms of discrimination, but he
did argue that "federal rights cannot successfully be asserted where the right
to vote is not protected."161 In other words, the right to vote is a necessary,
but not a sufficient, protector of other rights.
The Division's initial approach in each county with alleged voter discrimination was to attempt to negotiate with local officials before going to
Deal genera l counsel I have studied ... personified a distinctive legal style that shaped his agency's
approach to litigation and influenced agency lawyers in their handling of cases .... " PETER H. IRONS,
THE NEW DEAL LA WYERS 5 (I 982). Doar's legal s tyle and work ethic profoundly influenced the Division lawyers. As described in detail below, it entailed vigorous presence in the field, reliance on tedious
analysis of records, and presentation of a massive case so that adverse fact-findings would be overturned
as clearly erroneous.
BRIAN K. LANDSBERG, ENFORCING CIVIL RIGHTS 157 {1997); see also HUSTON, supra note
155.
145, at 255-56.
Transcript, Burke Marshall Oral History Interview I, by T.H. Baker (Oct. 28, 1968), Internet
156.
3,
a1•ailable
at
Copy,
LBJ
Library,
at
http://www.lbj lib.utexas.edu/johnson/archives.hom/oralhistory.hom/MARSHA-B/marsha-b.pdf
(last
visited Mar. 4, 2003) (hereinafter Marshall Oral History Interview].
157.
Affidavit of Burke Marshall at 48-49, United States v. McLeod, 229 F. S upp. 388 (5th Cir.
1964) (No. 2 1475) (Record on Appeal).
158.
See JACK GREENBERG, CRUSADERS IN THE COURTS ( 1994), for an account of the Legal Defense
Fund 's staffing and work. See also J.W. PELTASON, FIFTY-EIGHT LONELY MEN 94-95 (Urbana, Univ.
Ill. Press 197 1) ( 1961 ). The LDF, as it is now known, depended entirely on phi lanthropy for its budget;
the concept of a private attorney general, who may receive an award of attorney's fees in s uccessful
litigation, had not yet emerged to s upplement the LDF's budget. The firs t black lawyer was admitted to
the Alabama bar in 1937. By 1961, only 19 had been admitted. S. C hristian Leadership Conference v.
Sessions, 56 F. 3d 1281 , 1286 ( II th Cir. 1995) (en bane). Since most local white lawyers would not bring
suits challenging racial discrimination, the LDF had to rely on a slender network of black attorneys to
supplement its central staff,1ocated in New York.
MARSHALL, supra note 147, at 8.
159.
160.
/d. at8-9.
161.
/d. at 11 - 12.
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court. 162 This was in line with a policy of federal deference to the states. As
Assistant Attorney General Marshall explained, the policy "has been to try
to make the federal system in the voting field work by itself through local
action, without federal court compulsion." 163 However, as he further noted,
in some areas efforts to achieve voluntary compliance were fruitless, because "the political viability of white supremacy is at stake." 164 Marshall
presciently noted that "the degree of federal involvement will be determined
more by the amount of acceptance of state responsibility for the recognition
of federal rights, than by anything else. But the prospect for the near future
is not good." 165
Early Division efforts in Sumter County were scattered. The F.B.I. interviewed the members of the Board of Registrars in 1960, and Department
attorney R.J. Groh (now a United States Magistrate Judge) suggested that he
go to Sumter and "do a little drum beating."166 Attorney Gerald Choppin, a
native of New Orleans, argued a records production case in 1961 and supervised records inspection. He was followed by Gerald Stern, a bright young
attorney who would much later, in private practice, distinguish himself, first
167
in a mass tort case involving a collapsed dam in West Virginia, and later
as the lawyer for Armand Hammer of Occidental Oil. Then came Frank
Dunbaugh, a career lawyer who would later be in charge of all litigation in
Alabama, and Warren Radler, now a noted trial lawyer in Chicago. They
were followed by J. Harold (Nick) Flannery, the urbane, courtly raconteur
who became an appellate judge in Massachusetts, 168 and Carl Gabel, the
steady, dependable career attorney who introduced me to Alabama in 1964.
All these lawyers worked briefly in Sumter County in 1961. During the
1960s, the small staff, unpredictable crises, and shifting priorities led to
constant shuffling of personnel from one case to the next.
The small size of the Division and the heavy and shifting caseload led
to frequent readjustments of attorney assignments. 169 The trial team in the

162.
/d. at 23.
!d.
163.
164.
MARSHALL., supra note 147, at 24.
165.
!d. at 40.
166.
Memorandum from R.J. Groh to Mr. Norman, Sumter County FBI Report (Aug. 16, 1960) (on
file with author).
See generally GERALD STERN, THE BUFFALO CREEK DISASTER ( 1977).
167.
168.
A judge who served with Aannery on the Massachusetts Court of Appeals recalled that Nick,
[B]ecame a leader in the civil rights division's increasingly aggressive efforts to secure the
right to vole of black citizens in the south .... The headline of a newspaper published by a
civil rights organization in Holly Springs, Miss., once announced, "A annery is Coming," so
well-known had he become as a champion of voting rights in the area.
Rudolph Kass, A Judge Wh o Had a "Taste far Life," 27 MASS. LAW. WKLY. 1099 ( 1999).
See, e.g ., Memorandum from John Doar to Burke Marshall, Attorney Assignments (Sept. 14,
169.
1964) (on file with author). It lists active cases in twenty-three counties (some with multiple cases), as
well as decrees in e ight counties requiring enforcement follow-up. It assigns a supervisor, an attorney in
charge, and other attorneys assigned to each county. Although other lawyers were listed as working on
enforcement in Perry County, I was drafted to handle the case in October. Although I was listed as in
charge of the three cases in Dallas County, John Doar tried them. In short, assignments were in constant
flux .
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Sumter County case consisted of attorneys different from those who worked
on the initial investigation. All were white attorneys from the North- David
L. Norman from the northern plains via California, Arvid (Bud) Sather from
Wisconsin, Jonathan Sutin from New Mexico (now an appellate justice
there), Jim Kelley from Iowa, and me. In the words of one federal appellate
judge, we constituted the "spectacle of the invasion by the bright young men
from the North which is taking place in the South today." 170
Bud Sather tried the Sumter County case. He had served as a naval aviator and was still active in the Naval Reserves. In his early thirties, he impressed me, at twenty-six, as a seasoned trial lawyer. Presumably because of
his calm, unflappable demeanor and his intelligence and common sense, the
Department had assigned him to serve as James Meredith 's roommate at the
University of Mississippi during the early tumultuous days of Meredith's
desegregation of Ole Miss. By the time of the Sumter trial, he had worked
actively in fifteen Alabama counties, as well as in Georgia, Mississippi, and
Louisiana. 171 Bud was a litigator in the best sense of the word--organized,
focused, skeptical, well prepared, and articulate.
Chief advisor and supervisor of the case was David L. Norman, who
would later rise to become Assistant Attorney General for Civil Rights. He
was a brilliant man who treated litigation like a chess game and who helped
develop the innovative legal theories that would eventually migrate from the
caselaw into the Voting Rights Act. 172 He was deeply dedicated to black
voting rights, as indicated by this interview a year before the Sumter County
case was tried:
I have a technique I use and I used it in the Madison Parish,
Louisiana case. I got the registrar on the stand and the galleries
were packed with Negro leaders in the county. So I asked her questions for the benefit of the Negroes. Questions like: Now what are
your office hours? What days are you in your office? Now just what
do you require of persons who come in to make application to register? etc. And the Negroes are sitting right there and they leave the
courtroom armed with all that information. Plus, you see, I purposely ask the registrar if she intends to register all persons who
come in and who are qualified.

170.
Alabama v. United States, 304 F.2d 583,611 (5th C ir. 1962) (Cameron, J. , dissenting). Similarly, New Deal attorneys had been referred to as a "plague of young lawyers." IRONS, supra note 154, at

300.
171.
Record on Appeal at 129, 173, United States v. McLeod, 229 F. Supp. 383 (5th Cir. 1964) (No.
21475).
"A large amount of the credit for the development of the government 's strategy in enforcing the
172.
Civil Rights Act of 1957 belongs to Norman ... ." John Doar, The Work of 1/re Civil Rights Division in
Enforcing Voting Rights Under the Ci vil Rights Acts of 1957 and 1960, 25 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. I , 2
( 1997).
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Now, we just recently tried that case before Judge Dawkins and
he is nowhere near a decision, but the next week seventy Negroes
were registered. 173
I had spent most of my life in California. I was in the eleventh grade at
C.K. McClatchy Senior High School in Sacramento when Brown v. Board
of Education 114 was decided, and I attended U.C. Berkeley as an undergraduate and law student until 1962, just missing the Free Speech Movement and general campus turmoil. Aside from raising "Nickels for Bricks"
to help rebuild a school in Clinton, Tennessee, that had been bombed to
thwart integration, my only other "civil rights" activities had been a few
courses on free speech and equality from Jacobus tenBroek, 175 American
history from the renowned Reconstruction scholar Kenneth Stampp, and
equity from Dean Frank Newman of Boalt Hall. I had started my first law
job, with the Civil Rights Division, just a few months before the Sumter
County trial, at a salary of $7030 a year. I had already worked on trials in
the Middle and Southern Districts of Alabama by the time I helped with the
Sumter County trial. During my first year as a Justice Department lawyer, I
would work on nine trials and hearings and spend about 150 days in Alabama.
In earlier days, some regarded Department of Justice lawyers as "political hacks whose sympathy for their programs was suspect." 176 Attorney
General Kennedy and Burke Marshall had, by 1964, shunted any such persons in the Division aside. Lawyers assigned to the Division 's litigation in
the Deep South were dedicated to enforcing the civil rights laws, which at
that time primarily protected voting rights. Burke Marshall noted that as
events revealed that the Department of Justice would be thrust into the thick
of the "dramatic, colorful, interesting, turbulent" civil rights period, "there
were just a lot of young people coming out of law schools that wanted to
participate." 177 John Doar explains that "the spirit of the Division lawyers
assigned to enforce the Civil Rights Acts was governed by what President
Havel of Czechoslovakia calls a philosophy grounded in hope ... the ability
to work hard for something because it makes sense, not because it stands a
chance to succeed." 178 A very short time analyzing voter records or interviewing potential witnesses revealed the depth of racial discrimination in
voter registration, enough to fue up anyone with a fundamental sense of
173.
CHARLES V. HAMILTON, THE BENCH AND THE BALLOT: SOUTHERN FEDERAL J UOOES AND
BLACK VOTERS 220-21 ( 1973) (quoting a Jan. 1963 interview with David L. Nonnan).
174.
347 u.s. 483 (1954).
175.
Professor tenBroek, I later learned, had written the seminal works on the history of the Fourteenth Amendment and on the Equal Protection Clause. JACOBUS TENBROEK. THE ANTISLAVERY
ORIGINS OF THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT (195 1): Jacobus tenBroek & Joseph Tussman, Th e Equal
Protection of the Laws, 37 CAL. L. REV. 34 1 ( 1949).
IRONS, supra note 154, at II {describing New Deal lawyers' perceptions of the Department of
176.
Justice).
177.
Marshall Oral History Interview, supra note 156, at 4.
178.
Dear, supra note 172, at 5.
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fairness. Attorney General Nicholas Katzenbach singled out the Division
attorneys for praise: "I believe I have never, whether in government, in private practice, or in the academic world, seen any attorneys work so hard, so
well, and, often, under such difficult circumstances."179
Racial discrimination in administration of voter registration had been il18
legal since the Fifteenth Amendment was adopted in 1870. Congress had
immediately exercised its power under section two of the Amendment to
enact legislation protecting the right to vote free from racial discrimination. 181 But during the more than ninety years leading up to these lawsuits,
the courts and Congress had provided no clear road map of how to secure
equal voting rights. They simply forbade racial discrimination in voting.
The earlier cases had involved the grandfather clause, white primaries, racial gerrymandering-all legislative actions with clear racial purpose. 182
When Alabama blacks sought relief against racially discriminatory practices
of registrars in the early 1900s, the Supreme Court, in a remarkably brutal
and insensitive opinion of Justice Holmes, had said that the courts were
powerless to provide a remedy even if the alleged discrimination existed. 183
Even when the Court did say that plaintiffs were entitled to a remedy, as in
the school desegregation cases, it left the content of the remedy vague. 184
And in 1959, the Supreme Court upheld North Carolina 's use of a literacy
test despite its disproportionate exclusion of black citizens whose poor literacy stemmed from the state's discrimination in education. 185
So the Department faced two difficult hurdles. First, what proof would
be needed to make out a case of racial discrimination in registration? Second, what relief would the government be entitled to? In the end, the voting
cases became a template for other racial discrimination cases and legislation, and eventually for legislation and cases protecting against discrimination on account of sex, national origin, religion, disability, and age.186 And
they laid the template for the Voting Rights Act, often called the most effective piece of civil rights legislation. 187

°

179.
House Hearings, supra note 101, at 5.
180.
U.S. CONST. amend. XV ("Section I. The right of citizens of the United States to vote shall not
be denied or abridged by the United States or by any State on account of race, color, or previous condition of servitude. Section 2. The Congress shall have power to enforce this article by appropriate legislation.").
181.
The Enforcement Acts (including the Civil Rights Act of 1870, ch. 114, 16 Stat. 140, and the
Force Act of 1871 , ch. 99, 16 Stat. 433. Both were repealed by Act of Feb. 8. 1894, ch. 25, 28 Stat. 36).
See. e.g., Smith v. Allwright, 32 1 U.S. 649 (1944) (declaring white primary unconstitutional);
182.
Guinn v. United States, 238 U.S. 347 (191 5) (declaring grandfather clause unconstitutional).
Giles v. Harris, 189 U.S. 475,488 (1903).
183.
184.
See Brown v. Bd. of Education, 349 U.S. 294 ( 1955); Brown v. Bd. of Education, 347 U.S. 483
(1954).
185.
Lassiter v. Northampton County Bd. of Elections, 360 U.S. 45 ( 1959).
See Civil Rights Act of 1964, tit. VII, 42 U.S.C. § 2000(e) ( 1994): Americans with Disabilities
186.
Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2101 ( 1994); Age Discrimination in Employment Act, 29 U.S.C. § 621 (1994).
See. e.g., DrewS. Days, ill, Reality, 31 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 169, 176 (1994) ("As the Voting
187.
Rights Act approaches thirty, it deserves to be regarded as the most effective piece of federal civil rights
legislation on the books.").
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Although the front persons in court in 1964 were all white men, behind
the scenes the Civil Rights Division had, in one important respect, departed
from traditional hiring practices in the Department of Justice. One had to
look far to find a black person in the other divisions, except, perhaps, for
messengers. Even the Civil Rights Division had only a few black lawyers;
few blacks were admitted to law schools in those days. However, the Civil
Rights Division began recruiting black clerical staff from business colleges
and other predominantly black institutions. Analysis of voter applications
was a resource intensive exercise, and a group of black clerical staff worked
alongside the white attorneys in a two-room suite known as "Hattie's shop."
It was named after the senior clerical worker, Hattie Ballard. The work
somewhere acquired the nickname "Geef work." The existence of this group
was inspiring to the lawyers, in at least two ways. First, the black women in
Hattie's shop put their all into the work; they knew firsthand about racial
discrimination and they thought they were doing the Lord's work. Second,
the contrast between the complexion of the Civil Rights Division work force
and that of the rest of the Department, combined with the hard work and
ability of Hattie's shop, suggested to us the depth of racial discrimination.
We knew that our colleagues in other divisions would simply believe that
their hiring practices were not discriminatory. If Robert Kennedy's Justice
Department could rationalize its behavior in that way, how much more
likely was it that Southern voter registrars would do the same? Thus,
Hattie's shop stood as a reminder that special measures might be required to
ensure against racial discrimination and also as an example that could support the prophylactic measures of the Voting Rights Act.
IV. DRAMAT!S PERSONAE
The other players in the Sumter County case represent well some of the
general types of persons whose conduct led to the adoption of the Voting
Rights Act.
A. Joe Bizzell

I had begun work for the Civil Rights Division of the Justice Department in January of 1964, after compiling a very good record as a law student at Boalt Hall and the University of London. Eager to correct injustice
and litigate constitutional cases, I immediately found myself stuck for long
hours at a microfilm machine, reading voter registration applications from
Alabama seven days a week. Then came my first trip to Alabama, interviewing black citizens who had tried to register to vote. So this was law
practice. Records work and driving the red clay roads of rural Alabama.
This was how I first met Joe Bizzell, a fifty-seven-year-old farmer in Coa-
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topa, 188 Alabama, who had tried unsuccessfully to register to vote in 1954
and 1961. He had, indeed, been in the war so long, but hadn' t got tired yet.
Mr. Bizzell, a handsome middle-aged man with a confident and pleasing
manner, owned 120 acres of land; he had a fifth-grade education. My analysis of voter registration records had revealed that a white person of comparable background had successfully registered at the same time as Bizzell's
1954 application was rejected; the white applicant, Winn Holley, had not
filled out his own form. Mr. Bizzell 's penmanship was ragged but legible. I
got directions to his home, located six miles past the end of the hardtop; as I
neared it, the wheels of my rental car began to slip in the wet red clay of the
road. Soon I was stuck; trying to rock the car out of the increasingly deep
rut, I managed to wedge it against a pine tree. I walked the final yards to
Mr. Bizzell's white wooden farmhouse. He threw a saw into his tractor and
went to my car. After cutting down the tree, he towed me out of the mud.
He then invited me to his plain but comfortable home where we talked
about his experiences trying to register to vote.
Mr. Bizzell 's account was factual and straightforward. Three times he
had made applications, had received no help from the registrar, had never
heard whether his applications were accepted or not, but figured he had
failed the "test" somehow. The first time the merchant he had asked to serve
as supporting witness said "that he would have to know Mr. Bizzell for 25
189
years in order to be able to sign, so he did not sign. " He told me he had
not tried to register since 1961 because "he feels that he had done his best
and does not think that he could do any better." 190 I asked him to read to me
from the application form and he read it out loud and well; by comparison,
several white witnesses at the trial were unable to read at all, though they
had nonetheless succeeded in registering.
In Sumter County, rejected black applicants for registration routinely
explained to me that they had not been victims of discrimination; they had
simply "failed" the registration process in some way. I don't know whether
they really believed that. Perhaps they were simply reluctant to tell a white
man from Washington what they really thought about the local white officials . However, from my study of rejected and accepted applications for
registration, I knew that the registrars commonly completed forms for illiterate whites while turning down literate blacks, including teachers with
masters degrees. I knew that courthouse officials routinely vouched for
white applicants while refusing to vouch for most blacks.191 I knew that all

188.
As with many Sumter place names, Coatopa was named by Choctaw Indians, who preceded
whites and blacks in Sumter County; the name means "wounded panther." VIRGINIA 0. FOSCUE, THE
PLACE NAMES OF SUMTER COUNTY, ALABAMA 27 (c 1978).
189.
Interview with Joe Bizzell, in Coatopa, Alabama (Apr. 7, 1964) (on file with author).
190.
/d.
191.
For example, the record in the case reflects that one white official told a black applicant that he
could not vouch for the applicant because the official was "under bond." However, that official vouched
for over one hundred white applicants. See U.S. Brief, supra note 68, at 38. That official in effect engaged in covert civil disobedience to the Constitution's non-discrimination requirement.
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manner of procedures had been waived for whites but stringently imposed
on blacks. The black applicants might suspect these things but were in no
position to know them, and so they generally did not allege them. At Appendix B, infra, for example, is the application of Richard Wilson, Jr., who
tried to register in 1964 at the age of twenty-eight.
According to the law of Alabama, Wilson was entitled to vote if he met
citizenship, age, residency, literacy, character, and mental fitness requirements and had not been convicted of enumerated crimes. 192 His application
reflects that he met all these requirements. The Board rejected him for two
wrong answers to a newly adopted test that applicants before 1964 had not
been required to take. In fact, the registrars had registered illiterate whites
for years; from 1954 to 1963 more than sixty whites had been registered
whose forms were filled out by someone else. 193 In any event, there were
forty-eight states when Wilson graduated from high school, and the other
answer was arguably correct.
I never asked the blacks whom I interviewed why they had defied the
norms of the ruling minority by trying to register to vote. It was none of my
business; federal law guaranteed them non-discrimination in registration
and it was my job to enforce that law. It was the view of Congress and the
attorney general that voting was a foundational right, a prerequisite to other
rights. 194 I think the desire to register stemmed in part from belief in the
American creed, civic duty, and equality of citizenship. My visits to these
counties also revealed more concrete reasons. Blacktop roads turned to dirt
ones and sewer pipes to open ditches when one reached the black areas.
Black schools had still not been brought to physical and fiscal parity with
white ones, though progress had been made in an effort to avoid the desegregation required by Brown v. Board of Education. 195 Government employees were all white, except for teachers in the black schools and holders of
some menial jobs. In short, government had little reason to respond to black
citizens and much reason to respond to white voters.
It was the efforts of blacks like Joe Bizzell and Richard Wilson that laid
the foundation for the Voting Rights Act. Thousands of disenfranchised
blacks showed their interest in participating in democracy, as well as their
ability. Many tried repeatedly. Their personal experiences proved the corrupt nature of the state voting system.
B. Ruby Pickens Tartt

The Voting Rights Act is based largely on the prophylactic need to
guard against the risk of discrimination, not only by overt racists but also by

192.
193.
194.
195.

See United States v. Hines, 9 Race Rei. L. Rep. 1332, 1333 (N.D. Ala. 1964).
U.S. Brief, supra note 68, at 51.
See MARSHALL, supra note 147, at 10.
347 U.S. 483 (1954).
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well-intentioned white officials. 196 No one more poignantly shows this need
than Ruby Pickens Tartt, the descendant of a Revolutionary War general.
By 1963 she was in her eighties. Miss Ruby, as both black and white residents of Sumter County affectionately called her, had held what one author
later called "a chair of anguish" 197 as a member of the board of registrars,
the body responsible for registering voters, since 1952.
Mrs. Tartt had close ties with the black community. In the 1930s she
had interviewed former slaves and their descendants for the Works Progress
Administration oral history project. She recorded their recollections of being sold as young children and taken from their mothers; 198 of being
whipped; 199 of the packs of dogs trained to find runaway slaves.200 Some
recalled Reconstruction, blacks voting and being elected to office, trickery
and Ku Klux Klan violence to maintain white rule?01 Miss Ruby was regarded as one of the best of the WPA interviewers, "due in large part to the
unique relationship that she shared with the impoverished blacks of Sumter
County."202 She later became a "song-catcher" for John Lomax and Harold
Courlander, leading them to African-Americans who followed the traditions
of black Sumter County musicians and singers. 203 The depth of her ties to
the blacks of Sumter County became manifest in her fmal years. One of the
black singers, Rebertha Marsh remembered visiting Tartt in a nursing home:
"I stopped by there and sang for her, and she didn't want me to leave. I went
down there just like she was my mother. "204 Another of the singers, Dock
Reed, sang at her funeral.
196.
42 U.S.C. § 1973 ( 1994) (focusing on discriminatory result rather than discriminatory intent).
197.
HONEY IN THE ROCK, SUfJI'O note I, at ix.
198.
Laura Clark was born in North Carolina and was bought as a child by Mr. Garret of Sumter
County, Alabama.
He never bought my mammy, so I had to leave her behine. I recollect Mammy said to old
Julie. "Take keer my baby chile (dat was me) and iffen I never sees her no mo' raise her for
God." Den she fell off de waggin where us was all settin ' and roll over on de groun' jes
acryin'.
BORN IN SLAVERY, sufJra note 62, at 72 (from Tartt's interview of Laura Clark on July 15. 1937).
199.
Angie Garrett said " I been whooped ' tel I tell lies on myself to make 'em quit." !d. at. 134 (from
Tartt's interview of Angie Garrett on June 15, 1937). Others told of beatings they had observed. "One
day my mammy done sumpin ' an' ol' marster made her pull her dress down 'roun her waist an ' made
her lay down 'crost de door. Den he taken a leather strop an' whooped her." !d. at 28 (from Tartt's
interview of Oliver Bell on June 17, 1937).
200.
George Young's brother, Harrison, ran away "an' dey sot de 'nigger dogs' on him lack fox
houn 's run a fox today." After Harrison was caught "den dey turned de dogs loose on him agin, an' sich
a screamin' you never hyared." !d. at433 (from Tartt's interview of George Young on June 3, 1937).
201.
See GABR'L BLOW SOF': SUMTER COUNTY, ALABAMA, SLAVE NARRATIVES (Alan Brown &
David Taylor eds., 1997); see also LAY MY BURDEN DoWN, SUfJI'O note 61, at 19-20.
GABR 'L BLOW SoF'. supra note 20 I, at vii.
202.
Tartt, like the rest of genteel white Livingston, exercised a kind of benign paternalism in her
dealings with the blacks who worked for her and lived in her area . ... Yet, Tartt went beyond merely extending kindness to blacks; she risked the ridicule of her neighbors by becoming actively involved in the lives of her black friends.
!d.
203.
S he eventually received royalties from singers such as Harry Belafonte for having fou nd these
Hall of Fame, Ruby
Pickens Tarn (1880-1974), at
songs.
Alabama Women's
http://www.awhf.org/tartt.html (last visited Mar. 4, 2003).
204.
Clarke Stallworth, She Heard a Hymn in Colton Fields She's Been Singing Ever Since,
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Mrs. Tartt had tried unsuccessfully to persuade the Board of Supervisors to place in the county courthouse a sculpture honoring a black child
who had died while trying to rescue a drowning white child. Such a sculpture might have ameliorated the dominating presence of the statue of the
confederate soldier in front of the courthouse, which members of the Tartt
family and others had built in 1908 to memorialize those who had fought
and died to preserve slavery in Sumter County.
In the 1940s she wrote about the indefensible treatment the South accorded the Negro.205 On one occasion she helped a black landowner whose
white neighbor had tried to trick him into selling off his land. She decried
the lack of fire hydrants in the black part of town. She persuaded local officials to place benches in the square in Livingston, the county seat, on which
blacks could rest after the long walk to town. There is no indication that she
saw any anomaly in the need to have special benches for black citizens. She
loved to tell stories about the blacks of Sumter County. One story reflects
both her fond but patronizing feelings toward blacks and her understanding
of the discrimination in the voter registration process:
She wrote about "an old Negro man registering who wrote down
two words in answer to the so-called 'catch question' to prevent the
Negroes from voting. The question is: Name the duties and obligations of citizenship. We had college graduates and every answer
from the Declaration of Independence to the Sermon on the Mount.
This eighty-year-old uneducated Negro wrote, 'Be manable.' I hope
the board passes him for coining such a beautiful word. " 206
Among the first Department of Justice lawyers to meet Ruby Tartt was
J. Harold Flannery. Nick, as he was called, concluded that Mrs. Tartt
viewed "the Negro community in Sumter County with the benign paternalism of a benevolent despot." She expressed the view to him that many
blacks are not qualified to vote "because they do not keep up with public
events or are easily misled by unscrupulous politicians."207 On the other

BIRMINGHAM NEWS, June 12, 1983, ar I D.
205.
DIM ROADS AND DARK NIGHTS: THE COLLECTED FOLKLORE OF RUBY PlCKENS T ARTT 171
(Alan Browned., 1993) ("Cenainly rhere was no allempt [in he r writingsJro defend this section in their
lreatment of the Negro. There still isn ' t. This I know to be !rue. Awful tho il all was. And so much is
wrong today in not doing what we shou ld for them.").
206.
BROWN & OWENS, supra nore 94, at 53 (citing to Tam, manuscript fragment). Anolher version
of the story has been sanitized: "An old Negro man was regisrering to vote. Question No. 20 is, 'According to the Declaration of Independence, what are some of the duties and obligations of citizenship?' His
answer was, 'Be more able.' l think he coined a mighty expressive thought. I hope he gets to vote!" DIM
ROADS AND DARK NIGHTS, supra note 205, at 146.
207.
One of her slave interviews includes this: "Aller S'render, dey tuck a darky for de probil jedge,
but dat nigger didn't know nothin' an' he couldn'r rule. So den dey tuck a while man name Sanders, an '
he done all right." BORN IN SLAVERY, supra note 62, al 435 (Tant's interview of George Young on June
3, 1937).
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hand, she said, that whites who execute poor forms "are qualified because
they 'keep up with the newspapers. "'208
In 1962, Justice Department attorney Carl Gabel met Ruby Tartt when
he inspected the records of the Board of Registrars. 209 Unlike many of the
registrars he had met during records inspections, Miss Ruby was cordial to
Gabel. She was also talkative. When I interviewed Gabel in 2000, he still
remembered, thirty-eight years later, her telling him that if the blacks ever
got the vote, the City of Lexington would have financial problems, because
they would have to build a second water tower in order to extend running
water to the black part of town. 210 In a letter to a friend, Ruby Tartt characterized Gabel as "delightful and a real brain," but expressed concern about
whether blacks in Sumter County were ready for the vote. 211 Noting that a
different and unprincipled type of white people had recently moved into the
county, she worried:
This being election year, it has already shown its monstrous head,
so that what the docile, illiterate and ignorant negro now faces is not
in accord with human life, human justice or with human decency.
Their weaknesses are being exploited. They can be trained away
from cruelty and into moderate energy and to respect the law- if
they see the white man obey the law and that the laws apply equally
to black and white. Having been born poor, crushed by a lifetime of
squalor and privation, then to be offered this single blessing of hope
by the ballot which, they are told and believe, will be the resting
place of their salvation, it is not surprising that the negro should
grasp at anything to make this possible. For years they have chosen
to Jive in the day that was passing; now they are showing consideration for remoter tomorrows. Is the privilege to vote under condition
here the answer? Who can say what is fair, and to whom? Few of
them can read the registration form intelligently-after having been
drilled on the outside! Education is no doubt necessary before they
will dare be on their own. 212

208.
Memorandum from J. Harold Flannery to David L. Nonnan, Sumter County, Alabama: Summary and Recommendations (Feb. 27, 1963) (on file with author). On an earlier occasion she explained
to Flannery and Carl Gabel that blacks could learn to write well at Tuskegee, which she called "the
penmanship academy," wh ile the fonns o f less educated whites do not look very good. However, "These
whites know what is going on. are not subject to bloc voting, and they keep infonned by reading the
newspaper." Therefore, "she would accept the white and reject the Negro applicants described above."
Note from Carl Gabel, Statement of Mrs. Ruby Tartt (Aug. 3 1, J962) (on fil e with author).
The Department first inspected records in Sumter County in 1960 and again in 196 1, 1962,
209.
1963, and 1964. Gabel's inspection was apparently on March 6, 1962. See Senare Hearings, supra note
85, at 1410.
2 10.
Telephone interview with Carl Gabel (Jan. 18, 2000).
211.
Letter from Ruby Tant, Registrar. Sumter County, to Henry Snow (Mar. 16, 1962) (on file with
the University of West Alabama, Ruby Pickens Tartt Collection, Alabama Room Archives and Special
Collections) [hereinafter Letter from Tartt to Snow].
/d.
2 12.
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Confessing that she felt "like Atlas carrying the world on my bended back,"
she acknowledged, "When I think of what wrongs, what cruelties they've
suffered in helplessness, one wonders if this hope which they are told and
believe to be their salvation should be denied them."213 However, she went
on to ask, "shouldn't education come first so they will not remain slaves,
but individuals who can think and act for themselves?"2 14 She confessed
that: "Somehow I can't find any fixed rules for judging, for there are so
many intense local attachments. Five generations of us have lived here, have
worked among them and helped with their problems."215 She concluded,
"It's a responsibility-but one I'm unwilling to abdicate (before I'm
asked)."216 She wrote a note on a scrap of paper in 1963, saying that as the
longest serving registrar she accepted "the responsibility ... for any and all
mistakes which in the eyes of certain FBI gentlemen have been made. " 217
This mea culpa may have been warranted. Bud Sather, after interviewing black leaders and white officials in 1963, attributed the 1961 resignation
of the Chairman of the Board of Registrars to a dispute over the registration
of several black applicants. "Mr. Godfrey apparently wanted them registered and Mrs. Tartt refused to sign the applications."21 8 Flannery and Gabel
concluded from their conversations with Mrs. Tartt "that when a Negro of
whom she approves applies, she helps him materially to fill out the form
and get a voucher. Conversely, when a Negro she dislikes or doesn't know
applies, he is almost invariably rejected and receives no help."219
Ruby Tartt and the other registrars were instruments of the law of Alabama. That law was facially neutral. 220 Although it had been adopted with
racially invidious intent, it could have been applied in a racially neutral
manner. Miss Ruby's instincts all led her to seek fairness. There is no evidence that the other registrars wished to act unfairly. Bernard Hines, a registrar who testified at trial, told the court he had never made distinctions
based on race. Yet the social and legal structure of Alabama led the registrars, whether knowingly or not, to treat whites one way and blacks another,
to the detriment of the black citizens of Sumter County. The white people of
Alabama were no better and no worse than the white people of the United
States. They were no better and no worse than people of color throughout
the world. Ruby Tartt was able to see that injustices were being visited on
blacks in Alabama, and she did take some steps to bring about fair treat213.
!d.
214.
!d.
215.
/d.
216.
Letter from Tartt to Snow, supra note 211.
217.
/d.
218.
Memorandum from Mr. Sather to Mr. Norman, Sumter County, Ala., Status of Registration
(May 6, 1963) (on file with author).
219.
Memorandum from Carl Gabel & Flannery, R.P. Tartt and Registration Statistics (July 20. 1962)
(on file with author).
220.
See United States v. Hines, 9 Race Rei. L. Rep. 1332, 1332-33 (N.D. Ala. 1964) (explaining that
under Alabama law, the qualifications for registration were limited to age, residency, literacy, and certain character requirements).
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ment. However, her writing and her actions suggest that she proceeded from
a hierarchical base line. This may help explain why she was inconsistent in
her quest for fairness. She regularly filled out registration forms for white
applicants, thus ensuring that there would be no disqualifying errors. She
did so only three or four times for black applicants, while reJecting many
blacks for making disqualifying errors on their applications. 21 Similarly,
she regularly found supporting witnesses for white applicants, while rarely
doing so for black applicants, whom she instead rejected for failure to supply a supporting witness.
In later years, I litigated cases against racially segregated school districts. It was often clear that the school authorities wanted to desegregate but
needed the political cover of a federal court order to do so?22 It was never
my sense that this was true in the voter registration cases. Registrars either
believed that they were lawfully denying registration to unqualified applicants or they believed that the end of ensuring white electoral supremacy
justified the discriminatory means they employed. As appointees of statewide officers in the George Wallace administration, they may well have
recognized that their job, as far as Governor Wallace was concerned, was to
impede, rather than facilitate, registration by black citizens. Voter registration seems to be an area where the natural inclination of officials to favor
the status quo prevailed over their fidelity to federallaw. 223
C. Willie Dearman

The prophylactic provisions of the Voting Rifhts Act-especially its
suspension of the supporting witness requiremene -respond, as well, to a
risk exemplified by the story of Willie Dearman, a lifelong resident of Sumter County who had served as the probate judge there for over eleven years.
Voter applicants frequently asked him to serve as a supporting witness because he was conveniently located in the county courthouse where the registrars normally met and as an elected official he knew and wanted the votes
of a large number of Sumter Countians.225 He had vouched for twenty-three
blacks in ten years, while vouching for 205 whites during the same time
period?26 Judge Dearman testified as to why he vouched for some black
22 1.
U.S. Brief, supra note 68, at Table D (Analysis of Accepted Applications Jan. I, 1954 to Feb. I,
1964) (demonstrating the assistance given by Ms.Tartt).
222.
This was true as early as 1961 , when J.W. Peltason published his study of federal courts and
school desegregation. Many school board members "will publicly deplore such an injunction, but often
they will applaud privately." Peltason added, "Some federal judges have failed to recognize that their
primary role is to ' take the heat."' PELTASON, supra note 158, at 96.
223.
See Russell Korobkin, The Endowmem Effect and Legal Analysis, Nw. U. L. REV. (forthcoming) (explaining the "status quo bias").
224.
United States v. Logue, 344 F.2d 290 (5th Cir. 1965) (enjoining the supporting witness requirement under the authority of 42 U.S.C. § 1971).
225.
He said he knew eighty-five percent of the adults of both races in Sumter County. Transcript at
571, United States v. Hines, 9 Race Rei. L. Rep. 1332 (N.D. Ala. 1964) (No. 63-609) (on file with author) [hereinafter Hines Transcript].
U.S. Brief, supra note 68, at 44.
226.
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applicants for voter registration but not for others: He followed what I have
described as "the boat-load theory." As an amateur historian he claimed to
know which boat had brought the slave ancestors of these applicants to
America. Some boats brought good blacks and some brought bad ones. My
notes reflect that he testified that Negroes vary from tribe to tribe and about
fifteen percent of Sumter County Negroes are from an intelligent race.227 At
trial , he testified for the defense, and his testimony shocked many in the
courtroom:
[T]here are differences in your Negroes. There are differences in
places in Sumter County that you can go back to your old slave records that Africa was a big continent, that Negroes carne from many
tribes in Africa. Your old slave records will show you that Negroes
from one tribe would sell for as high as $3,000.00, where Negroes
from another tribe, it would be hard to ~et $300.00 for that Negro
because he didn't have the intellect ....2 8
Well, I would say fifteen per cent of the Negroes in the county
here were from an intelligent race, in other words they could learn if
they were taught. 229
Dearman had an even lower opinion of black lawfulness: "It would be
at least ten to one with the Negroes committing [infamous crimes]."230 This
estimate varied wildly from the sheriff's, who thought that the ratio was
closer to two to one, reflecting the population of the county. 23 1
My reaction at the time was one of absolute disbelief. I had not yet been
exposed to the writing of Zora Neale Hurston. The black protagonists in her
classic, Their Eyes Were Watching God, agree that whites think the blacks
they know are good, but those they don't know are bad.232 Nor had I yet
read R.D. Spratt's 1928 book entitled A History of the Town of Livingston,
Alabama.233 Spratt declared that the intelligent blacks "have sought the cit227.
Hines Transcript, supra note 225, at 574, 579.
228.
/d . at 574. In answer to the question on cross-examination. whether he felt "that this abi lity to
read and write is based on the basic inherited intelligence" he responded "Yes sir. All of your I.Q. 's, no
matter where your race is from, it makes a difference. For instance, a water lily grows up in an ugly
environment, but it turns into a very beautiful fl ower. Why, certainly, inheritance has much to do with
it." /d. at 579.
229.
/d.
230 .
Deposition of Willie E. Dearman at 8 (April 29, 1964) (No. 63-609): Hines Transcript, supra
note 225, at 576.
23 1.
Deposition of Sheriff Melvin Stephens at 8 (April 29, 1964) (No. 63-609) (stating about sixtyfive percent of those convicted of infamous crimes are Negroes and thirty-fi ve percent whites).
232.
ZORA NEALE HURSTON, THEIR EYES WERE WATCHING GOD 255 (1937). Hurston writes:
" De ones de white man know is nice colored folks. De ones he don 't know is bad niggers." Janie said this and laughed and Tea Cake laughed with her.
"Janie, Ah done watched it time and time again; each and every white man think he
know all de GOOD darkies already. He don' t need tuh know no mo. So far as he's concerned ,
all dem he don' t know oughta be tried and sentenced tuh six months .... "
/d.
233.
The Town of Livingston is the county seat of Sumter County.
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ies, and it is very largely the stupid incompetents who remain on the
farms." 234 Judge Dearman's position may not be so different from modem
America's. As one court recently put it: "As more well-educated blacks
flowed into America 's mainstream, whites even began to differentiate between the kind of blacks who reflected white values and who were not like
' those other' blacks akin to the inner city stereotype.'m 5

D. United States District Judge Hobart Grooms
Several provisions of the Voting Rights Act reflect distrust of federal
trial judges in the Deep South.236 Other provisions incorporate doctrines
first articulated in the Southern federal courts. 237 The late United States District Judge Harold Greene, who served in the Civil Rights Division from
1957 until 1965, observed that the Division initially "developed facts that
evidence of abuse existed throughout the South. However, after a couple of
years a pincer movement began. On the one hand was the district court
judges . . . . They always ruled against us. On the other side were white
government officials that resisted integration." 238 A rotten political system,
spawned by the combination of one-party rule and one-race rule, had placed
much of the federal bench in bed with the state governmental apparatus.
Judge Hobart Grooms, the judge in the Sumter County case, had allowed The University of Alabama to expel its ftrst black student in 1955,239
and, in 1962, had refused a prison sentence for men who had committed
mayhem and assault in burning a Freedom Ride bus. 240 The Supreme Court
had, at about the same time, reversed Judge Grooms' s dismissal of a habeas
234 .
R.D. SPRAIT, A HISTORY OF THE TOWN OF LIVINGSTON, ALABAMA 200 ( 1928).
235.
United States v. C lary, 846 F. Supp. 768, 779 (E.D. Mo. 1994), rev'd, 34 F.3d 7f1J (1994).
Gunnar Myrdal g ives another possible explanation for the fact that some blacks were allowed to vote:
Some Negroes may be penni ned to vote because they are "good" (a reward for obedience to
the cas te rules), because an influential white group needs their votes, because so few Negroes
vote that it is not worth the e ffort to hamper them beyond a certain point . .. , or because a
few Negro votes are handy to refute the accusation of unconstitutionality.
GUNNAR MYRDAL, AN AMERICAN DILEMMA 480 (1944).
236.
See Appendix A, inf ra.
237.
See Appendix A, infra.
238.
Harold Greene, Civil Rights Division Association Symposium: The Civil Rights Division at
Forty, 30 McGEORGE L. REv. 957,962 (1999).
See JACK BASS, UNLIKELY HEROES 18 1 (1 98 1); JACK GREENBERG, C RUSADERS IN THE COURTS
239.
226 (1994). Another author reports that before upholding the suspension, Judge G rooms told her lawyers
that,
[A]Ithough he had ruled with them in the past, he could do so no longer if he was to continue
living with his wife. Friends knew that Grooms slept with a loaded shotgun under his bed,
and his wife was badly frightened and concerned about their t wo young children because of
threats that were received after he ordered Miss Lucy' s admission.
JACK BASS, TAMING THE STORM 106 (1993). Judge Grooms in 1963, nonetheless, ordered the university
to admit two black s tudents. GREENBERG, supra at 338; see also P ELTASON, supra note 158, at 84, 13842.
See BRANCH, supra note 42, at 570. Grooms's version is that the sentence was based on a plea
240.
bargain, after a fi rst jury had been unable to agree on a verdict. See H.H. Grooms, Segregation, Desegregation, Integration, and Resegregation 36 (1979) (unpublished manuscript, on fi le with The University of
Alabama Library).
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corpus petition by civil rights leader, Rev. Fred L. Shuttlesworth.241 Yet
Grooms had often ruled for black plaintiffs in cases attacking various as242
pects of the racial caste system when the law and facts were clear. Judge
Brown, one of the progressive members of the Fifth Circuit, characterized
Judge Grooms as "a conscientious, vigorous, energetic Judge."243 Unlike
many other judges in the Deep South, Jud~e Grooms did not engage in delaying tactics in handling civil rights cases. 44 Judge Grooms's record, while
cause for concern, was better than the record of the other two judges in the
45
Northern District of Alabama, Seybourn Lynne and Clarence Allgood?
Although he was born and educated in Kentucky, where he was editor
in chief of the Kentucky Law Review in 1926, and was an Eisenhower appointee and, therefore, not in the political mainstream of Alabama,246 Judge
Grooms's roots developed in white society. He practiced with a Birmingham firm from 1926 until taking the bench in 1953. Since the Democratic
party controlled Alabama politics and both senators were Democrats, the
appointees to federal court vacancies in Alabama during a Republican
presidency had to satisfy both political parties. This led to noncontroversial
appointees, who "come from bland backgrounds, men of local but not national fame, men who make Who's Who after rather than before appointment."247
Judge Grooms took the oath of office in a ceremony that, as judicial investitures often do, took on the aspect of a love feast. Often such ceremonies celebrate the brilliant career, the intelligence, the success at the bar, and
the deep knowledge of the law that the speakers attribute to the new judge.
Judge Grooms, however, was celebrated as a man of unblemished character,
"a man of courtesy, of friendliness, and of personal consideration."248 An
241.
In re Shuttlesworth, 369 U.S. 35 ( 1962).
242.
See SIKORA, supra note 42, at 46, 176, 180, 278.
243.
Nelson v. Grooms, 307 F.2d 76, 79 (5th Cir. 1962) (Brown, J., concuning). One author opined:
"[T]he courage of U.S. District Judge Hoban Grooms of Binningham has been documented on more
than one occasion because of his forthright and even-ha nded manner in dispensing the law." SIKORA,
supra note 242, at 278.
244.
For a general description of judicial de lays in race discrimination cases in the 1960s, see Note,
Judicial Pe1[ormance in the Fifth Circuit, 73 YALE L.J. 90 (1963). In 1965, Assistant Attorney General
Burke Marshall testified that the average time between the filing of suit challenging discrimination in
voter registration and decision in the suit was 17.8 months and that it took, on average, another year to
complete an appeal from an adverse decision in such a case. Burke Marshall, Prepared Statement Submitted to the United States Commission on Civil Rights, Jackson, Mississippi (Feb. 18, 1965), reprinted
in House Hearings, supra note 101 , at 304, 308. Judge Grooms decided the Sumter County case within
ten months of its fi ling.
245.
See PELTASON, supra note 158, at 84; see also RICHARD C. CORTNER, CIVIL RIGHTS AND
PUBLIC ACCOMMODATIONS: THE H EART OF ATLANTA M OTEL AND M CCLUNG CASES 72 (200 1) (discussing Lynne). Lynne was known by Civil Rights Division lawyers as "the sly fox," because we perceived
him as a smart chess player trying to find ways to avoid ruling in favor of the Department of Justice in
race discrimination cases. See ALEXANDER BICKEL, POLITICS AND THE WARREN COURT 69-70 ( 1965)
(discussing Allgood).
246.
Judge Grooms, a native of Kentucky, was appointed to the bench in 1953. THE AMERICAN
BENCH, JUDGES OF THE NATION 70 (Mary Reincke & Jeaneen C. Wilhelmi eds., 1977)
247.
PELTASON, supra note 158, at 7.
248.
Frank E. Spain, Alabama's Newest Federal Judge, Harlan Hobart Grooms, 15 ALA. LAW. 180,
181 (1954).
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account of the ceremony concluded that "Harlan Hobart Grooms, in the
eyes of his partners is a simple man. Straight thinking is as natural as
breathing in the performance of his professional duties." 249
Judge Grooms characterized himself as "a good conservative, but not so
conservative that I can't see what the law is." 250 Although he could not be
expected to look at race discrimination from any perspective other than a
white one, most people, black or white, would probably have characterized
him as a decent man. He wrote in his civil rights memoir that desegregation
of The University of Alabama "was not only the right course legally and
equitably, but the right course morally."25 1 Judge Grooms was a devout
Christian, active in the Baptist church. In an article entitled Christianity and
the Law, he stressed that the law should be grounded in the lessons of religion: "The moral teachings of the scriptures emphasize the worth of the individual, the protection of whose dignity is the prime purpose of alllaw."252
He believed that Christianity's "influence has enabled men to conform their
conduct to its principles- princiEles rooted in the perpetual, universal, unchangeable moral laws of God." 53 And his article closed with the recognition that "legislators and judges are subject to influences which stem from
their religious as well as their personal, social and cultural backgrounds."254
Judge Grooms was aware of the importance of the vote to the blacks of
Alabama. Governor George Wallace had attacked him for ordering, in 1963,
that Vivian Malone be admitted to The University of Alabama. 255 Governor
Wallace had issued a statement that, as Grooms later noted, "set the tone of
defiance."256 Grooms wrote in 1979: "Governor Wallace felt safe politically
in taking this stance since the black vote in the state at that time was insignificant. The Democrat ballot still carried the emblem 'White Supremacy.'
Federal registration of black voters was in the future."257
It is apparent that Judge Grooms did not regard the Sumter County voting rights case as memorable. In his civil rights memoir, he tried to discuss
all the civil rights cases he had tried that involved racial discrimination, but
he noted "I may have overlooked some." Indeed he had. While he had
wanted "to preserve the record of events which are a part of the history of
the period in which they occurred," lest they "'fade into the storied past, and
in a little while are shrouded in oblivion,' [Aurelius]," he omitted mention
of discrimination in voter registration in Sumter County. 258
249.
/d. at 184.
250.
MCWHORTER, supra note 154. at 247. Bur see FRANK T. READ & LUCY S. MCGoUGH, LET
THEM B E JUDGED: THE JUDICIAL INTEGRATION OF THE DEEP SOUTH 20 I ( 1978) ("In political philoso·
phy perhaps the only characterization that can be made about him is that he defies categorization.").
25 1.
Grooms, supra note 240, at 7.
252.
H.H. Grooms, Christianity and the Lnw, 25 ALA. LAW. 3 11 , 318 ( 1964).

253.
254.
255.
256.
257.
258.

!d. at 323.
/d.
Grooms, supra note 240, at 23.
!d.
!d. at 24.
/d. at 87.
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When he died in 1991, the Birmingham News headline announced:
"Civil rights judge H. Hobart Grooms is dead at 90."259 The President of
Samford University recalled that "Judge Grooms was a gentle giant of the
legal profession, a man whose devout Christian faith caused him to stand for
principle, even when it was not popular to do so."260 And the Dean of Cumberland School of Law said that Grooms had "very courageously applied the
law fairly and evenhandedly."261
V. THE CASE

A. Steps Leading up to Suit

Although the Civil Rights Act of 1957 had authorized the attorney general to bring suit to remedy racial discrimination in voting practices,262 the
Eisenhower administration had brought only three cases in the first two
years under the legislation. 263 The Division attributed the paucity of cases in
part "to lack of access to local registration records."264 Thus began the pattern of legislative action, local intransigence, and legislative response that
culminated in the Voting Rights Act. On May 6, 1960, Congress adopted
the Civil Rights Act of 1960, which authorized the Department of Justice to
require voting officials to allow the Department to inspect and copy voting
records? 65 Department files do not reflect why, in June of 1960, President
Eisenhower's Attorney General, William P. Rogers, chose Sumter County
as one of four counties in Southern states to be asked to make their voting
and registration records available for inspection by agents of the Department of Justice. A press release from the Department of Justice simply
noted that "[t]hese are the third in a series of investigative demands served
on Southern counties ... to determine whether constitutional rights have
been denied citizens through discriminatory practices based on race or
color."266 The release then recited the available population and registration
statistics for each county.267

259.
Bob Blalock, Civil Rig/us Judge H. Hobart Grooms is Dead at 90, BIRMINGHAM NEWS, Aug.
24, 1991, at lA.
260.
ld.
261.
!d.
262.
Civil Rights Act of 1957 § 131, Pub. L. No. 85-3 15, 71 Stat. 634 (codified as ame nded at 42
u.s.c. § 1971 (1994)).
U.S. COMM'N ON CrvtL RIGHTS, REPORT OF THE U.S. COMMISSION ON CIVIL RIGHTS, 1959, at
263.
131 (1959).
264.
ld. at 133. In addition the Department may have been awaiting the outcome of a constitutional
challenge to the Act's authorization for the Department of Justice to bring suits challenging racial discrimination in voting practices. United States v. Raines, 362 U.S. 17 (1960).
265.
42 u.s.c § 1971 ( 1960).
266.
Press Release, Department of Justice (June 6, 1960) (on file with author) (noting "Available
statistics show 8,700 Negroes of voting age in Sumter County. census 1950. and 175 registered voters in
I':J5H. White persons of voting age numbered 3,600 in 1950 and 2,858 were registered in 1958").
267.
ld.
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Perhaps the choice of Sumter County was random; after all, Sumter was
one of twenty-two counties in Alabama in which less than ten percent of the
black voting age population were registered to vote. 268 The file contains no
complaint from black citizens of Sumter County. As the attorney general
testified in 1959, "we have been surprised that we have not had as many
complaints as you might expect in this area."269 He acknowledged that one
reason could be fear, but said he had no way of knowing the reason. 270 Although initial practice of the Civil Rights Division had been to rely primarily on complaints before investigating possible violations of the civil rights
laws, Assistant Attorney General Harold Tyler, who took office in 1960,
eliminated the requirement of a formal written complaint as a prerequisite to
a voting discrimination investigation.271 While the Department might sometimes act in response to information from the Civil Rights Commission, the
1959 Commission report had not included Sumter County in its list of possible discriminators. 272 Or perhaps the Department had chosen Sumter because it was known as a place where the white majority tolerated particularly harsh treatment of blacks. Just six years earlier, United States Attorney
Frank M. Johnson (soon to become a federal judge) had successfully prosecuted the Dials, white owners of a Sumter County plantation, for violating
the federal peonage laws. 273 They had whipped to death a black worker who
had tried to escape from their plantation, but the local prosecutor apparently
never charged them with homicide. Testimony reflected that Herbert
Thompson "was tied by the neck, feet and waist with rope to a bale of hay
and beaten by eight men with ropes," while Fred Dial "held a shotgun to
force Negroes to beat Thompson, and later participated in the beating himself . .. ."274 J.W. Boyd, a white farmer from Livingston who had testified
that beatings were common on the Dials' farm, later told defense counsel
that "whooping a nigger ain't bad in Sumter County."275 It is also possible
268.
U.S. COMM'N ON CIVIL RIGHTS, REPORT OF THE U.S. COMMISSION ON CIVIL RIGHTS, 1961, at
104 (1961).
CIVIL RIGHTS: Hearings on H.R. 300,351-53, 400,461,617- 19, 759,913- 14, 1902,2346,2479,
269.
2538, 2786, 3090, 3147-48, 3212, 3559,4169, 4261 , 4338-39, 4342, 4348, 4457, 5008, 5170, 5189,
5217-18, 5276, 5323, 6934-35 Before the Subcomm. on Civil and Constilutional Rights of the House
Comm. on the Judiciary, 85th Cong. 214 (1959).
The Kennedy Administration, by contrast, adopted an explicit policy of investigating counties
270.
where "most white adults are registered and qualified Negroes are being turned down." Burke Mars hall,
Federal Protection of Negro Voting Rights, 27 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 455, 465 ( 1962). The administration believed that "[t]hese two facts alone establish a case of discrimination. Only the details of the
techniques of discrimination are lacking . .. ." /d. The Kennedy Administration did not wait for complaints from such counties, because it believed that the separation of the races meant that rejected blacks
did not know that the registration requirements they had failed to meet were not applied to whites.
Hence, they tended not to complain. /d.
271.
LANDSBERG, supra note 155, at 85; Hawk & Kirby, supra note 37, at I 060-6 1.
272.
U.S. COMM'N ON CIVIL RIGHTS, REPORT OF THE U.S. COMMISSION ON CIVIL RJGHTS, 1959, at
71ff. (1959).
273.
TINSLEY E. YARBOROUGH, JUDGE FRANK JOHNSON AND H UMAN RIGHTS IN ALABAMA 25-31
(1981).
274.
Jury is Still Deliberating Case of Slavery Defendants, BIRMINGHAM NEWS, May 14, 1954, at 10.
275.
TONY A. FREYER & TIMOTHY DIXON, DEMOCRACY AND JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE: A HISTORY
OF THE FEDERAL COURTS OF ALABAMA, 1820- 1994, at 231 (1995) (quoting JACK BASS, TAMING THE
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that the Civil Rights Division chose Sumter because it was one of the few
Black Belt counties in the Northern District of Alabama, since it already had
cases pending in the other two federal judicial districts.276
The journey from records demand to discrimination suit followed an
unsteady path, marked by dilatory tactics of state officials, evolution of the
Civil Rights Division's understanding of the nature of the discrimination,
frequent turnover in Division personnel assigned to Sumter County, a gradual increase in the number of rejected black applications for registration,
and unexplained delays by the Division which probably resulted from the
demands that litigation elsewhere placed on the small staff.
Records inspection was normally an essential first step in determining
whether the registrars discriminated against black applicants. An early student of the voting rights cases noted that "[ w]ithout the records one cannot
demonstrate even so basic a fact as that 98 per cent of whites of voting age
in the count~ are registered whereas the corresponding figure for Negroes is
2 per cent." 77 The records may also show "that the registration imbalance is
due to the rigorous standards required of Negroes and the very indulgent
standards applied to whites." 278 Registrars, anxious to avoid disclosure of
their discriminatory practices, often played a delaying game--one that
eventually led to the Voting Rights Act's bypassing local registrars, by authorizing the attorney general to bring about appointment of federal voting
examiners to register voters. By 1964, registrars in thirty-eight of the one
hundred counties where the Department of Justice sought records had refused to provide them, and the Department had been required to sue under
the 1960 Act. 279
County officials initially took a public relations stance of cooperation
with federal agents, while assuring the press that they had not discriminated
in voter registration and accusing the agents of conducting a fishing expedition. A news article reported that Ruby Tartt told the FBI agents " that since
1955 there has been no rejection of Negro voting applicants in Sumter
County."280 Judge Dearman told the reporter "that Sumter County had never
barred Negroes from voting and that there have always been a percentage of
STORM 83 (1993)); see also Dials' Attorney Says DA Has Not Acted in Good Faith, BIRMINGHAM
NEWS, May 13, 1954, at 59. The national press yawned at this sensational case. The New York Times
devoted three sentences, not to the convictions, but to a UP story on the dismissal of charges against
some of the defendants. United Press, Slavery Charges Dropped, N.Y. TIMES, May 12, 1954, at 23. The
Birmingham News, however, covered every day of trial and jury deliberation, culminating in a frontpage story about the conviction on May 15, 1954. Dials Convicted in Forced Labor Case in Sumter,
BIRMINGHAM NEWS, M ay 15, 1954, at I.
According to John Doar, "[T)he Division's strategy was to develop and file a case of voter
276.
discrimination against a registrar in one county in each of the judicial districts" in Alabama, Louisiana,
and Mississippi. Doar, supra note 172, at 3.
277.
DoNALD S. STRONG, NEGROES, BALLOTS, AND J UDGES: NATIONAL VOTING RIGHTS
LEGISLATION IN THE FEDERAL COURTS 20 (1968).
!d. at 20-21.
278.
279.
/d. at 21.
Hugh W. Sparrow, FBI Agents Checking Sumter Vote Records, BIRMINGHAM NEWS, June 6,
280.
1960, at I.
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Negroes on the voting lists. He said that every Negro school teacher in the
county is a registered voter." 28 1 However, after allowing a few poll tax records to be copied, the local circuit solicitor advised the FBI agents that a
state judge in Montgomery had enjoined the release of the records.282 The
Birmingham News trenchantly summarized this first episode in Sumter the
following week with the headline: "U.S. agents sent out in ignorance;
Washington flubs in Sumter voting."283
For the next six months state and local officials engaged in a form of
civil disobedience to federallaw. 284 The Sumter registrars and probate judge
took the position that they could not turn over the record, due to state court
orders. In August, United States District Court Judge Frank M. Johnson had
overturned the order of the state court judge from Montgomery. 285 So the
FBI agents returned in October to copy the voting records, only to be advised that another state court judge, this one from the circuit that includes
Sumter County, had transferred custody of the records to MacDonald Gallion, Attorney General of Alabama, and had ordered that no one but Gallion
and the Sumter County officials could have access to the records.Z86 As with
the first order, this one was entered without notice or hearing; and this was
not even a case, in the normal sense, because there was a plaintiff but no
defendant. Because Gallion, not the local officials, now purportedly had
custody of the records, the Department of Justice demanded that Gallion
provide access to them. 287 The Department also tried, repeatedly and to no
avail, to get access from Judge Dearman, the re~istrars, and from Judge
Hildreth, who had entered the most recent order. 88 The New York Times
reported that Attorney General Gallion risked a possible jail sentence be-

281.
!d. In fact, several black Sumter County teachers testified at trial about their unsuccessful efforts
to register.
282.
Hugh W. Sparrow, U.S. Agents Sellt Out in Ignorance; Washington Flubs in Sumter Voting,
BIRMINGHAM NEWS, June 12, 1960, at 1.
283.

!d.

284.
They were following a pattern previously established by Attorney General (later Governor) John
Patterson and Circuit Judge (later Governor) George Wallace, who had defied Civil Rights Commission
subpoenas for records under the 1957 Act. See U.S. COMM'N ON CIVIL RIGHTS, REPORT OF THE U.S.
COMMISSION ON CIVIL RIGHTS 1959, at 70-71, 81 ( 1959).
285.
Alabama ex rei. Gallion v. Rogers, 187 F. Supp. 848 (M.D . Ala. 1960), a.ffd, 285 F.2d 430 (5th
Cir. 1961), cert. denied, 366 U.S. 913 (1961).
286.
Memorandum from FBI Birmingham Field Office, Inspection and Copying of Voter Registration Records in Sumter County, Alabama (Oct. 12, 1960) (quoting Order, Judgment and Decree, State of
Alabama, ex rei Ma cDonald Gallion, Attorney General of the State of Alabama, Petitioner, signed by
Emmett F. Hildreth (Oct. II , 1960) (on file with author)).
287.
Leiter from Harold Tyler, Assistant Altorney General, to MacDonald Gallion, Allorney General
(Oct. 24, 1960) (on file with author).
288.
Memorandum from Director of the FBI to Harold Tyler, Assistant Auurney General. Ins pection
and Copying of Voter Registration Records in Sumter County, Alabama, Election Laws (Nov. 3, 1960);
Memorandum from FBI Birmingham Field Office, Inspection and Copying of Voter Registration Records in Sumter County, Alabama (Dec. 2. 1960) (on file with author).
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cause of his refusal to grant access.289 It quoted Gallion as saying he had
taken his stand as a matter of states' rights and sovereignty. 290
This episode of official civil disobedience dissolved after a second federal court suit, this one before Judge Hobart Grooms in the Northern District
of Alabama, finally resulted in an order, three days after President Kennedy
was sworn into office and a new team of leaders began taking over the Department of Justice. 291 MacDonald Gallion, a Democrat rumored to be running for govemor,292 decided to resist no longer. 293 The following day, three
FBI agents under the direction of a Civil Rights Division attorney, began
copying records, prompting a flurry of news reports. For example, one local
paper's headline read: "Justice Snoopers Raid Vote Records After Court
Rules."294 A few days later, a cryptic editorial page item in the Birmingham
News noted that the Sumter County officials "took the situation with a
calmness and stoicism which could have been expected. Anyone familiar
with Sumter Countians would have known it would take more than such an
invasion to ruffle folks there. In Sumter County, the view is long, the patience deep, and the self-confidence beyond intrusive onslaught."295 The
press flurry ended with a short note in the Sumter County Journal: "The
Snoopers are gone from Livingston and odds are the Justice Dept. boys
simply wasted thousands of dollars of the taxpayers money without finding
any discrimination whatever."296
The records inspection had consisted of photographing thousands of
pages of registration and poll tax records. The film would have to be developed and then sent to the Civil Rights Division for indexing and analysis.
This meant spending weeks viewing poor quality microfilm and analyzing
the records. This was before the days of high-quality photocopiers, computer scanners, and personal computers. Division attorneys and clerical staff
289.
UPI, Alabama Aide Defies U.S. Order to Yield lloter Registering Data, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 12,
1960, at 10.
ld.
290.
291.
In re Gallion, 6 Race Rei. L. Rep. 185 (N .D. Ala. 1961 ); see also Jo Ellen O' Hara, Grooms
Asked to Bare Voter Registrations, BIRMINGHAM NEWS, Jan. 23, 1961 , at I; Jo Ellen O'Hara, After
Court Order-FBI Starts Probe of Sumter Voting, BIRMINGHAM NEWS, Jan. 24, 196 1, at I . The Department had filed the case on Dec. 22, 1960. Judge Grooms acted promptly, in contrast to Judge Thomas of
the Southern District, who took sixteen months to deny, without explanation, similar requests. The Fifth
Circuit Court of Appeals was " unable to find any conceivable justification supporting the trial court's
action." Kennedy v. Bruce, 298 F.2d 860, 862 (5th Cir. 1962). Judge Thomas's dilatory actions are
described in Note, supra note 244, at 97. It bears mention that, in contrast with Judge Johnson, Judge
Grooms did not submit this case for publication in the Federal Supplement, the official reports of the
United States District Courts.
292.
Memorandum from Director, FBI (initialed J EH), to The Attorney General, MacDonald Gallion,
Attorney General. State of Alabama, Information Concerning Inspection and Copying of Voter Registration Records in Sumter County, Alabama (Nov. 3, 1960) (on file with author). Mr. Hoover also noted
that when Gallion had opposed inspection he had commented " that he would like to be arrested by the
FBI because he would ' politically have it made.'" /d.
293.
Jerry Norris, Gallion Advises Sumter Officials to Release Files, BtRMtNGHAM POST-HERALD,
Jan. 24, 1961, at I.
294.
SUMTER COUNTY J., Jan. 16, 1961, at I.
295.
Th e Age Ills and Sumter. BIRMINGHAM NEWS, Jan. 29 , 1961, at Al2.
296.
Dick Smith, HiUtes, SUMTER COUNTY J., Feb. 2, 1961 , at I.
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developed a system for analyzing voter records. When I arrived in 1964, the
system was as follows: I would read an application on the microfilm machine and then dictate into a dictaphone what appeared on each blank on the
application. I would then turn the tape over to Hattie's shop.297 They would
type the information onto three-by-five inch, six-ply multi-colored carbon
sets and would then arrange sets by race (where known), chronologically,
alphabetically, and based on how various questions were answered.298 This
laboriously compiled information served as Lhe basis for further investigation and also was used to prepare exhibits and briefs.299 As Jimmie Breslin
later explained in his book about the impeachment summer of 1974, " By
cross-filing index cards of white and black voters, the lawyers were able to
prove that if a black man and a white man gave exactly the same answers to
the questions, the black man failed and the white man passed."300 Arranging
the cards in various ways would reveal patterns of conduct. John Doar said,
"Sometimes you get to moving them around and you find the cards are telling you a story you didn't know."301 For example, in the Sumter County
case, the records reflected a pattern of courthouse officials acting as supporting witnesses for many whites and only a few blacks. That analysis then
became the basis for cross-examination of those officials. Although the tedious examination of microfilm hardly seemed romantic, Division attorneys
were taught to think of it as "the romance of the records." These analyses
underlie much of the detailed record of discrimination that Congress relied
on in enacting the Voting Rights Act.
Departmental forays into Sumter County to interview black applicants
and leaders began after the records inspection. The FBI was, of course, the
investigative agency for the Department of Justice, and Civil Rights Division lawyers were not supposed to be investigators. So the attorneys took
trips to interview prospective witnesses, not to "investigate." 302 The visit of
Division attorneys to Sumter County in the spring of 1961 provided information that would become useful when the Division requested an FBI investigation. 303

See supra Pan IT (describing Hattie's shop).
For example, in one case the master chronology was arranged as follows:
( I ) Negro accepted - yellow copy
(2) Negro rejected - blue copy
(3) White accepted · orange copy
(4) White rejected -green copy
C ivil Rights Div., Dep't of Justice, Program for Birmingham 4 (Undated and unsigned) (on file with
author).
299.
1963 ATI'Y GEN. ANN. REI'. 184 (describing this system).
300.
JIMMIE BRESLIN, HOW Tim GOOD GUYS FINALLY WON II 1-12 ( 1975).
301.
!d. at 11 5.
"J. Harold Aannery, a young lawyer in the Division, says, ' We always had to disguise it as
302.
interviewing potential witnesses; otherwise it was usurping the Bureau 's function. "' NAVASKY, supra
note 52, at 125.
303.
John Doar told Navasky:
We'd go down South and make a tour of several counties, and we ourselves would interview
Negroes that had made some effon to register. We'd get their experiences and ask the names
297 .
298.
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Some Division attorneys also engaged in aggressive "SNCCing," a term
that denoted urging blacks to attempt to register to vote. 304 They understood
that their mere presence might encourage black applications, because once
blacks were aware that the federal government was investigating some of
the fears that impeded efforts to register might be lessened. On the other
hand, they were theoretically not supposed to overtly "SNCC." Nonetheless,
Nick Flannery wrote:
Gerry Stern gave [Sumter County black leader L.L.] Delaine a stiff
ultimatum on his last visit and the 15 Delaines who registered on 5
March 1962 were the result. I gathered that he had not done much
else and I gave him a lecture, after which he promised to get 20-25
people from that part of the county to go up during the ftrst week in
July_3o5
Without black applicants it would be hard to prove discrimination. If blacks
were to apply, either they would become registered, obviating the need for
litigation, or they would be rejected and a basis would exist for determining
whether the registrars were discriminating against black applicants. Yet
blacks were unlikely to apply without some outside encouragement: "For it
takes courage, patience, and a massive effort before a significant number of
Negro residents are ready to break the pattern of their lives by attempting to
register to vote." 306 Because civil rights organizations had bypassed Sumter
County, there would be no outside encouragement there if Division attorneys strictly followed Division policy. In effect, the Division would be
transferring to the civil rights organizations the power to set Division priorities. SNCCing is, in a way, analogous to a sting operation against a suspected law violator, an accepted if controversial law enforcement tool.
SNCCing could, however, create dangers. It might call into question the
Division's impartiality. It seemed inconsistent with Attorney General
Robert F. Kennedy's mantra that the Department 's activities in the South
were limited to carrying out the normal duties of law enforcement. 307 It
could subject the Justice Department to the charge of stirring up litigation.
In addition, Division attorneys might unwittingly be subjecting black applicants to the danger of reprisal. In light of these dangers, the Division's informal policy was that its lawyers were not to SNCC, but some Division
of anyone they knew of who had tried to register. Then we'd come back and .. . ask the Bureau to interview. It was like a pyramid club. Out of that would come 250 interviews.
ld. at 103-04.
"SNCC" refers to the Student Non-Violent Coordinating Committee, which played a central role
304.
in voter registration campaigns in many counties in the South. Division lawyers also used the term as a
verb, meaning to actively promote black voter registration.
305.
Memorandum from J. Harold Flannery to John Doar, Sumter County, Alabama: Summary and
Recommendations (July 6, 1962) (on file with author).
MARSHALL. supra note 160, at 2 1.
306.
307.
Robert F. Kennedy, Foreword to BURKE MARSHALL, FEDERALISM AND CIVIL RIGHTS, at viiviii (1964).
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attorneys thought there was a "wink, wink, nod, nod" flavor to the policy.
The approved approach is reflected in attorney Arvid (Bud) Sather's 1963
conversation with black leaders in Sumter County:
I pointed out to them that virtually no Negroes had been applying
recently and under these conditions the government was unable to
make a final determination as to discriminatory policy carried out
by the current Board, if any, and is unable to make any such determination unless there is a substantial attempt by Negroes to register
to vote. It was explained to these persons that it was not a concern
of the government as to whether Negroes decided to apply for registration ... [but that] it was our concern that they be acquainted with
the laws and the present situation so that whatever decision they
make, will be based upon an informed knowledge ....308
While the subtlety of Sather's formulation might escape the listener, it
would provide deniability if his actions were challenged, as they later were
in an attempted state grand jury investigation in Dallas County. 309
In May 1961 , two Department attorneys made the first visit to interview
blacks in Sumter County. They brought with them a list of rejected applicants and interviewed a prominent black to ascertain which ones were
black. After speaking with a few other black residents whose stories were
not helpful, they left. 310 In June of 1961-a year after the initial records
request- Assistant Attorney General Marshall asked the FBI to interview
black applicants, and the FBI furnished a 141 page report of those interviews.
These limited contacts led to an arguably premature proposal to sue.
The Department's files contain a memorandum that John Doar apparently
sent in July 1961 to Burke Marshall, recommending that the United States
bring suit against the Sumter County registrars. 311 The memorandum is only
three pages long. 312 It says that in the past seven years, thirty-three a~~lica
tions have been rejected, most from persons " known to be Negroes." 1 The
memo mentions only one discriminatory practice, but one that was clearly
unlawful: "The Board of Registrars has required Negro applicants to get a

308.
Memorandum from Mr. Sather to Mr. Norman, Sumter County, Ala.; Status of Registration
(May 6, 1963) (on file with author).
309.
See Record on Appeal at 5, United States v. McLeod, 229 F. Supp. 388 (5th Cir. 1964) (No.
21475) (stating that a grand jury was investigating "the role of the Justice Department in 'racial unrest'
in the area"). The county's attorney asked, "So, the effect of you and Mr. Doar there being in this county
is to disturb racial harmony rather than to keep it at rest, is it not?" /d. at 161.
3 10.
Memorandum to S umter County DOJ file, May ll , 196 1 Trip to Sumter County (Undated and
unsigned, the names of attorneys Dunbaugh and Radler handwritten at top) (on file with author).
3 11.
Memorandum from John Doar to Burke Marshall, The United States of America v. Earl C.
Godfrey, et al. (July 14, 1961) (on file with author).
312.
/d.
3 13.
/d.

2003]

Origins of the Voting Rights Act

923

white person to vouch for them."3 14 The memo mentions that winning this
suit would stimulate black registration efforts in Sumter and neighboring
Black Belt counties. 315 The file is silent as to why the Division did not sue
based on this memorandum. One possible reason was that other, more compelling cases were being brou§ht and Division resources were stretched too
thin to accommodate Sumter. 16 Closely related is the probability that the
discrimination in the other cases was more egregious.
A year elapsed without significant Division activity in Sumter County.
Then Nick Flannery spent four days there and interviewed three of the black
applicants who successfully registered in the prior six months and ten of the
thirteen blacks who had been rejected in the prior ten months. Flannery developed a clearer understanding of the registrars' practices. He concluded
that the white voucher requirement had quietly been dropped "and the wellqualified Negroes are getting registered, some with assistance."317 However,
he noted a pattern of discrimination: while "the rejected Negroes are not an
impressive group . . . there are whites registered who are no better qualified
than some of the Negroes now being turned down."318 Often, the "most
poorly qualified whites received substantial assistance. "319 Flannery concluded that if enough additional blacks applied-twenty-five to fifty-"we
shall have a basis for suit even if the Board continues to accept wellqualified Negroes.'mo In the month after Flannery's visit, another twentynine black applicants were rejected. 321 Flannery then prepared a memorandum that noted that in the past year, thirty-four blacks had applied unsuccessfully sixty-three times, while no whites had been rejected during that
period. 322 Again noting that "[t]he Negroes and their applications are not,
for the most part, impressive," Flannery reiterated that "in a county in which
whites are usually helped and never rejected, we do have enough for a
suit."323 This time he concluded that vestiges of the white voucher rule re-

314.
!d.
315.
!d.
316.
The Kennedy Administration 's first suits challenging discrimination in voter registration involved Dallas County, Alabama, whose county seat is Selma, and East Carroll Parish, Louisiana. United
States v. Atkins [Dallas County) and United States v. Manning [East Carroll Parish) were filed on April
13, 1961. Senate Hearings, supra note 85, at J 196, 1199. These cases were followed in July by suits in
Clarke and Forrest Counties, Mississippi and Ouachita Parish, Louisiana-United States v. Ramsey, 331
F.2d 824 (5th Cir. 1964); United States v. Lynd, 349 F.2d 790 (5th Cir. 1965); and United States v.
Lucky, 239 F.Supp. 233 (W.O. La. 1965). /d. at 1202, 1205, 1208. The Division filed three more suits in
August and six more in the remaining months of 196 1. Thus, the Division, which had filed six registration suits from 1957 until January 19, 1961 , had filed fourteen such suits in the first eleven months of the
Kennedy Administration.
317.
Memorandum from J. Harold Flannery to John Doar, Sumter County, Alabama: Summary and
Recommendations (July 6, 1962) (on file with author).
!d.
318.
319.
/d.
320.
/d.
321.
U.S. Brief, supra note 68, at Table C-21.
322.
Memorandum from J. Harold Flannery to John Doar, Sumter County, Alabama: Summary and
Recommendations (typed Oct. 25, 1962) (date stamped Feb. 27, 1963) (on file with author).
/d.
323.
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mained.324 Variations in procedure "stem from Mrs. Tartt's insistence that
she know the voucher and the persons used as references. She does know
and approve of some Ne~oes whom the applicant may use if he, fortuitously, knows them also. " 25 He concluded that "[w]hether a Negro will be
registered depends in the last analysis upon Mrs. Tartt's estimation of
him."326 Flannery also learned that the board was applying an " unauthorized
rule that persons are permitted to apply only three times."327 Mrs. Tartt said
that Judge Dearman told her (erroneously) that this was state law. Based on
his review of the rejected blacks' applications, Flannery believed that most
would be registered if they had been white. 328 In November, David L. Norman told Flannery to prepare a suit justification memorandum and a complaint "if you are convinced that we have a suit here." 329
By the following spring, attorney Arvid Sather, newly assigned to the
case, had concluded that the registrars had violated federal law in six
ways.330 Every item in his list provides an example of the devices and procedures that the Voting Rights Act would later seek to end:
(1) A resignation and a death left Ruby Tartt as sole registrar; in
effect, no board any longer existed;
(2) The board refused to give three time losers a fourth opportunity to register;
(3) The board had no clear meeting place for registration;
(4) The registrars registered low literacy whites and did not use
the application form as a test for them, but rejected low literacy and
some good literacy blacks, using the form as a test for blacks;
(5) Blacks must supply supporting witnesses; whites need not do
so; and
(6) Rejected applicants are not notified of their rejection or the
reasons for it. 33 1

Sather recommended that the Division notify the circuit solicitor of these
issues and of "the procedures and standards which we feel the new Board
must comply with." 332
324.
!d.
325.
ld.
326.
ld.
327.
Memorandum from J. Harold Flannery to David L. Norman, Sumter County, Alabama; Summary and Recommendations (typed Oct. 25, 1962) (date stamped Feb. 27, 1963) (on file with author).
328.
!d.
329.
Note from David L. Norman to Mr. Flannery (Nov. 17, 1962). Flannery apparent ly was reassigned after this, though the file does not refl ect t he change. A 1964 status report lists Flannery as handling primarily cases in Mississippi: Sunflower County, Chickasaw County (two cases), Marshall
County, and Clarke County. It also shows him as in charge of a case in Fayette County, Tennessee.
Senate Hearings, supra note 85, at ll 7Sff.
Memorandum from Mr. Sather to Mr. Norman, Sumter County, Ala.; Status of Registration
330.
(May 6, 1963) (on file with author).
!d.
331.
332.
!d. Division policy required an attempt to negotiate prior to bringing suit. See MARSHALL, supra
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Sather's recommendation triggered an extended period of negotiations.
Because there was no functioning Board of Registrars, Assistant Attorney
General Burke Marshall initially wrote to Alabama Attorney General Richmond Flowers, sending a copy to the Circuit Solicitor for Sumter County.
Marshall 's letter described in detail both the discriminatory practices and
the steps that must be taken to remedy them. 333 Marshall pointed out that
"The Civil Rights Act of 1957, as amended, authorizes the Attorney General
to bring suit against the State alone where there is no functioning board of
registrars."334 He expressed the hope that a new board would be appointed
and would voluntarily comply, so that litigation would be unnecessary.335
The new board should, according to Marshall, apply to black applicants the
same qualification requirements under which whites had been registered;
use the application form to determine whether applicants possess those applications, instead of as a test; inform applicants whether they had successfully registered, and if not, the specific reasons for denial; allow rejected
applicants to reapply without any waiting period; give adequate notice of
when and where persons could apply; and clearly tell applicants of the supporting witness requirement and that the witness may be black. 336
Unlike Governor George Wallace, Attorney General Flowers was
viewed as a moderate on race relations.337 Nonetheless, Flowers did not
respond to Marshall's letter, which had requested a response by June 15.
However, two new members were appointed to the Board in June, so there
was a functioning Board that would once again process applications. In October, Marshall wrote Flowers a letter saying that a review of actions since
June revealed "that the Board has elected not to follow" the procedures outlined in the May letter. 338 Twenty-three blacks had applied to register, but
twenty applications were rejected, including four by school teachers and six
by persons with high school educations. 339 Marshall said that nineteen of the
twent~ applications met the standards under which whites had been registered. 40 He reiterated his desire for voluntary resolution, and gave the
Board of Registrars two weeks to agree to register the nineteen qualified

note 160, at 23.
333.
Letter from Burke Marshall to Richmond Flowers (May 23, 1963) (on file with author).
334.
!d.
335.
/d.
336.
/d.
337.
In 1965, he brought two prosecutions for murders of civil rights workers. Ala. Dep' t of Archives
Alabama's
Attorneys
General:
Richmond
Flowers,
at
&
Hist.,
http://www.archives.state.al.us/conoff/flowers.html (last visited Aug. 7, 2002). He won support of black
voters in his unsuccessful 1966 race for governor against Lurleen Wallace. Assistant Attorney General
Gordon Madison, the head of the federal section of the Alabama Attorney General's office and Flow·
ers's top assistant in voting rights matters, was a fair and able lawyer, who also seemed to be a "moderate." JOHN HAYMAN, BITIER HARVEST: RICHMOND FLOWERS AND THE CIVIL RIGHTS REVOLUTION 188
(1996). Flowers characterized Madison as "an experienced , brilliant lawyer." Id.
338.
Letter from Burke Marshall to Richmond Flowers (Oct. 16, 1963) (on file with author).
339.
/d.
340.
ld.
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applicants and to otherwise comply, as spelled out in the May letter. 341 Presumably, the Division did not expect the registrars to comply, for the following week John Doar forwarded Assistant Attorney General Marshall a
memorandum recommending suit together with the necessary papers to
commence suit, "so that we can file Friday if we get no satisfaction."342
The Board of Registrars did respond by the deadline.343 It agreed to take
some steps, but not the steps required by Marshall's letter. For example,
instead of agreeing to stop using the application form as a test and to apply
the standard under which whites previously had registered, the Board simply said it would use the application to see whether the applicant was qualified and would use the same standard for both black and white applicants.344
Instead of agreeing to register the nineteen recently rejected applicants
whose applications reflected that they were qualified, the Board gave attempted justifications for each rejection. 345 Arvid Sather concluded:
The action of the new board has again discouraged Negroes at a
time when they had expectations that the white officials at the
courthouse would give them a fair chance to register. From my observations talking to Negroes and the county officials at the courthouse I cannot help but feel that the next step, whether it be additional negotiations or litigation, must produce decisive results in
this matter. 346
The following week, Sather prepared a letter for Marshall to send to Flowers explaining that suit would be filed because " it is apparent from the
Board's response that it is unwilling to make necessary changes in its practices in order to comply with federal law." 347 A month passed before the
letter was sent and suit was filed. The file does not explain this latest delay,
but it was most likely due to President Kennedy's assassination, which
briefly brought Robert F. Kennedy's Department of Justice to a standstill.
On December 16, 1963, -rnore than two-and-one-half years after Attorney General Rogers's initial records demand- the United States brought
its suit against the three members of the Board of Registrars and the State of
Alabama. 348 The complaint was signed by Attorney General Kennedy,
Burke Marshall, United States Attorney Macon Weaver,349 and John Doar.
34 1.
/d.
342.
Memorandum from John Doar to Burke Marshall (Oct. 22, 1963) (on file with author).
343.
Lener from Bernard G. Hines, Ruby P. Tant, & William S. Holman to Burke Marshall (Oct. 23,
1963) (on file with author).
/d.
344.
345.
/d.
346.
Memorandum from Arvid A. Sather to David L. Norman, Status of the Negotiations with the
Sumter County, Alabama Board of Registrars Concerning the Discrimination Against Negro Applicants
for Registration to Vote (Nov. 7, 1963) (on file with author).
347.
Lener from Burke Marshall to Richmond Flowers (Nov. 14, 1963) (on file with author).
348.
United States v. Hines, 9 Race Rei. L. Rep. 1332 (N.D. Ala. 1964) (No. 63-609).
In the Northern District of Alabama, as in most judicial districts in the South, the United States
349.
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Its allegations largely tracked the letters that Marshall had sent to Aowers.350 However, as in some other cases brought during this time period, the
complaint added a set of allegations that had not been mentioned in either
the letters or the suit justification memorandum: that the racially separate
but unequal schools for blacks in Sumter County had provided a public education that " has been and is inferior to that provided for white persons," and
351
that therefore the use of the form as a test is racially discriminatory. The
complaint alleged that these "deprivations of rights have been and are pursuant to a pattern and practice of racial discrimination."352 This allegation, if
proven, could lead to the appointment of a federal referee who could consider applications for registration.
The complaint asked for injunctive relief. 353 This was not a case for
damages, nor was it a criminal prosecution, either of which would have
required a jury trial. Suits for injunctions are called actions in equity and are
not included in the constitutional right to trial by jury. 354 So this case would
be tried before a judge, who would find the facts and apply the law. If the
government were to win the case, the critical question would be what relief
the judge would grant. The prayer for relief requested that the defendants be
enjoined from specified acts, including "applying different and more stringent registration qualifications, requirements, procedures, or standards to
Negro applicants for registration than those which have been applied to
white applicants in determining whether or not such applicants are qualified
to register to vote," as well as "rejecting applicants by grading the application form and questionnaire as a test under unreasonable and arbitrary standards. " 355 The prayer also asked that the court order the defendants to register blacks whose rejected applications met the standards previously applied
to whites. 356
The United States had filed its case. Now it would have to support it
with law and facts . The defendants aimed their fust salvo at the government's claim of unequal education, quickly filing a motion to strike that
allegation. 357 They soon followed with discovery papers- interrogatories
and motions to require the government to produce documents.358 The motion to strike previewed the defense's general theme that low black registration simply reflected low black qualifications: "Said paragraph seeks to
Attorney would sign as local counsel, but would not actively panicipate in the case. One of Weaver's
assistants, Ray Acton, was normally assigned to make appearances and provide advice to the Civil
Rights Division lawyers.
350.
Complaint, United States v. Hines, 9 Race Rei. L. Rep. 1332 (N.D. Ala. 1964) (No. 63-609).
351.
/d.
352.
fd.
353.
/d.
354.
See Shields v. Thomas, 59 U.S. 253, 262 (1855) (holding that right to jury trial under Seventh
Amendment does not extend to actions in equity).
355.
Complaint, United States v. Hines, 9 Race Rei. L. Rep. 1332 (N.D. Ala. 1964) (No. 63-609).
356.
/d.
357.
STATUS REPORT, supra note 150, at 100, reprinted in Senate Hearings, supra note 85, at 1273.
358.
Plaintiffs Answers to Defendants' Interrogatories, United States v. Hines, 9 Race Re i. L. Rep.
1332 (N.D. Ala. 1964) (No. 63-609).
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have the court place a premium on ignorance and lack of education . . .
[and] would have the court discriminate against better educated persons in
favor of those with inferior education."359 This theme had animated opposition to the black vote even before the Fifteenth Amendment was adopted. 360
The interrogatories added the "two wrongs don't make a right" theme, perhaps drawn from an early Alabama voting rights case that reached the Supreme Court: 361 "Do you now claim that Negroes may be registered contrary to the Constitution and laws of Alabama because Whites have
been ?" 362 Later, the defendants' answer would raise two more defenses:
They denied that past or present Boards of Registrars in Sumter County had
discriminated based on race; and the State claimed that since there was now
a functioning Board of Registrars, there was no justification for keeping the
State of Alabama as a defendant in the case.363
In February, the court granted the motion to strike the unequal education claim. 364 However, the theory was far from dead, and the government's
evidence of unequal education in Sumter County ultimately became part of

359.
Motion to Strike, United States v. Hines, 9 Race Rei. L. Rep. 1332 (N.D. Ala. 1964) (No. 63609) (filed Dec. 30, 1963, by Attorney General Richmond Aowers and Assistant Attorney General
Gordon Madison). Even before the complaint was filed, the Circuit Solicitor for Greene, Marengo, and
Sumter Counties had explained the low black registration as stemming from high black illiteracy. In a
dig at the home of the Justice Department, he claimed that "(a] high school education in a negro school
in Sumter County means possibly no more than one in a largely predominate Negro school in Washington, D.C., where, I have read, many cannot even read and write after receiving their diplomas." Letter
from Thomas H. Boggs to Burke Marshall (Oct. 18, 1963) (on file with author).
360.
See ROBERT M. GOLDMAN, RECONSTRUCTION AND BLACK SUFFRAGE: LOSING THE VOTE IN
REESE AND CRUIKSHANK 9 (2001) (referring to "those who agreed with President [Andrew] Johnson in
believing that African Americans were not yet ready to be granted the right to vote. Having been denied
by law the opportunity for education under slavery, the vast majority of black adults were illiterate, and,
so the argument went, were incapable of exercising the franchise in any meaningful way").
36 1.
Giles v. Harris, 189 U.S. 475,486-87 (1903). Justice Holmes assigned as one reason for denying
equitable relief that if the Court accepted plaintiffs ' claim that the "whole registration scheme of the
Alabama constitution is a fraud upon the Constitution of the United States," the Court would then lack
equitable power to order the plaintiffs registered, because that would simply perpetuate the fraud. Giles,
189 U.S. at 486·87. The anomalous result was to leave the white registrations under the scheme standing
and to leave the black applicants with no remedy.
362.
Defendants' Interrogatories, United States v. Hines, 9 Race Rei. L. Rep. 1332 (N.D. Ala. 1964)
(No. 63-609). The United States responded, at length, to this question:
Plaintiff does not contend that any person should be registered contrary to law. Plaintiff's position is that under the Constitution and laws of the United States the registration requirements of Alabama law must be construed to require reasonableness in the administration of
the laws and that, in accordance with the decision of the Court of Appeals in U.S. v. Atkins,
the Constitution and laws of Alabama require registrars to determine the qualifications of applicants by fair and reasonable methods, standards and procedures. Further, insofar as voters
in Sumter County are concerned, the law of Alabama is no more and no less than it has been
interpreted and construed by the usages of the Board of Registrars of Sumter County. Therefore, the Board of Registrars is obliged to register all Negro applicants who possess the substantive qualifications to register, measured fairly and reasonably, as those qualifications
have been construed and applied by the Board in registering white persons in the County.
Plaintiffs' Answers to Defendants' Interrogatories, United States v. Hines, 9 Race Rei. L. Rep. 1332
(N.D. Ala. 1964) (No. 63-609).
363.
Answer of Defendants, United States v. Hines, 9 Race Rei. L. Rep. 1332 (N.D. Ala. 1964) (No.
63-609).
364.
Order, United States v. Hines, 9 Race Rei. L. Rep. 1332 (N.D. Ala. 1964) (No. 63-609).
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the record submitted by Attorney General Katzenbach to support adoption
of the Voting Rights Act. 365
Meanwhile, the Civil Rights Division filed some discovery papers, but
its lawyers were busy preparing other cases. In March, Arvid Sather tried a
voter discrimination case in the federal court in Montgomery, against the
Elmore County Board of Registrars. I spent almost two weeks working on
that case, my first experience in federal court. In April, Sather tried a case in
the federal court in Selma, against the Perry County Board of Registrars. I
had made my first trip to Sumter County, where Jonathan Sutin and I interviewed thirty-three black applicants for registration, for a solid week. Sather
and I then attended the pre-trial conference in the Sumter County case, held
in the federal courthouse in Tuscaloosa/66 where I met Judge Grooms for
the first time. I also met Registrars Hines and Holman and County Solicitor
McConnell, whom a memo to our files had described as "a very staunch
segregationist."367 Sumter County case preparation was then immediately
interrupted by preparation for the trial of the Perry County case, which
Sather presented in late April. I then resumed my work on the Sumter
County case, which was tried on May 5 and 6. On May 8, I returned to
Washington, which I had not seen since AprilS. All successful lawyers face
the need to juggle cases, but the combination of resistant state and local
officials and foot-dragging judges was stretching the resources of the Civil
Rights Division. It was becoming obvious that county-by-county litigation
offered a painfully slow and resource-intensive path to compliance with the
Fifteenth Amendment. One possible solution was statewide rather than
county-by-county litigation. The other would be sweeping legislation, the
Voting Rights Act.
For the lawyers assigned to the case, however, statewide suit or sweeping legislation were remote, while the trial was quickly approaching. Trial
preparation for the government attorneys was intense. They interviewed and
re-interviewed the black witnesses, prepared exhibits, and took depositions.
They prepared a witness folder for each potential witness, containing copies
of registration forms, interview notes, reports of FBI interviews, and an
outline of information to be elicited.
One of the requirements in any case alleging race discrimination in registration is proof of the race of each applicant. Without knowing the race, it

365.
Lener from Katzenbach to Sen. James 0. Eastland (April 2, 1965), reprimed in Senate Hear·
ings, supra note 85, at 249-50. The analysis of unequal educational facilitie s in Sumter County appears
in Senate Hearings, supra note 85, at I 161-74.
366.
The counhouse, a classical granite and brick building built in 1910, now serves as the Tuscaloosa City Hall.
367.
Memorandum to Sumter County, Alabama file, Photographing of Registration Records (May 9,
1963) (describing McConne ll as "about 5'9" tall and . .. very solidly built." Based on conversations with
McConnell during the photographing the anonymous DOJ attorney concluded: "He resents very much
the federal government's activities, and I have the impression that he is a very strong type of white
Citizens Council member." Citizens Councils were segregationist organizations that formed after the
decision in Brown v. Board of Education. Unlike the Ku Klux Klan the Citizens Councils renounced
violence as a means to promote segregation) (on file with author).
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is impossible to know whether blacks and whites are being treated differently. In Sumter County, registration books reflected the race of registered
voters, but the race of rejected applicants was not noted in county records.
One of the techniques the government lawyers used to establish the race of
rejected applicants was to take the deposition of public officials, post office
employees, and storeowners. The Division took twenty-one such depositions in late April at which defendants' lawyers asked questions designed to
support their general theme that most Sumter County blacks were not qualified to register. In addition to Judge Willie Dearman, whose testimony was
described above, a parade of witnesses testified that almost all whites in
Sumter County were literate and that many or most blacks were illiterate.
Thus, the postmaster in Ward, Alabama, testified that ninety percent of
whites were literate and seventy-five percent of blacks were illiterate. 368 The
sheriff testified that fifteen percent of whites and seventy percent of blacks
were illiterate, 369 while the tax assessor said that two percent of whites and
sixty-five percent of blacks were illiterate and that fifteen blacks were convicted of infamous crimes in Sumter County for every one white?70 The
other recurring theme was that blacks were not interested in registering. 371
The defense had adopted familiar themes that, though they could easily
boomerang, would in time be echoed by opponents of the Voting Rights
Act. 372 lf local officials presumed that blacks were not qualified and that
whites were qualified to vote, that could explain but could not justify their
discrimination. Their assumptions made credible the government's contention that the defendants applied a double standard in registering voters. And
the contention that blacks were not interested in registering reflected a failure to appreciate the dampening effect that repeated rejections of qualified
blacks would have on registration efforts.
B. The Trial

Judge Grooms set the case for trial in May 1964. Four years had elapsed
since Attorney General Rogers had demanded voter registration records in
Sumter County, but only five months had passed since the United States had
filed the suit. The leadership of the Division formed a trial team, composed
of lead attorney Arvid Sather; supervising attorney David L. Norman; attorneys Jonathan Sutin, James Kelley, and me; and secretary Joyce Auth. My
files contain a nine-page list of assignments for each trial team member. For
368.
Deposition of Emma P. Mitchell at 8 (April 29, 1964) (No. 63-609).
369.
Deposition of Melvin Stephens at 8-9 (April 29, 1964) (No. 63-609).
Deposition of Sam Webb at9- 10 (April29, 1964) (No. 63-609).
370.
E.g., Deposition of Pierson Stuan at 10- 11 (April 29, 1964) (No. 63-609).
37 1.
See, e.g., Senate Hearings, supra note 85, at 740 (testimony of Frank Mize ll, representing the
372.
registrars of Alabama: "illiteracy, conviction of disqualifying c rimes, mobility of the population .. . plus
plain inenia and indifference" explain Alabama's low voting rate). The theme of black ignorance had a
long pedigree, beginning at least as far back as 1866, when it was argued that blacks ' lack of education
rendered them not ready to be given the vote. GOLDMAN, supra note 360, at 9. 13. Proponents of the
Boswell Amendment had made the same argument. !d. at 11.

2003]

Origins of the Voting Rights Act

931

example, my pretrial assignments were to prepare offers of proof relating to
the education claim,373 help check the completeness and accuracy of our
fifty-two exhibits, figure out how to make our proof on discriminatory use
of the voucher requirement, and help prepare witnesses. During the trial I
was to take attendance of subpoenaed witnesses, prepare black witnesses,
interview white witnesses whom we had not previously interviewed, and
interview some additional blacks.
We had to deal with two types of white witnesses. First, we had subpoenaed some whites in order to demonstrate that they had received favored
treatment. Our analysis of accepted application forms led us to suspect that
some were illiterate or only marginally literate and had received help in
filling out the forms. Others appeared not to have been required to secure a
voucher (supporting witness). Some had been interviewed by the FBI and
had corroborated our suspicions. Others had never been interviewed, so we
were the first to speak with them about their registration experience. While
a few were hostile, most were glad to speak with us because the subpoena
caused anxiety. We had established an order of calling witnesses that called
for us to put one or two blacks on the stand, followed by a white whose experiences would contrast with that of the blacks. We knew which black witnesses we would put on, but relied largely on the interviews at the courthouse to determine, at the last minute, which whites to put on, and when.
The defendants had called other white witnesses, and we needed to speak
with them to determine the nature of their testimony and to plan our crossexamination.
Joe Bizzell's story at trial was the story I recounted earlier, minus the
car and tree. Eighteen blacks--college graduates, teachers, contractors,
maids, and housewives whose registration efforts had been rebuffedtestified for the government. One black witness after another recounted the
story of filling out the registration form and seeking a supporting witness.
The government also called the same number of white witnesses, who had
been registered despite their limited literacy, their failure to complete the
registration form, or their failure to secure a supporting witness. But at trial
there was a depressing sameness as each took the stand. The witnesses' personhood was not explored; they were simply tools to prove a pattern of racial discrimination. The Department of Justice lawyers represented the government, not the black witnesses. So the persons whose rights were at stake
had no control over what questions would be asked or who would be called
to testify. The evidence was limited by the nature of the issue raised in the
government's complaint. That issue was not why the registrars discriminated, nor was it the effects on the victims of discrimination. It was simply
whether unlawful discrimination had taken place, and by what means. On
373.
Because Judge Grooms had stricken that claim from our complaint, we assumed he would not
allow us to present evidence to suppon it. Under Rule 43(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
(now found in the Federal Rules of Evidence, Rule I 03(a)(2)), however, we had the right to inform the
coun of the substance of the evidence we wished to submit, in order to preserve the issue for appeal.
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this point, the testimony devastatingly supported the claim of racial discrimination.
For example, Margaret Campbell Brown, a maid at the white college in
Livingston, testified about her two attempts to register. Brown, a homeowner with an eleventh-grade education, had lived in Sumter County for all
of her forty-six years. She first tried to register in 1957, at the age of thirtynine. Only one black successfully applied that year. Brown's application
form is reproduced in the government's brief. 374 It is written in clear, firm
penmanship. In response to the question: "Name some of the duties and
obligations of citizenship," she responded: "Honesty, obedience to all laws
of our country." 375 And she responded correctly to the next, "trick," question: "Do you regard those duties and obligations as having priority over the
duties and obligations you owe to any other secular organization when they
are in conflict?"376 Many applicants of both races were tripped up by this
question, and answered "no" when they meant "yes," or simply left the
question blank. Whites who answered "no" or did not answer at all were
nonetheless registered, while similarly situated blacks were rejected. However, Brown answered "yes." Moreover, unlike many rejected blacks,
Brown had persuaded a white employee in the courthouse to vouch for her.
So why was her application rejected? Brown did not know; she had never
been notified of her rejection, much less the reason for it. She had assumed
that she had properly conveyed the information needed, because the registrars had told her they would let her know whether she was registered. The
word "Incomplete" was written, presumably by a registrar, at the top of her
form. 377 Was she rejected for failing to say when she had become a "bona
fide" resident of her precinct? If so, why did Mrs. Tartt not tell her to fill in
that blank? In any event, numerous whites had failed to fill in that very
same blank and had nonetheless been accepted. Was she rejected for failing
to fill out page three of the application (the oath page)? The government's
brief listed twenty-four accepted applications of whites on which the registrars, rather than the applicants, had filled out page three, in whole or in
part.378
We don't know what prompted Margaret Brown to seek to register in
1957, but it seems likely that her application in July 1963 was an outgrowth
of Arvid Sather's conversation with black leaders in May. Two blacks, including Brown, were rejected on July 1, another six on July 2, and three on
July 3. 379 Only one black had even applied in the preceding six months,380
perhaps because of the lack of a truly functioning board until June. After
registrars Hines and Holman took office in June, the Board met and agreed
374.
375.
376.
377.
378.
379.
380.

U.S. Brief, supra note 68, at 56.
/d.
!d.
/d.
/d. at Table D.
U.S. Brief, supra note 68, at Table C-22 to C-23.
/d. at Table C-22.
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that all applicants must give a "reasonable" answer to all questions on the
form and must provide a supporting witness. 381 As the government argued
in its brief:
When the Board adopted this new and more strict requirement it
was obvious that many qualified applicants would be rejected for
many of the applicants who had been registered since 1954 had
failed to give an answer to all questions. The registrars also knew
that practically all eligible white persons were registered to vote
while only very few eligible Negroes were registered.382
Brown's rejection was par for the course for black applicants under this new
board. In its first eight months, it rejected twenty-two (sixty-one percent) of
all black applicants, while rejecting only eight percent of the 141 white applicants.383 Brown's application was again rejected for being incomplete and
also for failure to provide a supporting witness. She testified she had been
unable to find anyone to sign before closing time that day. In contrast, a
white who applied a few months later testified that a registrar had gone with
him to find his supporting witness. 384
Despite the seeming abstraction of the issue, in the courtroom there was
flesh and blood. The registrars were determined to defend the case vigorously. They cross-examined most of the black witnesses for the government, seeking to show that the black applicants had failed to ask the registrars for help, and to poke other possible holes in the testimony. They called
as witnesses eight blacks who had successfully registered to vote. Eightythree-year-old Addie B. Jackson, a retired schoolteacher who had lived in
Sumter County since her birth in 1880, had successfully registered a few
months before trial. She had no explanation of her failure to try to register
between the adoption of female suffrage and 1964. Her testimony implicitly
backfired: it showed that even highly educated blacks were not expected to
register and vote in Sumter County. This was underscored by her testimony,
on cross-examination, that she hoped to vote for the very first time in the
November 1964 election, if she lived that long. Similarly, testimony of a
black illiterate who had been registered and of blacks who had received help
finding a supporting witness underscored the arbitrary distinctions registrars
drew between "good" and "bad" blacks. The defendants also presented fourteen white witnesses, including Judge Dearman, Registrar Hines, and other
county officials, to testify about the fairness of the registration process. The
testimony of several of these white officials also backfired, both by reflecting the prejudices of some witnesses and by demonstrating the arbitrary
381.
/d. at 59.
382.
/d. Once a person becomes registered in Alabama, he or she normally stays registered for life.
See Report of the President's Commission on Registration and Voting Participation 65 (1963) (indicating that Alabama had statewide "(p)ennanent registration").
U.S. Brief, supra note 68, at 59.
383.
/d. at 32.
384.
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nature of such decisions as whether to vouch for an applicant. Although the
form now only asked the witness to verify the applicant's residency, a black
person's right to vote was made to depend on whether a white person
thought she was "a good Negro" or not.
The Sumter County case played out, in the legal arena, the old debate
between the views of Booker T. Washington and those of W.E.B. DuBois.
Washington, in his autobiography, looked back at what he regarded as the
errors of post Civil War Reconstruction. 385 He argued that Reconstruction
policy was artificial and forced; that it was used as a tool to elect white officials; that it included a punitive element that was bound to hurt blacks in the
end. 386 He thought more attention should have been paid to education. 387
And, as to voting, he said:
I cannot help feeling that it would have been wiser if some plan
could have been put in operation which would have made the possession of a certain amount of education or property, or both, a test
for the exercise of the franchise, and a way provided by which this
test should be made to apply honestly and squarely to both the
white and black races.388
By contrast, W.E.B. DuBois, one of the founders of the NAACP, believed
that Washington's ideas had led to the disfranchisement of AfricanAmericans "and the legal creation of a distinct status of civil inferiority of
the Negro."389 The historian John Hope Franklin notes that "DuBois contended that it was not possible ... for Negro artisans, business men, and
390
property owners to defend their rights and exist without the suffrage. "
The government's suit supported DuBois's position that the vote should
come first, a position later adopted by the Voting Rights Act.391 While the
defendants tried to show that educated and responsible blacks were allowed
to vote, the government did not stop at demonstrating that in fact many educated and responsible blacks were denied the vote. We also argued for registering the less educated blacks. The country could wait no longer for blacks
to advance educationally or economically before allowing them to vote because as long as blacks were denied the vote, the white majority would continue to keep them down educationally and economically. So although we
made much of the prejudice implicit in the testimony of Willie Dearman
and other white officials of Sumter County regarding the low educational
attainments of Sumter County blacks, we also reinforced it to some extent
385.
386.
387.
388.
389.
(2d ed.
390.
391.

BOOKER T. W AS HINGTON, UP FROM SLAVERY

(1900).

/d.
/d.
/d. at 84.
JOHN HOPE FRANKLIN, FROM SLAVERY TO FREEDOM: A HISTORY OF NEGRO AMERICANS

1956).
/d.
Voting Rights Act of 1965 § 4, 42 U.S.C. § 1973 (1994).

388
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by offering dramatic evidence of discrimination in educational opportunities. We showed that the median education of blacks in Sumter County was
five years, while the median for whites was 11.5 years. 392 We also showed
gross disparities in per pupil expenditures and pupil-teacher ratios in the
racially segregated schools of Sumter County. 393 Proffered testimony would
have included Reverend Will Jimerson 's story of his five years attending
school for three months a year in a one-room log cabin, taught by a teacher
with an eighth-grade education. His story resembled that of Amanda Halsey, who attended a one-room school with over one hundred students and
one teacher, where the students sat on planks laid across wood blocks and
wrote on slates for the two-and-a-half months the school met. Black witnesses would have testified that there was no transportation to the black
high schools, so that only those who lived nearby or could afford to board
away from home were able to attend them. Another black witness, Bernice
Hood, had taught from the time she graduated high school in 1944 until
1959, while trying to take college classes during the summers.
The government's argument was twofold. First, the defendants had registered uneducated whites. White illiterates were part of the electoral majority and could generally be counted on to support the status quo. For whites,
the vote was a right, unimpaired by any educational or character requirement. Was a white applicant illiterate? A registrar would fill out the applicant' s form. Did the white applicant know no one to serve as a supporting
witness? A registrar would find a witness. But for African-Americans, registration was a privilege to be earned only by meeting some undefined and
flexible standard, depending on the registrars' and potential witnesses' exercise of a sort of lese majeste. After all, blacks were in the majority, and a
large proportion of them were poorly educated. Second, the requirements,
even if fairly administered, were racially discriminatory. The literacy requirement was discriminatory because the state had denied most blacks a
decent education, while providing a much better education to whites. The
supporting witness requirement was discriminatory initially because the
registrars would accept only white supporting witnesses; even after the
white voucher requirement was dropped, there were so few black registered
voters that it continued to be much more difficult for blacks to find a supporting witness than for whites.
Although the Department of Justice is not normally viewed as taking
radical positions, implicit in its argument was a radical shift in the place of
voting in Alabama. The shift was caused, not by radicalization of the Department, but by the facts of this and similar cases. Alabama's view of the
vote came through clearly in testimony about the supporting witness requirement, which placed an applicant's right to vote into the hands of those
already admitted to the club. Whites who vouched seemingly did not under-

392.
393.

U.S. Hrief, supra note 68, at 84.
/d.
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stand that under Alabama law the only point they were vouching for was the
applicant's residence and, prior to 1964, lack of disqualifying circumstances. Repeatedly, whites testified that they signed as supporting witnesses if they considered the applicant a "good citizen." For example, one
witness said he signed for Dave Wabbington, a black applicant, because
"He was intelligent enough to vote" and was "an awful good boy," who
"paid taxes like the rest of us."394 The defendants treated the vote as a privilege that must be earned; racial prejudice and racial politics made it more
difficult for African-Americans to earn it. In simple terms, whites were presumptively qualified to vote, while blacks were presumptively not qualified.
In fact, Alabama granted virtual universal suffrage for whites, so the application of the non-discrimination rule led the Department to argue for virtual
universal suffrage for blacks.
At the end of the trial, Judge Grooms gave the United States thirty days
to brief the case, with the defendants' brief due fifteen days after ours was
filed. 395 The government attorneys would have to work quickly. In those
pre-computer days the Division mimeographed its trial briefs, a laborious
process requiring the preparation of stencils that were difficult to correct.
Each person on the trial team was assigned portions of the brief for which
he would be responsible. I was to write the description of the case, the parties, and the registration process, the argument regarding discrimination in
the use of the supporting witness requirement, and to compile detailed appendices regarding the witnesses, exhibits, race identification, and analysis
of accepted and rejected application forms.
The government's "brief' contained eighty-eight pages of facts, law,
and argument, followed by more than thirty pages of proposed findings of
fact, conclusions of law, decree, and list of sixty-four rejected blacks whom
the court should order the registrars to register. 396 A separate volume contained over one hundred pages of tables providing more detailed analysis of
the voting records and testimony, as well as analysis of the disparities between black and white education in Sumter County. 397 Faced with the voluminous brief and tables, Alabama Assistant Attorney General Gordon
Madison requested oral argument and did not file a reply brief. He complained: "We could not help but recall that in one of the early Tidelands'
cases ... Mr. Justice Black of the Supreme Court of the United States ordered the attorneys to brief the briefs before they received any consideration
by the Court. "398 The following week the government made one last attempt
to convince Judge Grooms that racially disparate educational opportunities
in Sumter County rendered the manner in which the registrars were using
394.
!d. at 42 (containing testimony of Andrew Parker) (quoting transcript at 16- 17, United States v.
Hines, 9 Race Rei. L. Rep. 1332 (N.D. Ala. 1964) (No. 63-609)).
395.
Court Docket, United States v. Hines, 9 Race Rei. L. Rep. 1332 (N.D. Ala. 1964) (No. 63-609).
U.S. Brief, supra note 68, at i-xi.
396.
397.
!d. at Tables A to G.
398.
Letter from Richmond Flowers, by Gordon Madison, to Honorable H.H. Grooms (June 22,
1964) (on file with author).
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the application forms unlawful. David L. Norman wrote to Judge Grooms to
tell him of Judge Johnson's decision, rendered after the government's brief
was filed, in a similar case in Elmore County, ruling for the government on
the educational theory. 399
The record does not reflect why no oral argument was held, but events
in the country were placing increased responsibilities on the court and the
Department of Justice. The day before Madison sent his letter, three civil
rights workers in Neshoba County, Mississippi, disappeared.400 Their murder triggered a massive investigation and federal prosecution. Ten days after
Madison's letter, President Johnson signed the Civil Rights Act of 1964,
which forbade race discrimination in public accommodations and employment and vastly increased the enforcement authority of the Department of
J ustice.40 1
C. The Court's Decision
Judge Grooms issued his decision on the day that he joined two other
judges in holding that the Civil Rights Act of 1964 was unconstitutional
insofar as it forbade Ollie's Barbecue in Birmingham to discriminate based
on race.402 The Ollie's Barbecue opinion contained a detailed analysis of the
law and the facts. 403 It was published in the official reporter. Judge
Grooms's decision in the Sumter County case contained no such opinion
and he chose not to publish it in the official reporter. He transformed the
stories that the witnesses recounted into findings of fact and conclusions of
law and an order, following in many respects those proposed in our brief.404
The court held the registrars' earlier requirement of a white supporting witness, and their more recent discriminatory application of a facially neutral
supporting witness requirement, were both unlawful.405 They also discriminated in the use of the application for registration, allowing assistance to
whites but not blacks and using the application form as a strict test for
blacks but not for whites. Even after the Department of Justice investigation
and complaint in 1963, the Board rejected sixty-three percent of the black
applications and only eight percent of those from whites.406 Judge Grooms
found that even the facially neutral use of the form as a strict test would
399.
Letter from Burke Marshall, by David L. Norman, to Honorable H.H. Grooms (June 29, 1964)
(on file with author).
BRANCH, StlfJra note 42, at 365 (citing Claude Sitton, Three in Rights Drive Reported Missing.
400.
N.Y. TIMES, Junt: 23, 1964, at 1.).
401.
Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 24 1 (codified as amended in scattered
sections of 42 U.S.C.).
See generally CORTNER, supra note 245 (describing the Ollie's Barbecue case). Cortner charac402.
terizes Judge Grooms as having "compiled a record of hostility to civil rights claims during his tenure on
the district bench." /d. at 72.
403.
McClung v. Katzenbach, 233 F. Supp. 815 (N.D. Ala. 1964), rev'd, 379 U.S. 294 (1964).
404.
United States v. Hines, 9 Race Rei. L. Rep. 1332 (N.D. Ala. 1964) (setting forth findings of fact
and conclusions of law).
405.
!d. at 1335.
406.
!d. at 1334.
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"have a definite tendency to freeze indefinitely the imbalance in the registration between Negroes and white persons in Sumter County.'.4°7 He rejected two of the government's arguments. Although agreeing that particular black applicants "appear to have been victims of the practice and pattern
of racial discrimination herein found to exist," he stopped short of finding
that those applicants were qualified to register and vote. 408 He also rejected
the government's argument that even a facially neutral literacy requirement
would be discriminatory in light of the disparities in educational opportunities in Sumter County.409 He followed legal standards that the Fifth Circuit
Court of Appeals had already adopted, but the government was pushing the
envelope with the educational arguments, which the court of appeals had
410
not addressed.
These findings and conclusions were legally all that was needed to justify relief against the defendants. They failed to tell the individual stories of
the witnesses and other victims of discrimination, but they were dramatic.
They did tell the story to anyone who would give any serious thought at all
to what they meant: that officials of the State of Alabama had, solely on
account of race, denied black citizens of Sumter County a place in the body
politic. Although two-thirds of the county's population was black, its government was reserved for whites only. And the defendants had done this
even though it clearly violated the Constitution and laws of the United
States. Lawlessness of this magnitude would not be tolerated in non-racial
areas of the law. The court's job was to ensure that it would no longer be
tolerated here either.
Despite his findings, Judge Grooms awarded only part of the relief the
United States had sought. He enjoined the defendants from discriminating
based on race and specifically enjoined the use of the supporting witness
requirement and application of "different and more stringent registration"
411
standards to black applicants than had been applied to whites since 1954.
This latter provision seemingly required the registration of applicants with
only the barest minimum of literacy. He ordered the defendants to register
applicants who met qualifications specified in his order, but included a requirement that the "applicant is able to demonstrate his ability to read and
write.'.4 12 We were especially disappointed that Judge Grooms-following a
413
pattern set by a federal court in Montgomery in Giles v. Harris in the
early 1900s-refused to order the Board to register the persons on his list of
407.
!d. For the development of "freezing" doctrine, see Hawk & Kirby, supra note 37, at 1137-52.
Hines, 9 Race Ret. L. Rep. at 1334.
408.
!d. at 1332-37.
409.
410.
Judge Frank M. Johnson did adopt the government's theory in the Elmore County, Alabama,
voting rights case, which was decided shortly after the Sumter County brief was submitted. United States
v. Cartwright, 230 F. Supp. 873 (M.D. Ala. 1964). However, his decision, in another judicial district,
was not binding on Judge Grooms.
Hines, 9 Race Ret. L. Rep. at 1336.
411.
!d.
412.
413.
This unreported case from the Circuit Court of the United States for the Middle District of
Alabama was appealed to the United States Supreme Court at Giles v. Harris, 189 U.S. 475 (1903).

2003]

Origins of the Voting Rights Act

939

apparent victims of discrimination; instead, he ordered that they be notified
of their right to reapply.414 So Joe Bizzell, Margaret Campbell Brown, and
the other discriminatorily rejected blacks would have to apply yet again,
despite having already demonstrated their qualifications to register. The
court's failure to tell their stories in the merits portion of the findings made
it possible to neglect them in the remedy portion.415 In our view, we had
proved that each of the sixty-four listed blacks was qualified to register and
had been discriminatorily denied registration, some more than once.416
Therefore, we believed the court had the duty of requiring the registrars to
register them.
The government did not appeal the decision. Although the Department
of Justice files do not reflect why it decided not to appeal,417 there are several possible reasons. The government's brief had cited no authority compelling the court to enter such an order. Indeed, it did not even cite authority
showing that the court had power to enter the requested order.418 Although
no higher court had yet found a duty to enter such an order where a pattern
or practice of discrimination in voter registration existed, the Fifth Circuit
had upheld a lower court's order requiring registration of named black rejected applicants.41 9 An appeal would challenge the district court's exercise
of discretion, always a risky claim.420 Moreover, in the wake of the adoption
of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 a few months earlier, our personnel were
stretched to the limit. Finally, we probably thought that the blacks on the list
would in fact reapply and would this time be registered under the revised
standards. While this hardly seems fair to the rejected blacks, they were not
our clients, and I imagine that practical results seemed more important to us
than a chancy appeal to the Fifth Circuit. So instead of appealing, the De-

414.
Hines, 9 Race Rei. L. Rep. at 1336.
415.
See Ross, supra note 48, at 23 (describing the use of abstraction to ignore the stories of the
litigants and justify the doctrine of separate but equal).
The sixty-four black applicants accounted for a total of ninety-five rejected applications over a
416.
ten-year period.
417.
The Division is supposed to consult with the solicitor general on whether to appeal an adverse
decision. 28 C.F.R. § 0.20(b) (200 1). However, Judge Grooms's decision was partially favorable to the
government, so we may have thought it unnecessary to write a no-appeal memorandum. See Hines, 9
Race Rei. L. Rep. at 1332.
The government did send Judge Grooms a letter attaching Judge Johnson 's opinion and order in
418.
the Elmore County voter registration case, in which Judge Johnson ordered that the defendants register
102 named rejected black applicants. Letter from David L. Norman to Judge Grooms (June 29, 1964)
(on file with author).
419.
Alabama v. United States, 304 F.2d 583 (5th Cir. 1962).
420.
Alabama, 304 F.2d at 589 (upholding Judge Frank M. Johnson's exercise of remedial discretion
in ordering that fifty-four named black applicants be registered, the court noted, "It was in this settingunder the cumulative impact of gross abuses in the past and little expectation of improvement for the
future-that the Judge was led to conclude ' that this Court is of the firm opinion that this case warrants
not only a prohibitory decree but a decree mandatory in nature."' The court of appeals concluded, " In the
light of the circumstances ... we are of the clear view that this order was within the power of the Court
to grant, and that the exercise of that power was eminently proper."). I d. If an order to register named
applicants was within the court's discretion, so might the court have discretion not to enter such an
order. See id.
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partment declared victory: "Judge Grooms ' decree is one of the most farreaching we have obtained in Alabama."42 1

D. Post-Trial Developments
A lawsuit does not end with the trial or even with the court's decision.
The immediate goal of this lawsuit was to change behavior and transform
Sumter County into a democracy. After the trial, and before Judge Grooms
ruled in the case, the defendants changed their practices slightly: they began
rejecting more white applicants (twenty-four percent). 422 However, they
rejected sixty-seven percent of the blacks who applied. 423 For example, one
of the government's witnesses at trial, Atlas Campbell, was once again rejected. A farmer who co-owned one hundred acres, Campbell had previously applied in 1954, at the age of forty-six. His 1954 application reflected
that he was qualified. Though it contained minor errors, whites who filled
out forms with identical errors were registered. He testified that he never
heard from the Board about his 1954 application. The Board later cited as
the reason for rejecting the July 1964 application of Campbell: "Failed
Test," consistent with the government's charge that the registrars were using
the form as a test rather than to elicit information about the applicant's eligibility to register. 424 During this period fifty-one blacks "failed test" and
two more were rejected for failing to provide a supporting witness. 425 The
Board did register some blacks between trial and decision, including Margaret Campbell Brown.426 Atlas Campbell was finally registered in October
427
1964, after Judge Grooms entered his decree.
After the decree was entered, the Sumter County Journal published an
article with the curious headline, "Federal Judge Hits Sumter Voter Records.'.428 The article further stripped away the story of the discrimination
against blacks in Sumter County. It provided the overall statistics and reported that Judge Grooms had ordered the Board of Registrars "to stop discrimination against Negro voter applicants.'.429 It did not explain the devices
that the Board had used to discriminate. The article did accurately report the
content of the decree, including a list of the sixty black applicants who, as
the article mistakenly put it, had been "ordered by the court to try to reregister.'.430 While the registrars continued to administer the literacy test,
they did not reject applicants based on their poor performance on the test.
Joe Bizzell filed his fourth application, which this time was accepted. The
421.
422.
423.
424.
425.
426.
427.
428.
429.
430.

STATUS REPORT, supra note 150, at 100, reprimed in Senate Hearings, supra note 85, at 1273.
Board of Registrars' Report (Feb. 18, 1965) (on file with author).
/d.
/d.
/d.

ld.
Board of Registrars' Report, supra note 422.
Federal Judge Hits Sumter Voter Records, SUMTER COUNTY J., Sept. 24, 1964, al I.
/d.
/d.
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Department of Justice moved to hold the registrars in contempt for administering the literacy test, but Judge Grooms held his order did not forbid the
use of the test; it only forbade rejecting applicants for failing the test. 431
I went to Sumter County shortly after the decree had been entered. The
federal job had largely been completed; we had cleared the way for nondiscriminatory registration, but the federal government had no responsibility
to organize a voter registration drive. Black leaders in the county were excited and spoke of plans to organize in order to register enough blacks to
defeat the sheriff in the next election, "unless he changes his attitude toward
the Negro people of the County.'.432 However, the Department of Justice
assessed the situation thus: "At present Sumter County seems to suffer from
a lack of Negro leadership or an organization that would stimulate voter
registration. Until this problem is solved it is doubted that Negro voter registration will be materially increased.'.433
The following year Congress adopted the Voting Rights Act.434 The Act
empowered the attorney general to send federal examiners to counties covered by the law, where the registrars were not properly registering voters. 435
The attorney general sent examiners to recalcitrant counties, but tried to
convince registrars to comply instead.436 Within three months, examiners
had listed over 56,000 black voters in the twenty covered counties.437 More
remarkably, local registrars had registered more than 110,000 blacks, including 229 in Sumter County. 4 38 Sumter County registrars rejected no applicants during that period. 439 My own involvement with Sumter County
ended about this time, but not the involvement of the Department of Justice.
Once blacks were free to register, and did register, how would the allwhite leadership of the Sumter County government react? In 1966, Judge
Dearman acknowledged that "the county made a mistake years ago when
there were only registered Negro teachers and perhaps they should have
registered more Negroes.'M0 In 1982, Justice Department lawyer David
Hunter observed in a pre-election report: "whites do not wish to relinquish
political control in Sumter County.'M 1 The Department had by then sued
431.
STATUS REPORT, supra note 150, at 99-100, reprinted in Senate Hearings, supra note 85, at
1272-73. Alabama registrars attempted to use Judge Grooms's approval of this practice as an argument
against the Voting Rights Act's suspension of literacy tests. Senate Hearings, supra note 85, at 769
(containing testimony of Frank Mizell).
432.
Memorandum from Edward H. O'Connell to Sumter County Trial File (Nov. 19, 1964) (on file
with author).
433.
Senate Hearings, supra note 85, at 1273.
434.
Voting Rights Act of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-110, 79 Stat. 437 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C.
§§ 1971, 1973 to 1973bb- l (1994)).
435.
See 42 U.S.C. § 1973 ( 1994).
436.
U.S. COMM'N ON CtVIL RIGHTS, THE VOTING RIGHTS ACT: THE FIRST MONTHS 40 ( 1965).
437.
!d. at 37-39.
!d. at 2, 37.
438.
439.
/d. at 55.
440.
Memorandum from Gary L. Betz to Frank M. Dunbaugh, Sumter County, Alabama Voting Post
Election Conference with Judge Dearman (May 25, 1966) (RG 60, File 166-1-17/10: National Archives
Building, College Park, Md.).
44 1.
Memorandum from David Hunter to Gerald Jones (Aug. 25, 1982) (on file with author).
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Sumter County officials to allow federal observers to fully observe elections,442 and to prevent a voter re-identification law from being implemented until it could be made non-discrirninatory.443 The Department sent
federal observers to every Sumter County election. In justifying sending
observers in 1983, David Hunter noted that "potential exists for the type of
tense, ~larized election that Sumter County has witnessed in recent
By 1974, blacks constituted a majority on the Democratic Party
years.'
County Executive Committee, and Willie Dearman, still the probate judge,
was sued for attempting "to circumvent the authority of the blackcontrolled" comrnittee.445 By 1976, supporters of white office-seekers sent a
flyer to 554 persons listed as registered in Sumter County who had nonSumter County addresses, urging them to vote absentee because "of the
delicate political situation that exists in our County. Certain individuals and
groups of individuals are making a concentrated effort to seize control in
this election. ' 7446
Gradually, blacks began winning other county offices, until, by 1986,
the state legislators representing Sumter County were black, as were the tax
assessor, the appraiser, the tax collector, and all members of the Board of
Education and County Comrnission.447 Today, blacks hold more than seventy percent of the elected offices in Sumter County and constitute about
seventy-two percent of the population.448 They hold most of the important
county offices and many offices in the little cities around the county.449
They are no longer outsiders at the county courthouse. It seems fair to say
that the political process is open today, though racial tensions may still effect elections. Are the blacks of Sumter County better off now that they can
influence the government? Surely securing the franchise has been an important step toward the full citizenship that the Fourteenth Amendment guaranteed more than 130 years ago. Hopefully there is now running water for the
residences of blacks in Livingston. My guess is that it will take some years
before blacks in Sumter County achieve economic equality.

442.
United States v. Executive Comm. of the Democratic Party, 254 F. Supp. 543 (N.D. Ala. 1966),
described in Extension of the Voting Rights Act: Hearings on H.R. 939, H.R. 2148, H.R. 3247. and H.R.
3501 Before the Subcomm. on Civil and Constitutional Rights of the House Comm. on the Judiciary,
94th Cong. 204 (1975).
443.
United States v. Bd. of Registrars (N.D. Ala. 1981) (CV81-P- 1075-W).
444.
Memorandum from David Hunter to Gerald Jones (Oct. 17, 1983) (on file with author).
445.
U.S. COMM'N ON CIVIL RIGHTS, THE VOTING RIGHTS ACT: TEN YEARS AFrER, 169-70 (1975);
see also Ward v. Dearman, 626 F.2d 489 (5th Cir. 1980); Sumter County Democratic Executive Comm.
v. Dearman, 514 F.2d 1168 (5th Cir. 1975).
446.
Memorandum from David H. Hunter to William Bradford Reynolds (Sept. 21, 1981) (on fi le
with author).
447.
Telephone conversation of Charles McKeag with Gerome Gray, Alabama Democratic Conference (Jan. 19, 2000).
448.
/d.
449.
/d.
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VI. ORIGINS OF THE VOTING RIGHTS ACT

The conventional story is that the Voting Rights Act primarily responded to the frustration and sense of crisis many Americans felt when the
Alabama state troopers and Dallas County deputy sheriffs so visibly and
brutally went to war against black citizens who were simply seeking the
voting rights that the country thought it had already secured in the Civil
Rights Acts of 1957, 1960, and 1964.450 The charge by mounted law enforcement officers against unarmed Americans was the final straw. The
normal reaction to frustration and crisis is that we must "do something." So
it was clear that new legislation would be brought before Congress.
This conventional story, while correct as far as it goes, omits two important elements. First, the charge at the Edmund Pettus Bridge was simply
the dramatically visible manifestation of the official racial caste system. The
everyday working of the system depended on the actions of government
officials to enforce it. Some registrars consciously wished to subordinate
blacks, but even those who professed a desire to act fairly found themselves
applying a double standard for voter registration.451 Even after the 1957
Civil Rights Act reiterated the promise of the Fifteenth Amendment, the
Sumter County registrars persisted in applying that double standard, in "apparent ostrich-like disregard as well as disrespect for the law.'.452 Nor did

450.

When the Act became law, an Alabama newspaper editorialized:
The harsh and extravagant voting rights bill was passed ... at the Edmund Pettus Bridge,
when Col. Lingo's forces of law a nd order commenced to beat the daylights out of a handful
of marchers. The televis ion view of that cruel and stupid performance brought ... new shame
to the state .... Mark it well: Alabama passed this law.
The Wallace-Lingo Act, supra note 43: see also DERRICK BELL. RACE, RACISM AND AMERICAN LAW
596 (4th ed. 2000) (recognizing both origins); KEITH ] . BYBEE, MISTAKEN IDENTITY: THE SUPREME
COURT AND THE POLITICS OF MINORITY REPRESENTATION 16-22 (1998); DAVID J. GARROW, PROTEST
AT SELMA: MARTIN LUTHER KING, JR., AND THE VOTING RIGHTS ACT OF 1965 (1978) (describing two
equally weighted origins of the Voting Rights Act: the events at the bridge in Selma and the history of
state and local obstruction of federal efforts to enforce the Fifteenth Amendment); SAMUEL
(SSACHAROFF, PAMELA S. KARLAN, RtCHARD H. PtLDES, THE LAW OF DEMOCRACY 546-48 (2d ed.
2002) (quoting Attorney General Katzenbach, as reported by HOWELL RAINES, MY SOUL IS RESTED:
MOVEMENT DAYS IN THE DEEP SOUTH REMEMBERED 2 15 (1977), as saying "You people in Selma
passed that [Voting Rights Act] on that bridge that Sunday."); PARKER, supra note 40, at 9 (the civil
rights "protest effort s ucceeded in accomplishing what case-by-case litigation against registration restrictions failed to do"); ABIGAIL M. THERNSTROM, WHOSE VOTES COUNT? AFFIRMATIVE ACTION AND
MINORITY VOTING RIGHTS 2-4 (1987); Michael J. Klam1an, Brown, Racial Change and the Civil Rights
Movement, 80 VA. L. REV. 7, 147-49 (1994).
451.
Lawrence, supra note 52, at 322. Charles Lawrence argues that because of our shared experiences "that attach significance to an individual 's race and induce negative feelings and opinions about
nonwhites ... we are all racists." /d. However, " We do not recognize the ways in which our cultural
experience has influenced our beliefs about race or the occasions on which those beliefs affect our actions." ld. The Sumter County Registrars at best were not consciously racists but easily fit into Lawrence 's definition. See also Ross, supra note 48. at 17 ("Even the white segregationists did not make
their law out of s tories about a world of black subjugation and the special advantages this subjugation
created for the whites; instead, they too envisioned a world of perfect harmony, although their vision
included a perfect separation which they imagined as jus t and righteous.").
452.
Burke Marshall, Speech at Howard Law School Annual Dinner (undated), in I CIVIL RIGHTS,
THE WHITE HOUSE, AND THE JUSTICE DEPARTMENT: 1945-1968, at 399, 404 (Michal R. Belknap ed.,
1991).
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their practices change after Attorney General Rogers sought their records in
1961, or even after suit was brought in 1964. As Attorney General Katzenbach testified:
[I]n some areas, it has become the theory that a voting registrar is
not really required to do anything except what he has been doing
until his records have been examined and he has been hauled into
court and, at public expense, his case has been defended by the
State, and all the delaying devices possible have been used . . . .
Then, when a decree is finally entered, that decree can be construed
as narrowly as possible and he can do as little as he can get away
with under that decree. Then that decree-what it means--can be
questioned again in court, new evidence can be introduced, and,
meanwhile, election after election is going by.4 53
Similarly, the discriminators had "found aid and comfort in the disingenuousness of some district judges and in the genuinely troubled vacillation of others.'.454 While most federal judges were not aversive racists, many
nonetheless had difficulty believing that strong remedies were needed for
discrimination in voter registration, just as federal judges in a prior era did
not see racial discrimination in the separate but equal doctrine.455 The
Chairman of the House Judiciary Committee, which was considering the
proposed Voting Rights Act, observed, "officials as high as the U.S. district
judges have taken on the color of their surroundings and have given forth
decisions which seem contrary to the Supreme Court decision and the Constitution. '.456
There would have been no Voting Rights Act had the registrars applied
a neutral standard. There probably would have been no Voting Rights Act
had all the federal judges issued effective relief. Conversely, even without
the debacle at the Edmund Pettus Bridge, further voting rights legislation
might well have been enacted.457 President Johnson expressed interest in
such legislation in December of 1964.458 He "indicated a desire to move
forward early next year with a legislative proposal authorizing a Commission to appoint federal officers to serve as registrars .... '.459
453.
454.
455.

House Hearings, supra note 101, at 66-67.
Hawk & Kirby, supra note 37, at 1196.
See House Hearings, supra note 101 , at 83 (containing Remarks of Chairman Emmanuel Cel-

ler).

/d. More recent s tudies suggest that "although judges s hould be constantly vigilant for potential
biases and prejudices, they will not always recognize their own biases and stereotypes." Debra Lyn
Bassen , Judicial Disqualification in the Federal Courts, 87 IOWA L. REV. 1213, 1250 (2002).
"Selma was in a sense the breaking of a dam-a dam which had been blocking the participation
457.
of the Negro in constitutional government in the South for a century." Hawk & Kirby, supra note 37, at
456.

1053.
458.

Memorandum from Lee C. White for Bill Moyers (Dec. 30, 1964), reprinted in 15 CIVIL
RIGHTS, TliE WHITE HOUSE, AND THE J USTICE D EPARTMENT: 1945-1968, at 150 (Michal R. B elknap
ed., 1991 ).
459.
/d.; see also GARROW, supra note 450, at 36-39 (describing the White House and Justice De-
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Second, the conventional story fails to account fully for the content of
the Act. For once the public was determined to "do something," it would
still have to decide what that something should be. What should the legislation provide beyond what had already been enacted? True, accounts of the
origins of the Act do mention that it responded in part to a history of litigative delays and of the unfair use of various tests and devices.460 However,
461
those statements fail to place any flesh on the skeletal account. True, too,
some of the new methods of enforcement had been proposed in the past. For
example, the administration had proposed the appointment of tem£orary
voting referees in its proposal that led to adoption of the 1964 Act.4 2 This
proposal, like the referee provision of the 1960 Act,463 may be seen as a
precursor to the federal examiner provision of the 1965 Act. 464 However,
appointment of the temporary voting referees was to be placed within the
discretion of the court, while the 1965 Act placed the appointment function
with the attorney generai.465
The content of the Act drew heavily on both the positive and negative
lessons of litigation-on the rules developed by federal litigation in Alabama, Louisiana, and Mississippi-and on the failures of some federal
judges to properly enforce the Fifteenth Amendment.466 The impact of Department of Justice litigation on the Voting Rights Act can be summarized
as follows: The litigation:
( 1) Developed legal rules that VRA adopted.
(2) Provided a factual predicate for Congress's power to enact the
legislation.

partment 1964 consideration of new voting rights legislation).
460.
). MORGAN KOUSSER, COLORBLIND INJUSTICE: MINORITY VOTING RIGHTS AND THE UNDOING
OF THE SECOND RECONSTRUCTION 54-55 (1999); Themstrom, supra note 450, at 1 1-14.
See. e.g., ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, POLITICS AND THE WARREN COURT 125-26 (1965);
461.
KousSER, supra note 460, at 54-55; PARKER, supra note 40, at 29-33; THERNSTROM, supra note 450, at
11-14.
462.
Hearings OilS. 1731 Before the Senate Comm. Oil the Judiciary, 88th Cong. § IOI(c) (1964).
President Kennedy had noted the "usual long and difficult delay which occurs between the filing of a
lawsuit and its ultimate conclusion" and proposed that temporary federal voting referees be appointed
"to provide for interim relief while voting suits are proceeding through the courts ...." John F. Kennedy, Special Message to the Congress on Civil Rights, Pus. PAPERS 221,223-24 (Feb. 28, 1963) [hereinafter Special Message to Congress].
463.
Civil Rights Act of 1960 § 601,42 U.S.C. § 1971(e) (1994).
Voting Rights Act of 1965 § 3, 42 U.S.C. § 1973a (1994).
464.
465.
See 42 U.S.C. § 1973.
The relation between the litigation and the content of the act is recognized by Hawk & Kirby,
466.
supra note 37, at 1195- 1204. This shows "how the courts shaped the 1957 Civil Rights Act and its 1960
amendments into a fl exible and creative law which provided the model in most significant respects for
the 1965 act." /d. at 1054; see also Doar, supra note 172, at 13-14 ('The Division 's hard work underpinned the opinions and orders ... that established the freezing principle .... These decisions had an
influence on individual members of the House Judiciary Committee as they decided upon the final
content of the 1965 Voting Rights Bill .... "). Armand Derfner also has pointed out that the development of the freezing principle, of s tatistically based presumptions, and of judicial s upervision of local
voting officials "were instrumental in formulating the pattern of the Voting Rights Act of 1965." Armand Derfner, Racial Discrimillatioll and the Right to Vote, 26 VAND. L. REV. 523,550 (1973).
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(3) Through the development of stringent remedies, signaled Congress that it could impose strong enforcing legislation.
(4) May have helped the Department of Justice to grab the laboring
oar, contrary to some Civil Rights Commission proposals.
(5) Revealed the need to bypass some federal judges.
(6) Either because they would not do their jobs; or
(7) Because Congress had placed unreasonable and unrealistic demands upon them.
467
(8) Revealed the need to bypass local registrars.
The bill that became the Voting Rights Act was drafted by lawyers in
the Department of Justice and presented to Congress by Attorney General
Nicholas Katzenbach.468 Katzenbach noted that Congress had thrice in modern times adopted litigation tools as the solution for discriminatory denials
of the right to vote.469 Referring then to the record of Department of Justice
enforcement efforts, he declared: "But three times we have seen that [litigation] alternative tarnished by evasion, obstruction, delay, and disrespect.
The alternative, in short, has already been tried and found wantin§. 'The
47
time of justice,' the President said on Monday ' has now come. "' Thus,
the Voting Rights Act would contain administrative as well as litigation
methods of enforcement, would shift some enforcement away from Southern federal judges to the federal court in the District of Columbia, and
would ban outright the use by Southern states of literacy tests and support471
ing witness requirements.
The very failure of suits such as the Sumter County case to provide
prompt and effective relief became the justification for drastic new administrative remedies-appointment of federal officials to prepare and maintain
472
lists of persons eligible to vote in the covered jurisdictions and to observe
elections,473 and the requirement that changes in voting standards, practices
or procedures in the covered jurisdictions be pre-cleared as nondiscriminatory.474 Appendix A, infra, charts the origins of prominent provisions of the
Act. And the record compiled in these cases of disparate educational opportunities, and abuse of the literacy test and supportin~ witness requirement
4
supported the temporary regional ban on their use. 5 The most damning
evidence was not that some aversive racist registrars discriminated; nor was
it that some aversive racist federal judges denied relief. More important than
either of these facts was the record of well-meaning registrars like Ruby
467.
See Derfner, supra note 466, at 545.
See Hou se Hearings, supra note 101, at 2- 19.
468 .
469.
!d. at 5.
470. !d.
471.
See id. at 2-19.
472.
42 u.s.c. § 1973d (1994).
473. !d. § 1973f.
!d.§ J973c.
474.
475.
President Kennedy had previously noted the abuses of tests and devices but had proposed more
limited corrective action. Special Message to Congress, supra note 462, at 223-24.
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Tartt and Bernard Hines, and of conscientious judges such as Judge
Grooms. 476 Prior laws had required only racial neutrality, but too many local
officials and federal judges had proven unwilling or unable to provide neutrality.
The Fifteenth Amendment had provided a simple formulation: "The
right of citizens of the United States to vote shall not be denied or abridged
by the United States or by any State on account of race, color, or previous
condition of servitude.'"'77 Similarly, the Civil Rights Act of 1870 (also
known as the Enforcement Act), which provided civil and criminal remedies, stated the substantive rule simply, requiring election officials to "give
to all citizens of the United States the same and equal opportunity to perform such prerequisite [to voting], and to become qualified to vote without
distinction of race, color, or previous condition of servitude.'"'78 The 1957
Civil Rights Act had essentially adopted the same formulation. 479 The 1960
Act did not tinker with the substantive formulation; it simply added to judicial power and duty where the government proved an "act or practice" of
racial discrimination in voting or registration.480 Not until the 1964 Civil
Rights Act did Congress attempt to provide a more specific statement of
what constituted unlawful discrimination. 481 Here, for the first time since
Reconstruction, Congress banned some registration practices without specific reference to race. 482 Responding especially to the freezing principle
established in the Department of Justice litigation up to that time, Congress
made it unlawful to deny registration to some applicants by applying different standards, practices, or procedures than had been applied to successful
applicants; it also banned denial of registration for immaterial mistakes
made on the application form, required that any literacy test be conducted
wholly in writing; and made completion of the sixth grade presumptive evi483
dence of literacy . The 1964 Act constituted a tentative, limited step toward recognition that registrars simply could not follow some practices
without discriminating, and that the federal courts needed much more ex484
However, with the gathering storm of official violence
plicit guidance.
and black protest against discrimination, the 1964 Act proved to be too little, too late.
476.
477.
478.
479.

See PELTASON, supra note 158, at 138-42.
U.S. CONST. amend. XV,§ I.
Civil Rights Act of 1870 § 2, ch. 114, 16 Stat. 140.
42 U.S.C. § 197l(a)(l)(l994):
All citizens of the United States who are otherwise qualified by law to vote at any election ..
. s hall be entitled and allowed to vote at all such elections, without distinction of race, color,
or previous condition of servitude; any constitution, law, custom, usage, or regulation of any
State or Territory, or by or under its authority, to the contrary notwithstanding.

/d.
/d. § 197 1(c).
480.
See id. § 1971 (a)(2).
481.
See id.
482.
483.
42 U.S.C. § 1971 (a)(2).This was in substantial accord with recommendations of the Civil Rights
Commission. See House Hearings, supra note 101, at 124-28.
See 42 U.S.C. § 197l(a)(2).
484.
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The Voting Rights Act, enacted the next year, took the logic of the 1964
Act to a striking conclusion.485 It embraced a variety of "effects" tests for
unlawful discrimination: a statistical test to determine which states would be
covered by the special provisions of the Act, bans on various practices that
had the effect of excluding blacks from the vote in covered jurisdictions,
and an effects test for judging the validity of changes in voting practices in
covered jurisdictions.486 Literacy tests, good character requirements, and
supporting witness requirements were forbidden outright in the covered
states.487 In other words, even plainly illiterate individuals must be allowed
to vote if they possessed the qualifications other than literacy.
The federal ban on literacy tests was a truly radical measure. It bypassed a discussion which President Kennedy' s Commission on Registration and Voting Participation had initiated of whether literacy should be a
prerequisite for voting, transforming it into an issue of racial discrimination.488 The Supreme Court had previously upheld the constitutionality of
literacy tests as against a constitutional challenge,489 and Horace Busby, a
close advisor to President Johnson, objected that the ban " might place the
President in the indefensible position of advocating ' illiteracy' as a qualification, rather than a disqualification, for electors.'"'90 Busby worried about
" the incompatibility of an illiterate minority with the successful functioning
of our Democratic system,'"'91 much as Ruby Tartt had. However, the record
in Sumter County and other cases showed that bans on discrimination in the
design or administration of literacy tests were ineffective. Attorney General
Katzenbach argued that Congress had power to outlaw " the use of any practices utilized to deny rights under the 15th [A]mendment.'"'92 And, he argued, the covered states had already, in effect, abandoned literacy as a requirement " by registering illiterate or barely literate white persons.'"'93
494
Eventually, the ban on literacy tests was made permanent, poll taxes
were held unconstitutional,495 the age for voting was lowered to eighteen,496
and other federal laws promoting ease of registration led to virtually universal suffrage. The cases showing how various registration restrictions were
485.
/d. § 1973.
486.
/d.
487.
/d.§ 1973(b).
488.
The majority of the commission had recommended that literacy tests not be a requisite for
voting, arguing that the right to vote "is t he right of every citizen no matter what his formal education ..
. . " REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT' S C OMMISSION ON REGISTRATION AND VOTING PARTICIPATION 40
( 1963). Commissioner Brendan Byrne dissented, arguing that "some minimal standards in knowledge
and understanding are needed to make an intelligent choice at the polls." /d. at 53.
489.
Lassiter v. Northampton County Bd. of Elections, 360 U.S. 45 ( 1959).
490.
Memorandum from Horace Busby to Bill Moyers & Lee White (Feb. 27, 1965). reprinted in 14
C IVIL RIGHTS, THE WHITE HOUSE, AND THE JUSTICE DEPARTMENT: 1945-1968, at 3 (Michal R. Belknap
ed., 1991).
/d. at 4.
49 1.
492.
House Hearings, supra note 101 , at 15.
/d. at 16.
493 .
494.
See Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641 ( 1966).
495.
U.S. CONST. amend. X XN, § I.
496.
U.S. CONST. amend. XXVI.
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improperly manipulated smoothed the way toward universal suffrage. Opponents of the Act were not "willing to make the argument flatly that Negroes shouldn't be allowed to vote,"497 they could not credibly argue that
Southern states were complying with the Fifteenth Amendment and civil
rights acts,498 and so their primary arguments against the proposed Act were
that it was unconstitutiona1499 and that it would promote "political domination by a majority which is illiterate."500
The temporary ban on the use of tests or devices was not the only provision invalidating facially neutral state laws and practices.50 1 Perhaps the
most remarkable provision, the one that Justice Black could not support,
was section five of the Act. Justice Black's objection, however, went to the
procedure-requiring States to come to Washington for approval of changes
in state voting laws. 502 The substantive standard of section five is just as
remarkable. Pre-clearance is to be granted only if the state or subdivision is
able to show that "such qualification, prerequisite, standard, practice, or
procedure does not have the purpose and will not have the effect of denying
or abridging the right to vote on account of race or color. "503 Section five
thus adopts an effects test for the validity of changes in voting practices.504
This test is based on a prophylactic principle: Congress may legislate
against the risk that state law, while neutral on its face, is in fact racially
discriminatory. 505 As the Supreme Court subsequently said, in upholding
section five, Congress knew that some covered jurisdictions "had resorted to
the extraordinary stratagem of contriving new rules of various kinds for the
sole purpose of perpetuating voting discrimination in the face of adverse
federal court decrees."506 Therefore, "Congress had reason to suppose that
these States might try similar maneuvers in the future in order to evade the
497.
Interview by Paige E. Mulhollan with Nicholas D. Katzenbach, Attorney General of the United
21
(Nov.
12,
1968),
available
at
States,
at
http://www.lbjli b. utexas .edu/johnson/archi ves. hom/oralhistory. hom/katzenbach{katzen b ! .pdf (last visited Mar. 5, 2003).
But see Voting Rights Legislation: Joim Statement on S. 1564, Before the Senate Committee on
498.
the Judiciary, 89th Cong. 13-14 (1965) (statement of Charles J. Bloch; individual views of Senators
Eastland, McClellan, and Ervin).
499.
/d. at 2-20 (statement of Charles J. Bloch), /d. at 21-34 (statement of Thomas H. Watson); see
also Katzen bach interview, supra note 497 (transcript at 2 I) ("'(T]hey tried constitutional arguments and
this, that and the other thing.").
500.
Senate Hearings, supra note 85, at 737 (testimony of Frank Mizell on behalf of registrars of
State of Alabama).
501.
See generally Voting Rights Ac t of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89- 110, 79 Stat. 437 (prior to 1970 and
1975 amendments).
502.
/d.§ 5.
503.
42 U.S.C. § 1973c (1994).
504.
/d.
505.
Section three also includes an effects test: Where the Attorney General proves that a "test or
device has been used for the purpose or with the effect of denying or abridging the right ... to vote on
account of race or color," the court is to suspend the defendant's use of tests or devices. Voting Rights
Act of 1965 § 3, 42 U.S.C. § 1973a (1994). Section four, the so-called "bail-out" section, allows j urisdictions covered by the Act's formula to escape coverage by proving that no test or device has been used in
the past five years "for the purpose or with the effect of denying or abridging the right to vote on account
of race or color .. .. " /d. § 4, 42 U.S.C. § 1973b (1994 ).
506.
South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 30 1,335 ( 1966).
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remedies for voting discrimination contained in the Act itself."507 This provision of the 1965 Act would ultimately lead to the imposition of a nationwide "results" standard for judging laws that affect voting rights. 508
VII. CONCLUSION

Civil disobedience can be categorized by the group engaging in it, the
type of action taken, the policy to which the protestors object, or the type of
relief sought. Is the group well defined or amorphous? Are the actors engaged in violence, non-violent but unlawful behavior, or behavior that is
lawful but at odds with custom? Do the protestors object to an unlawful
policy or one that is lawful but perceived as unjust? Are the protestors ' aims
well defined or amorphous? Are they narrow or broad? Are they clearly
linked with the policy that the protestors challenge?
Civil disobedience is an inherently blunt instrument. It can communicate broad messages, but not details. The confrontation at the Edmund Pettus Bridge is a perfect example. It originated with voter registration drives
in Selma and Marion, Alabama. 509 Jimmie Lee Jackson, a black demonstrator in Marion, was killed by an Alabama State Trooper. 510 From the initial
suggestion of a funeral cortege going from Marion to Montgomery came the
idea of a Selma-Montgomery march for voting rights.511 The marchers thus
knew they wanted black voting rights; the Alabama State Troopers and the
Dallas County Sheriff's deputies knew they opposed black voting rights.512
Widespread television and newspaper coverage of what came to be called
"Bloody Sunday" energized the nation, the President, and Congress to "do
something" to ensure black voting rights.513 However, neither the marchers,
nor the mounted wielders of billy clubs, nor the media reporters were communicating the details of what that "something" should be. 514 Many acts of
civil disobedience have resulted in remedial actions that proved to be ineffective because the unfocused nature of the actors' grievances led to unfocused or poorly implemented solutions that lacked popular support. 515 And
507.
Katzenbach, 383 U.S. at 335; see also Brian K. Landsberg, Safeguarding Constitutional Rights:
The Uses and Limits of Prophylactic Rules, 66 TENN. L. REV. 925,938-39 (1999).
508.
See 42 U.S.C. § 1973 (1994); see also THERNSTROM, supra note 450, at 82.
509.
LEWIS, supra note IS, at 31 4-16.
510.
/d.at314-17.
511.
/d. at 318.
/d. at 326.
5 12.
513.
See generally id. at 323-47.
514.
See LEWIS, supra note 15, at 323-47.
515.
For example, the cries of despair that fueled the 1967 riots in large American cities gave rise to
the recommendations of the Kerner Commission. The Commission conveyed a sense of urgency in
recommending programs embracing three principles:
I. To mount programs on a scale equal to the dimension of the problems:
2. To aim these programs for high impact in the immediate future in order to close the gap
between promise and performance;
3. To undertake new initiatives and experi ments that can change the system of fa ilure and
frustration that now dominates the ghetto and weakens our society.
U.S. KERNER COMM'N, REPORT OF THE NATIONAL ADVISORY COMMISSION ON CIVIL DISORDERS 2
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some have resulted in no remedial action at all, because of the lack of clarity
of their message or the lack of a firm foundation for further action.516
The civil disobedience of the blacks of Sumter County to the customary
law of white supremacy took a more subtle form. They simply tried to exercise their rights that were guaranteed by the Constitution. In this, they more
closely resembled Rosa Parks, who took a bus seat that the Constitution said
she could take. In her case, the remedy was to desegregate the buses. The
Civil Rights Acts had designed a simple remedy for the deprivation of voting rights, but a combination of official disobedience and judicial ineffectiveness led to the complex scheme of the Voting Rights Act.
The Department of Justice's focus on letting the remedy flow from the
facts led, I believe, to an unanticipated dividend. The black registration efforts and the Department's voting rights suits in the early 1960s did not pursue a conscious policy of laying the groundwork for either more legislation
or for major changes in race discrimination law. The lawyers developed
theories of the case that were driven by their understandings of the facts.
Defendants helped the process along through actions that required ever
tighter remedial orders. Yet it is hard to envision that the Voting Rights Act
would have taken its particular shape without the foundation created by
these cases. The records in these cases established the existence of widespread discrimination; the failure of some federal district judges to award
effective relief, along with the recalcitrance of some defendants, established
the need for rigid rules and administrative relief. Had there been no cases,
but only the official recalcitrance and the violence at the Edmund Pettus
Bridge, it seems unlikely that Congress would have adopted the effects test,
the freezing principle, federal examiners and observers, the pre-clearance
requirement, or universal suffrage.
The story of racial discrimination resonates with great power if it is
properly told. The road to change in Sumter County included many detours.
Few could have predicted that the end of the road would be legislation as
sweeping and powerful as the Voting Rights Act.

(New York. Bantam Books 1968). While some recommendations were adopted, many of the core conditions that led to the riots continued. See generally ANDREW HACKER, TwO NATIONS, BLACK AND
WHITE, SEPARATE, HOSTILE, UNEQUAL(I992).
516.
For example, the Albany Movement of the early 1960s failed to bring about meaningful progress in desegregation. BRANCH, supra note 42, at 630-3 1. It was late r criticized as having "spread its
demands too broadly." /d. at 631 (describing criticism by Slater King).
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APPENDIX A:
VOTING RIGHTS Acr ANALYSIS
PROVISION OF 1965
VOTI NG RIGHTS Acr

Special coverage
formula,§ 4
Temporary ban on
literacy tests; § 4

PRECURSOR
511
(Sumter case in Italics)
Litigation. "In the problem of racial
discrimination, statistics often tell much,
and Courts listen." 518
Litigation. "Where, as established . .. in
this case, a great majority of one race is
already permanently registered while but
a small minority of the other race has
succeeded in registering, the adoption and
application of new and more stringent
registration requirements or standards,
the effect of which is to perpetuate past
discriminations, are constitutionally impermissible." 520

RATIONALE
Effects probative of
519
discrimination.
Freezing. "[E]ven fair
administration of the
tests, following decades
of discrimination when
most whites were permanently registered
without having had to
pass such tests, would
simply freeze the present registration disparity created by past
violations of the 15th
amendment. As the
courts have made clear,
this is not acceptable.
(See, e.g., United States
v. Louisiana, 380 U.S.
521
145 ( 1965))."
Prophylactic. "[N]ot
capable of fair administration.''522" [N]ot bona
fide qualifications.',s23

5 17.
While I he chart refers extensively to Sumter County, many other cases could be used to make
the same points. See, e.g .. United States v. Strong. 10 Race Rei. L. Rep. 7 10 (M.D. Ala. 1965);-United
Sta~gh. I() R!tce-R~r-L. Rep ..:ro9'j :f£r.-lrllt:-l-965),518.
United States v. Hines, 9 Race Rei. L. Rep. 1332. 1335 (N.D. Ala. 1964) (quoting Alabama v.
United States. 304 F.2d 583 (5th Cir. 1962), affd, 371 U.S. 37 ( 1962)); see Hawk & Kirby, supra note
37, at 1119-34 (discussing the development of this doctrine).
5 19.
"Experience demonstrates that the coincidence of suc h schemes [tests or devices] and low
electoral registration or participation is usually the result of racial discrimination in the administration of
the election process." Senate HeOI·infiS, supra note 85, at 14 (testimony of Attorney General Katzenbach).
520.
Hines, 9 Race Rei. L. Rep. at 1335.
521.
H.R. REP. No. 89-439, at 15 ( 1965).
522.
/d.
/d.
523.
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requirement.

Pre-clearance of
c hanges in voting
practices. § 5
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Litigation. ''The use of the supporting
wimess requiremellt with the present
disproportionate number of registered
Negro voters, as compared to white voters
of approximately ten to one, is in contravemion of Fourteenth and Fifteenth
Amendments ... ." 524 The requirement
"has been strictly applied as to Negroes
525
but not as to whites."
Litigation. Reference to "{t]he more
complicated and burdensome requireme Ills imposed by the present application
form and the stricter standards of grading

.. . ... 526

Prophylactic. Freezing.

Prophylactic. "Barring
one contrivance too
often has caused no
change in result, only
527
in methods." The act
is " necessary to meet
the risk of continued or
renewed violations ...
u528

Pre-clearance suits
must be brought
before District
Court in District of
Columbia

1964 Act had allowed A.G. to seek three
j udge district court in voting rights cases.

Administrative
appointment of
Federal examiners.
§6

1960 Act's Referee provision; Civil
Rights Commission proposals in 1959 and
196 1 for federal registrars; Kennedy
proposal for stronger Referee provision in
529
1963.

Administrative
appointment of
Federal observers.
§8

Force Act of 1871. Leadership Conference
on Civil Rights proposal of April l ,
1965.531

Prophylactic. Record of
some federa l district
courts in South of, at
best, grudging and
ineffective enforcement
of the 1957 and 1960
acts.
Prophylactic. Needed
where registrars e ngage
in slow down, close
offices, or otherwise
530
impede registration.
Federal judges had
failed to make adequate
use of referee provision.
Prophylactic.

524.
Hines, 9 Race Rei. L. Rep. at 1335.
525.
!d. at 1334.
526.
/d. at 1335.
527.
H.R. REP. No. 89-439, at 10 (1965).
/d. at 19
528.
529.
See Hawk & Kirby, supra note 37, at 1062. In addition, one author claims that Burke Marshall.
before he became Assistant Attorney General, had proposed federal registrars in the 1950s, and that
Attorney General Rogers had "converted the suggestion to the tamer one of federal referees." NAVASKY,
Sllf1ra note 52, at 194.
530.
See H.R. REP. No. 89-439, at 16 (1965).
531 .
See House Hearings, supra note 101, at 689-91 (testimony of Roger Wilkins and Joseph Rauh).
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APPENDIXB:
VOTER APPLICATION OF RICHARD WILSON, JR.
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